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Abstract
This research examines the expanding role of public-private partnerships (PPPs or
P3s) in Denver metro transportation projects in three areas: (1) innovative funding and
financing of transit infrastructure projects, (2) the partnerships between freight and
passenger rail services, and (3) emerging collaborations of local governments, transit
agencies, and transportation network companies (TNCs).
The purpose of the first study was to examine the recent use of P3s in the Denver
Regional Transportation District’s (RTD) FasTracks program, a 2004 voter-approved
$4.7 billion transit expansion program. After a shortfall in funding, RTD partnered with
several private consortia to enable the FasTracks program to move forward. Using indepth interviews with key stakeholders and policymakers in the Denver region, I found
that the Eagle P3 commuter rail project and Union Station redevelopment were the most
successful of the Denver P3s, and the FasTrack P3s could serve as a model for transit
infrastructure expansion in other metropolitan regions in the U.S.
The opportunity exists to minimize environmental and social impacts of
expanding passenger rail transit by sharing existing corridors with freight rail operators.
The purpose of the second study was to evaluate existing agreements between freight and
passenger rail services and identify issues, challenges, and best practices of shared-use
corridors. Through in-depth interviews with local experts in shared-use rail corridors, I
found the main issues surrounding FasTrack’s Northwest rail line were the absence of
ii

accurate and timely cost estimates for the line and changing requirements for the shared
track. Overall, the other FasTracks shared-use corridors involved successful negotiations
of right-of-way (ROW) acquisitions. Recommendations include taking advantage of
corridor banking for future rail expansion when possible.
TNCs and public agencies are starting pilot P3 programs in the U.S., and these
new P3s could greatly affect the cost and efficiency of transportation provision. Using
interviews with public and private agencies involved in ridesourcing P3s, the third study
documents the characteristics of two partnerships in the Denver metro region: Go
Centennial and DU Moves. The pilot projects had lower than expected ridership, but the
Go Centennial pilot was identified as a strong proof of concept for future partnerships.
The most common reasons for public agencies to seek out partnerships with TNCs are to
improve first-last mile connections and on-demand services, and reduce single-occupancy
vehicle trips in a cost-effective manner. TNCs also benefit from partnerships through
increasing their brand awareness and creating positive relationships with cities. The role
of the transit agency is changing with the increase in private sector mobility options.
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Chapter One: Introduction to studies in public-private partnerships in U.S.
transportation
Introduction
With population and traffic congestion growing in urban areas throughout the
United States, the demand for transportation infrastructure and transit service
improvements in U.S. cities is growing. However, funding to expand and repair aging
infrastructure is falling due to lack of federal funds, the recent economic crisis, and local
revenue shortfalls. State and local governments are especially susceptible to funding
woes and have increasingly turned to the private sector to fill in funding and service gaps
and accelerate project build-outs. Public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s) have become
more widely utilized in recent years throughout the U.S. as a way to expand
transportation infrastructure and transit services. More research is needed on the
emerging trend of using PPPs in transit infrastructure procurement as well as transit
service provision, especially in the U.S. Research is needed to discern the benefits and
shortcomings of transit PPPs, as well as analyze cooperation between private and public
entities such as transit agencies and local governments, freight rail companies, and ridesourcing services.
This research study examines the nature of PPPs that have been established to
facilitate planning, construction, and operation of several transit and highway projects in
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the Denver metropolitan area. In particular, this research focuses on three areas in which
the Denver metro area is utilizing public-private partnerships: (1) innovative funding and
financing of transit infrastructure projects, (2) the partnerships between freight and
passenger rail services, and (3) emerging collaborations of local governments, transit
agencies, and ride-sourcing transportation network companies (TNCs).
The studies together will address a common theme of transport PPPs in Denver,
and each study will then answer its own research questions and objectives. Overall, the
studies will analyze the role of PPPs in transport in Denver, assess their successes and
failures, and recommend best practices for other agencies and governments looking to
Denver as a potential model for developing transport P3s. The studies utilize in-depth
interviews with experts and stakeholders and survey methods.
This introductory chapter provides a discussion of significance of the studies by
addressing their intellectual merit and broader impacts. Next, I discuss the theoretical
framework of the new mobilities paradigm and neoliberalism that ground each of the
studies. Then, I provide a more in-depth discussion of the methods used in the studies.
Finally, I provide an outline for the rest of the dissertation.
Intellectual Merit
In a recent commentary in the journal Nature, Bruun and Givoni (2015) suggest
six research routes to steer future transport research policy. This study addresses several
of these research avenues. These papers answer their question, what kinds of governance
works for transport systems? Research on the potential of ridesourcing P3s, which are
still in the early stages of interaction with public agencies and regulatory issues, is
especially relevant. The research on ridesourcing P3s also answers the call by Bruun and
2

Givoni (2015) for studies of the long-term impacts of new technologies in transport. The
policy implications of rapid changes in technologies, such as app-based ride-sourcing, are
important to understand. Much of the previous research on transport P3s comes from the
international perspective or focuses on roads, bridges, and tunnels. This research
advances the limited knowledge of U.S. public-private partnerships in transit and transitrelated services.
Broader Impacts
These studies are significant because of the growing involvement of the private
sector in public sector transportation service and infrastructure procurement. Research is
needed to analyze the financial and social costs and benefits of these partnerships and to
provide feedback on the level of success of these P3s for transit agencies to learn from
the innovative practices taking place in Denver. Policymakers, government officials,
agencies, and private investors can use policy and best practice recommendations from
this research to inform their decision-making and policy choices.
Bruun and Givoni (2015) posit the question of how to evaluate the impacts of
transport systems, suggesting that researchers should look beyond the typical economic
cost-benefit analysis to include evaluation of transportation infrastructure and service
based on their impact on social equity, accessibility, and mobility using both quantitative
and qualitative methods. The following research seeks to evaluate the impacts of
transport systems using both qualitative and quantitative methods. This research is
socially relevant because it addresses urban mobility through the lens of social justice and
urban sustainable mobility. Improved and expanded transit infrastructure and service

3

provision addresses some of the social inequalities of urban mobility while also creating
more options for reduced carbon emissions from transportation.
Theoretical framework and contribution to the field
Qualitative approach and new mobilities paradigm
This research contributes to the field of transport geography by bridging the
divide of quantitative and qualitative methods called out by Goetz et al. (2009). Using
in-depth interviews with experts and stakeholders in public-private partnerships, coupled
with data driven results of innovative ride-sourcing partnerships, this research answers
the call for alternative research approaches in transport-related research, bringing it more
in line with other human geography subfields of urban and cultural geography (Goetz et
al 2009). In addition, the following papers address the need to focus on critical transport
geography by examining public policy, social justice, and environmental issues.
These studies are grounded in the social theories of the new mobilities paradigm
and neoliberalism. The field of transport geography has experienced a critical turn,
incorporating and adapting the new mobilities paradigm of sociology (Sheller & Urry
2006). As an example of critical geography, the mobilities turn at its core establishes that
“no mode of transport, infrastructure, or technology can be understood in isolation of its
social and cultural context” (Jensen, 2015, p. 485). The mobilities turn differentiates
travel as merely movement from point a to b from travel as movement that has the ability
to affect different groups economically and socially. This research recognizes this
fundamental concept of the new mobilities paradigm and incorporates the idea that
mobility and transportation studies must consider the socio-political context of transport
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systems. This research delves into the social, political, and cultural context of transit
systems in Denver, Colorado.
Neoliberalism, growth machine, and financialization
According to David Harvey (2007),
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. (p.2)
The theory of neoliberalism underlies the current reductionist government spending and
expansion of the private sector in public policy and financing (Springer et al., 2016).
Neoliberalism incorporates political and economic practices that support free markets and
free trade with privatization and market-driven forces as its bedrocks.
Scholars have articulated the manifestations of neoliberalism in cities through the
development of theoretical frameworks and empirical studies of the impacts of neoliberal
policies. The growth machine theory of Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987) is
used to explain both regional cooperation and conflict in seeking economic development
in an area. The local urban growth machine is typically made up of a city or region’s
elites and entrepreneurs, from both the public and private sector. Their goal, which
benefits themselves as landed elites or their locality through increases in land values, is to
encourage economic growth in a city through land development. Thus, the growth
machine theory can explain and interpret both the increasing regional collaboration
amongst a mix of local and regional elites to bring development to its region as well as
intraregional conflict because of increasing competition between cities for economic
development funding and infrastructure provision. In addition, the local growth machine
5

may also work together to respond to increasing competition from national and global
competition to attract development to its locality. The theory of the city as an urban
growth machine helps to explain the rise of regionalism and the effects of neoliberalism
on local governance in U.S. cities.
Neoliberal policies in urban and transport development have increased the role of
global finance markets at the local level. Financialization, the increasing dominance of
the financial industry in the economy, is on the rise at the country level, but it
increasingly affects local economies. Neoliberalism has been a strong driver of the
globalization of economic markets. More and more, local funding and financing of urban
and transport infrastructure are influenced by credit-rating agencies and global investors.
Neoliberalism in the highway and automobile sector
Transportation provision in the U.S. has primarily been affected by neoliberal
policies through expanded privatization and deregulation. Because of tax revenue
shortfalls due to increased fuel efficiency, a recent decrease in the national vehicle miles
traveled (VMT), and cost inflation, the traditional funding sources of highways are roads
have not met the demand for maintaining and operating the aging road infrastructure.
Neoliberal policies of privatization and free market ideologies have begun to change the
conventional funding mechanisms, and state DOTS are looking to the private sector to fill
in the gap of infrastructure provision. One example of privatization of roads is the
propagation of toll lanes on roads, which charge a user fee to drivers to help pay for the
building and maintenance of that road. The recent propagation of infrastructure PPPs in
the U.S. can be juxtaposed with past public capital infrastructure investments such as the
post-WWII Federal Interstate Highway System.
6

Neoliberalism in the railroad industry
The railroad industry is privatized and has been from its inception, but because
railroads created monopolies in the 1800s and were undermining interest of the public
good, they were subject to extensive government regulations. After increased competition
from trucking and highways diminished the railroad's competitive advantage by the mid20th century, the industry underwent deregulation through the 1980 passage of the
Staggers Rail Act. The railroad network carries both freight and passengers, with the bulk
being freight. As a result of the 1970 Rail Passenger Service Act, the railroad industry
shed much of its unprofitable passenger service, and Amtrak, a government entity, now
provides most of the intercity passenger rail service in the U.S. Because the provision of
railroad infrastructure has historically been the responsibility of a private rail company,
neoliberalism affected the railroad industry to a lesser degree than other modes. Massive
expansion of the current railroad network is not expected in the future because of the high
cost of building out new rail lines. Most of the costs of rail infrastructure provision lie in
the maintenance of existing lines and the creation of new transit and passenger lines,
many within freight rail corridors. Freight rail gets some additional capital through its
partnerships with public transit agencies seeking to expand their operations in freight rail
rights of ways or on freight rail tracks.
Transit service expansion is traditionally funded through additional taxes levied
within the transit district, usually voter-approved. The transit agency, as a public entity,
can also sell tax-exempt bonds to pay off interest on loans they take out for infrastructure
and capital improvements. One challenge to this type of funding is a limit to the transit
agency’s debt capacity. This is where private investor and private equity firms have
7

stepped in to help take some of the debt off of the accounting sheets of transit agencies,
allowing more money to be raised than by the agency alone.
Neoliberalism in public transit
Privatization of transit is not new. The development of the transit industry in the
U.S. was led by streetcars, which were typically owned and operated by private investors
or industry that wanted to facilitate real estate development further out from the city
center (Schweitzer, 2017). These private companies were able to leverage their
investment in the capital costs of the infrastructure because they benefited from their
other investments in real estate and retail along the streetcar lines. Eventually,
competition from the bus and private automobile reduced ridership on streetcars and
eventually buses as well, until the transit companies were taken over by public agencies
because of the need for subsidies to continue their operation. Neoliberal policies of the
1980s repopularized the concept of private sector involvement in providing public transit,
and some agencies began to outsource a portion of their services to private companies.
Through neoliberal restructuring by the legislature beginning in 1988, Colorado now
requires transit agencies to contract a minimum 35% of its operation to the private sector.
Whereas privatization of service provision has become somewhat commonplace
in transit, infrastructure provision is only recently taking advantage of private sector
investment. Financing infrastructure through private equity firms and global investment
companies is one way that transit is being liberalized. Like toll roads, transit agencies are
also experimenting with long-term operation and maintenance agreements with private
companies as well. The Eagle P3 project in Denver is currently the only operating
example of a private-public partnership in transit that includes private financing and a
8

long-term operations and maintenance concession agreement. The Federal Transit
Administration’s (FTA) Penta-P program, which granted funds to the Regional
Transportation District Eagle P-3 rail project, specifically rewarded transit infrastructure
projects that utilized innovative financing with the private sector and encouraged
agencies to explore both disadvantages and advantages of such partnerships. More transit
agencies are exploring the benefits of PPPs and private financing of transit expansion
projects. Innovative financing is necessary as neoliberal policies continue and the
public’s tolerance for tax increases wanes.
Increasingly, the private sector is seeing potential profit in a new market of transit
and transportation service industry, especially as a new generation of young adults is
more interested in alternative transport modes and living car-free. Although contracting
by public transit agencies is not new, this arena is expanding as local transit agencies
begin to look to the private sector to fulfill new transit demand through partnerships with
transportation network companies (TNCs) such as Uber and Lyft. Public-private
partnerships in the building of transportation infrastructure as well as providing financing
of infrastructure is becoming more common because of lack of federal and state funding
and decreased local tax revenue.
Methods
Interviewing as a Methodology
The discipline of geography uses a wide range of methods to answer a wide range
of research questions. Geographers’ research exists along a spectrum of methodologies
utilizing qualitative and quantitative methods, often incorporating multiple or mixedmethod approaches. Geographic methods can also be divided into extensive and intensive
9

methods, the former focusing on breadth of material and subjects versus the latter
focusing on depth. Qualitative methods are interdisciplinary and cannot be claimed by
any one discipline, but are often used by the social sciences, including political science,
sociology, and geography. Qualitative methods are useful for finding out what people
think, know or feel (Secor, 2010) and to answer research questions about social structures
and individual experiences (Winchester and Rofe, 2010).
Interviewing is considered a qualitative and more intensive method because it
involves direct interaction with the research participant (Hoggart, Lees, and Davies,
2002). Interviews have generally been defined as a face-to-face exchange between the
interviewer and informant, whereby the interviewer asks questions to seek out
information or opinions from someone, although the face-to-face aspect is now not
required as some research can be conducted through written email communication or a
telephone interview. Dunn (2010) solved the face-to-face issue by defining interviewing
as “a data-gathering method in which there is a spoken exchange of information” (p.
101).
Interviews are useful to fill a gap in knowledge, investigate complex behaviors
and motivations, collect a diversity of opinion and experiences, and to show respect for
and empower the informants (Dunn, 2010). According to Hoggart et al. (2002),
interviews are “appropriate when research seeks to unravel complicated relationships or
slowly evolving events” (p. 205). In order to reveal these relationships and experiences,
interviewers ask open-ended questions to elucidate detailed descriptions and in-depth
knowledge of the topic. Interviews are most appropriate for research questions that
answer how rather than how many. Interviews can be divided into several types according
10

to Winchester and Rofe (2010) that include the unstructured, semi-structured, structured,
and open-ended focus groups. I primarily use semi-structured interviews in my research,
which allows me to develop open-ended, content-focused questions while still allowing
for flexibility and change during the interview (Dunn, 2010).
Conducting research with members of an elite class can provide unique
opportunities as well as unique problems to consider when compared to interviewing
members of the general population. Sometimes this type of research is also referred to as
“studying up” or the corporate interview. Elites can be defined in several ways and the
definitions vary based on the research arena, business sector, or corporation being
studied. Harvey (2011) defines elites as occupying senior management positions and
being influential decision makers in a company or business sector at the time of research.
Rice (2010) was more practical about determining an elite for his research on urban
regeneration, stating that an elite was someone that has the ability to answer his research
questions. Hunter (1995) uses the term “studying up” to describe the often elevated
social status of elites. Literature exists on the specific nature of interviewing local elites,
especially in policy research, which is what applies to this research (Lancaster, 2017;
Cochrane, 1998; Ward and Jones, 1999; Sabot, 1999). Research utilizing local elites and
policy elites often addresses local economic development and elites are the people who
influence the local decision making processes. In my study, I see an elite as an expert on
the research topic with intimate, local knowledge to answer my research questions.
Recruiting and gaining access
Recruiting participants for elite interviews provides another set of challenges that
may not exist in non-elite research. Often elites can be hard to locate or establish a time
11

of communication. Harvey (2011) points out the need to identify gatekeepers to the elites.
These gatekeepers may include important people such as personal or administrative
assistants who keep the calendars of the elites. In other instances, it is useful to get the
blessing of upper management or first interview the head of the company, which can cast
the interviewer in a positive light to the underlings (Hoggart et al. 2002). Again, in some
cases, it is useful to play up the insider role, while other times the outsider. As Sabot
(1999) found, sometimes a foreign national is more likely to receive a response for an
interview or be granted more access that a local researcher.
Snowball sampling, whereby previous informants recommend potential
interviewees, is often very effective when interviewing elites. It is especially helpful if an
informant can vouch for the researcher by sending an email request to other potential
interviewees. An experienced researcher who has conducted previous studies on a topic
may begin to be seen as an insider by elites and has often developed their own network of
informants to draw from, therefore researchers tend to conduct research where they are
already considered an insider. This strategy can be useful to reduce the barriers to gaining
access to elites. In interviewing local urban elites in politics, transportation, or economic
development, geographers and social scientists work side by side with local elites on
committees, research teams, or other affiliations which can ease access to informants.
The literature does focus on the relative difficulty in accessing elites compared to
the general populations. While it may be true that it is harder to identify people who
would be able to answer a particular research question with a certain level of expertise,
the barriers to access are often overstated in my opinion, especially when talking about
local elites. In particular, politicians who want to show their expertise on a topic are
12

usually not hard to persuade to sit down to talk. On the other hand, if a politician thinks
that your research could be controversial or he or she does not want to take a side, then
the interview request can go unanswered. Most responsive are officials in public or civil
service, especially those working in roles that use tax-payer funding. These officials often
see it as their duty to respond to requests for interview or research and typically are
transparent and open to academics in general. They can also be the most helpful in
linking the researcher to other potential interviewees in other sectors.
Interviewing and the theoretical framework
I believe that no research, whether quantitative, qualitative, or a mixedmethodology, can be declared objective or without bias. The researcher’s positionality
influences the questions asked, methods used, and interpretation of the data. Choosing a
particular method should not be based on the researcher’s affinity for a particular method,
but because the method is the best one to answer the questions being asked. My research
seeks to answer questions about the perceived success of transit operations and
expansions, identify implications and impacts of policy decisions, and ascertain benefits
and limitations of such policies. These questions can best be answered by using
qualitative methods such as interviewing to delve deeper into people’s experiences with
and knowledge of such partnerships. Interviews are not intended to generate a
representative sample of the general population, but rather to explore the nuances and
reasoning behind an informant’s responses and ideas. There is not one definition of
success or a final determination of the winners and losers of public-private partnerships.
We must be critical of such research that claims to provide the definitive answer to such
nuanced questions.
13

The theoretical framework of the new mobilities paradigm supports the use of
interviews because it stresses the fundamental concept that mobility and transportation
studies must consider the socio-political context of transport systems. In-depth interviews
also enable researchers to look beyond the typical economic cost-benefit analysis and
ridership revenue to include evaluation of transportation infrastructure and service based
on their impact on social equity, accessibility, and mobility, key concepts of the new
mobilities paradigm. As a relatively inexperienced researcher who did not have
extensive shared affiliations or networks with the respondents, I relied more on
colleagues’ networks and past research experiences to gain access to the elite informants.
Interpretation of Data: Transcribing and Coding data
Following the preparation and interviewing stage, I began analyzing the interview
data. Most researchers agree about the benefits of recording interviews rather than relying
solely on handwritten notes (which can, however, be an appropriate back-up method and
additional data source). I was able to record all but one interview, since the respondent
requested only notes be taken. Recording interviews allow the researcher to focus on the
responses and engage in appropriate follow-up questions and prompting for more
clarification or elaboration from the interviewee. A written record can be referred back to
as often as needed, without the concern of a faulty memory or misremembering getting in
the way of accuracy.
I transcribed the interviews myself, which enabled me to experience and engage
with data again (often at a slower speed), after the interview (Dunn, 2010). Verbal cues,
silences, and other mannerisms are sometimes lost if a transcription service is used. The
tone of a response, a pregnant pause, or a nervous laugh can sometimes tell a different
14

story than the written response would otherwise indicate (Dunn, 2010). On the other
hand, if a larger number of interviews had been required or if I conducted each of the
studies concurrently, a transcription service would have been vital and may be required
on some studies. For example, the additional time it takes for the researchers to transcribe
the interviews might cause her to reduce the number of interviews she is willing to
conduct because of a research deadline. But all things considered, the value of hearing
the interviews again and revisiting the audio exchange far outweighs drawbacks of the
time-consuming task of transcription.
When presented with the vast amount of transcribed data, the researcher can
sometimes be overwhelmed with words. Systematic coding of the responses allows the
researcher to organize and interpret the data. Coding the responses involves labeling
sentences or ideas using categories or labels, and usually common themes will emerge
from the respondents’ answers. This type of coding can be done by hand, using
highlighters, scissors, and tape for the more tactile learner, or using basic word
processing software to copy, cut, paste, search, and highlight responses. Prior to the
advent of powerful software such as NVIVO, most coding was done this way. NVivo is
an example of a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS).
CAQDAS allows a researcher to import text and code sections of the text with multiple
codes. I utilized word processing and “hands-on” coding. Cutting the coded transcript
excerpts allowed me to experiment with different way to combine and frame excerpts and
to see the interplay of the themes in new ways. Although I have utilized NVivo in past
research, the pen and paper methods to sorting and coding the data worked well for this
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project. The interview questions were fairly straightforward and the studying up
interviews required less creative interpretation of the data.
Dissertation Organization
The following chapters consist of three distinct research projects regarding publicprivate partnerships in the Denver, Colorado metropolitan area. Chapter 2 focuses on
utilizing public-private partnerships for innovative funding and financing of transit
infrastructure projects and is titled Innovative Approaches to Improved Intermodal
Transit Infrastructure Funding and Financing through Public-Private Partnerships: A
Denver Case Study. Chapter 3 looks at the partnerships between freight and passenger
rail services, and is titled Passenger Rail and Freight Rail Partnerships: A Case Study in
Denver, CO. Chapter 4 addresses emerging collaborations of local governments, transit
agencies, and ride-sourcing transportation network companies (TNCs) and is titled:
Public-private partnerships with public transit, local government agencies, and
ridesourcing in Denver, CO. Chapter 5 provides a summary of the research projects and a
conclusion about public-private partnerships in transportation in general.
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Chapter Two: Innovative Approaches to Improved Transit Infrastructure Funding
and Financing through Public-Private Partnerships: A Denver Case Study
Introduction
Cities across the United States are grappling with a looming transportation crisis
as a result of ever-increasing passenger and freight transport demands and overburdened
networks of aging infrastructure. All levels of government, but particularly state and local
governments, need to develop innovative funding and financing mechanisms to maintain
and enhance transportation infrastructure. Public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s) have
increasingly been utilized in a number of cases to help address ongoing shortfalls in
public infrastructure funding, and to accelerate project build-out.
This research analyzes the increasingly important role of PPPs in transit
infrastructure provision in the Denver, Colorado, metropolitan region. It examines five
PPP projects in the Regional Transportation District (RTD) voter-approved FasTracks
program: Eagle P3 commuter rail; Denver Union Station redevelopment; U.S. 36 bus
rapid transit; I-225 light rail; and North Metro commuter rail. Each of these transit
projects has employed some form of a public-private partnership to facilitate RTD’s
transit expansion, and I discuss the nature of each P3 agreement. The Denver metro area
is seen as a model for regional collaboration and innovation in transit funding and
financing through public-private partnerships (Jonas, Goetz, Brady, 2019). The Regional
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Transportation District in Denver is the first transit agency in the U.S. to use a full
design-build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) P3 contract for transit infrastructure.
Using in-depth interviews and surveys with key stakeholders and decisionmakers, I analyze the financial and social benefits of the projects for the public and
private partners as well as the Denver community at large. I examine the impact of P3s
on regional collaboration and the delivery of public information. I also discuss the
benefits and shortcomings of using the P3 delivery method and the extent to which
Denver’s use of PPPs can serve as a model for other transit agencies seeking alternative
procurement methods.
Research Questions
•

What is the role of public-private partnerships in transit infrastructure provision in
Denver, CO?

•

To what degree have the transit PPPs in Denver been successful or not?

•

Could the Denver P3s serve as models for other agencies seeking to expand
transit infrastructure?

Literature Review
Transport PPPs in the U.S.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been used widely throughout the world to
deliver many types of infrastructure. The United States (U.S.) has lagged behind the
international community in its use of PPPs. Nevertheless PPPs are becoming increasingly
popular in the U.S. as a tool for leveraging funds by cash-strapped state and local
transportation agencies. Between 1989 and 2011, 81% of the 104 transportation publicprivate partnerships in the U.S. were for highways, bridges, and tunnels, and only 19%
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of transport PPPs were for rail transit projects (Istrate and Puentes, 2011). Most of the
transit PPP research has focused on international transit projects (for a review of
international light rail P3 1 projects, see Mandri-Perrott, 2009). The list of transit P3s in
0F

the U.S. is small but growing (see a summary of U.S. transit P3s in Thomas, 2014), and
more transit and transportation agencies are interested in pursuing them to expand their
transit infrastructure. Papajohn et al. (p. 127, 2011) found that of the 32 U.S. states that
responded to their survey, 25 had either experienced, were currently adopting or had
plans to implement transportation PPPs in the future, while only 7 stated they do not plan
to pursue them. With the increasing interest in utilizing the private sector in transit
infrastructure delivery, more research is needed on the implementation of transit-specific
P3 projects in the U.S, especially long-term concessions (i.e., those typically covering 20
or more years) that include a financing element. 2
1F

PPPs are defined in different ways by different entities. Typically, PPPs are
comprised of a consortium of private sector firms, which is under a contract with a public
authority to deliver and/or finance the infrastructure in question. The definition that most
applies to transit PPPs discussed in this paper is from the U.S. Department of
Transportation (USDOT). The USDOT defines PPPs as a form of procurement.
According to the USDOT’s 2004 Report to Congress on Public-Private Partnerships
(cited in FHWA, 2007)

1

I use the terms PPPs and P3s interchangeably throughout the chapter but they are referring to the same
thing.
2
DBOM and DBFO(M) contracts, as described in this section, typically include an operating and
maintenance agreement of 25 years or more according to USDOT (2004). O’Steen and Jenkins further
describe DBOM contracts as averaging between 15-25 years and DBFO averaging about 20 years, with
some as long as 50 years (for example the U.S. 36 toll lane project discussed here).
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A public-private partnership is a contractual agreement formed between public
and private sector partners, which allows more private sector participation than is
traditional. The agreements usually involve a government agency contracting with
a private company to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a
facility or system.
Private sector financing does not have to be included as a component of the PPP, but
innovative financing has become more prevalent in recent years. This research project
looks at financing in particular as a component of PPPs in Denver.
PPPs can take several forms and the most common in transit procurement are:
design-build (DB) and design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) (Thomas, 2014). In the
U.S., design-build contracts made up 62% of the total transport PPPs from 1989-2011,
and DB is also the most common for highway projects (Thomas, 2014). These are
considered “alternative methods” of project delivery because they differ significantly
from the more traditional design-bid-build method of contracting (Thomas, 2014). In a
design-bid-build project, the public agency has more control over the design of the
infrastructure. The agency either designs it themselves or contracts out the design
according to their precise specifications, then companies bid on the construction of that
project. In the DB and DBOM models, the public agency develops certain performance
specifications for the project, and the detailed design is left up to the private groups who
bid for it. This allows more flexibility for the private sector to utilize efficiencies and
develop innovative ways ideally to decrease the cost of the project. DBOM then adds
operations and maintenance responsibilities to the contract, which is usually for a longerterm of 15 or more years. One advantage of including operate and maintain (O&M) in
the PPP is to incentivize the private sector to produce a high quality project because it
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will also be paying for the operating and maintenance costs over time. The HudsonBergen light rail system in NJ is an example of the DBOM model.
Financing can also be added to these alternative delivery methods whereby the
private sector brings in equity or takes on some of the debt burden of the project. The
public entity will use revenue generated from the project (usually farebox or toll revenue)
to pay the private sector or issue availability payments over the course of the O&M
period. A full design-build-finance-operate-maintain or DBFOM delivery method can
further transfer financial risk to the private sector as well as generate life-cycle cost
savings (Thomas, 2014). The Denver Eagle P3 project is the first full transit DBFOM in
the U.S. The Maryland Purple Line is being modeled after the Eagle P3 project and is in
the early stages of development.
The benefits of using P3s to procure new transportation infrastructure have been
identified in several research articles and federal publications. P3s are expected to
deliver projects faster and at a lower price than traditional methods (see next section)
(FHWA, 2007). The on-budget on-time expectation was tested by the National Audit
Office of the U.K. (NAO, 2003), which found that only 24% of PPP projects were
delivered late compared to 70% of projects delivered by traditional methods. The NAO
(2003) study also found that budgets were exceeded in 22% of PPPs versus 73% of
traditional procurements.
Increased innovation and expertise from the private sector in the construction and
operation phases is another benefit of PPPs. Proponents argue that innovation leads to a
better quality product at a lower cost (Thomas, 2014 p. 6; Papajohn et al., 2011, p. 130131). PPPs can also stretch limited capital funds of an agency by allowing it to finance a
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project over a longer period of time, as well as utilize private financing and capital to
build more transportation infrastructure than through public financing alone. P3s also
have the potential to allocate appropriately some risks to the private sector (FHWA,
2007). Interestingly, Papajohn, et al. (2011) found in their survey that 57% of U.S. states
implemented PPPs because of financing reasons, while 21% used PPPs for cost-saving
reasons. None of the states identified risk transfer as the reason for setting up a PPP.
Measuring and quantifying these benefits is not always easy, and the extent to which a
state or agency realizes these benefits is project-specific.
There are also potential drawbacks to consider when it comes to choosing to
conduct a transportation project as a P3. The initial costs at the bidding stage and other
transaction costs are much higher for a P3 because of the need to hire experts in P3
contracts (Valila, 2005; Vining et al., 2005). Critics of P3s also have concerns about the
loss of public accountability when the private sector takes over the operation of a public
asset (Siemiatycki, 2006; Forrer et al., 2010). Some people are concerned that profit
maximization will come at the expense of the public good. Siemiatycki (2006) analyzed
the Canadian Richmond-Airport-Vancouver (RAV) urban rail line PPP and found that it
did not deliver on expected benefits such as limiting cost escalations and producing
technological innovation. P3s are not a viable alternative of infrastructure delivery in all
cases; a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to assess the viability of a project to be
conducted as a P3 (Reinhardt and Utt, 2012).
Much of the research on transport PPPs comes from the evaluation of
international projects (e.g. Transport Reviews 2015 special issue on PPPs, Banister,
2016). Previous research on transport PPPs in the U.S. has focused mainly on toll roads
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and highway infrastructure (e.g. Van der Hilst, 2012), which is where the majority of P3
funds are spent (Istrate and Puentes, 2011). These studies, however, are somewhat
applicable to transit PPPs because the contracts are often modeled after toll road PPP
contracts, according to our interviews. Papajohn et al. (2011) stated that innovative
financing is usually involved in P3s. According to our research, the experts tended to
agree that a “full P3” has to include financing, and DB contracts are becoming the
standard procurement method. More research is needed on transit-specific P3 projects in
the U.S., especially those that include financing, such as the Eagle P3 transit project in
Denver.
Study area and background on Denver’s transit PPP projects
In November 2004, voters in the Denver-Aurora and Boulder metropolitan areas
approved a 0.4% increase in the regional sales tax to support the FasTracks rail transit
program, which would add 122 miles of light and commuter rail transit to Denver’s
existing 35-mile light rail system. FasTracks would expand rail transit into six new
corridors, including a new link to Denver International Airport, extend three existing
corridor lines, complete a bus rapid transit line to Boulder, and refurbish Denver Union
Station into a multimodal transportation hub for intercity and regional rail and bus
service. At an initial cost of $4.7 billion, the FasTracks project was at the time one of the
largest urban rail transit construction programs in the U.S.
However, delays in construction soon led to an increase in the costs of the
FasTracks projects. Between 2003 and 2008, construction material costs rose much faster
than RTD had predicted. The global economic crisis of 2007-2008 greatly affected the
regional economy in Denver, and sales tax revenues were not as large as originally
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projected. By 2012, the cost estimate for FasTracks completion rose to $7.4 billion. As
regional officials looked to the federal government to cover the growing gap in funding,
it was clear that further measures were required. In 2007, the FTA had launched its
Public Private Partnership Pilot Program (Penta P) to encourage transit agencies to
explore how P3s could reduce risk on federally funded projects. Denver RTD was one of
three agencies selected for the program and the only one that continued with it. In May of
2011, the FTA awarded a $1.03 billion fully-funded grant to the RTD for the completion
of three major corridors in the FasTracks system. A key factor in the FTA’s decision was
the RTD’s commitment to creating a new public-private partnership to deliver the project
in a timely and cost effective fashion. In awarding the money to Denver, the head of the
FTA, Peter Rogoff, praised the RTD’s plans as a “model of private-sector involvement in
transportation” (cited in Lieb, 2011). The creation of a P3 having access to nontraditional sources of capital was a centerpiece of the RTD’s plan.
The successful completion of the FasTracks system is hindered only by the
Northwest rail line. Because of the increased construction and right-of-way costs,
decreased sales tax revenue, and lack of a federal funding, the Northwest commuter rail
line to Boulder and Longmont was sacrificed to get the rest of the system built. The Eagle
P3 agreement did enable the first six miles of the Northwest rail to be built to
Westminster. RTD officials have put a date of 2042 on the completion of the Northwest
rail line. They are legally bound by the FasTracks legislation to build the line, but they do
not have the financial ability to pay for it without a tax increase 3. This has caused some
2F

3

For more information about the cost estimates and shared-use agreements for the Northwest rail corridor,
see chapter 3.
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tension between regional stakeholders in Boulder and Longmont who voted for the sales
tax, but who are not getting their rail line. Improvements in the bus service along U.S. 36
were implemented as part of the toll road P3 instead.
Making a P3: The Eagle P3 Project
An example of a new generation P3, the Eagle P3 project in Denver is described
as “an innovative financing and project delivery method in which a public entity partners
with the private sector on a public infrastructure project” (RTD, 2015a). Central to the
Eagle P3 project is the delivery and completion of three key components of the FasTracks
project (see Table 1), namely, the East Rail Line (now the A-line) and the Gold Line
(now the G-line) (which together comprise the main East-West extension) and the first
segment of the Northwest Rail Line (B Line), along with the Commuter Rail
Maintenance Facility (a site for storing and maintaining the commuter rail vehicles that
serve parts of the FasTracks system). These lines are significant because they connect
downtown Denver to major urban edge developments, including Stapleton and Denver
International Airport (DIA), as well as the cities of Aurora, Arvada, Wheat Ridge and
South Westminster (Figure 1). They are integral to ongoing regional efforts to retrofit
mass transit to the new metropolitan geography of urban development, to promote smart
growth, and to encourage transit-oriented developments throughout the Denver region.
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Figure 1: RTD map of Eagle P3 rail project. Author: S. Brady, Source: RTD FasTracks
2015a.
Table 1: Major transit corridors covered by the Eagle P3 PPP project (Source: RTD, 2015c)
Corridor name

Distance
(miles)

Corridor description

Local jurisdictions and
major developments served

East Rail Line (A
Line)

22.8

Electric commuter rail linking
Denver Union Station and Denver
International Airport (DIA)

City/County of Denver,
downtown Denver, DIA

Gold Line (G Line)

11.2

Electric commuter rail linking
Denver Union Station and Wheat
Ridge

City/County of Denver,
Adams County, Arvada,
Wheat Ridge

Northwest Line
(first segment only)
(B Line)

6.2

Electric commuter rail linking
Denver Union Station and
Westminster

City/County of Denver,
Westminster
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The Eagle P3 Project is described as a “Design, Build, Finance, Operation and
Maintenance (DBFOM) project” (FasTracks 2015c), meaning it involves all stages from
project construction to financing and maintenance. Some $2.2 billion in capital has been
committed to the project, which is comprised of $1.03 billion in grant funding from the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA), regional sales tax bonds, and private equity of at
least $450 million raised by the private consortium, Denver Transit Partners [DTP] (see
Table 2; RTD FasTracks, 2015a, 2015c). The RTD makes payments to the private
partners over the lifetime of the project whilst retaining ownership of all assets relating to
the FasTracks system. Phase 1 of the project began in August 2010. The remaining
construction phase of the project (Phase 2) was completed in 2016. While the A-line
portion of the project opened as scheduled in 2016 and the B Line in July of 2016, the Gline was significantly delayed. The G-line was delayed for over 2 years, until April of
2019, because of crossing-gate issues that also affected the A-line and B-line. DTP (the
private consortium) will continue to operate the project thereafter and for the remainder
of its contracted lifetime of 29 years.
Who are the partners in the Eagle P3 project? DTP represents a consortium of
private concessionaires, including Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 4 Denver Rail (Eagle) Holdings,
3F

which is a subdivision of John Laing PLC, 5 and Aberdeen Infrastructure Investments, a
4F

4

Fluor Corporation is a Fortune 500 global engineering and construction firm headquartered in Irving,
Texas. In 2013, it employed more than 40,000 worldwide and earned revenues of $27.4 billion (Reuters,
2015).
5
John Laing PLC specializes in raising capital for transportation, renewable energy, and social infrastructure
projects involving state-led PPPs in the UK, Europe, Asia, the Pacific, and North America (John Laing,
2015). In the last 30 years, it has invested in more than 100 such projects worldwide, including most recently
the I-4 Ultimate Highway project in Florida, which is financed by a combination of debt equity and a loan
provided by the US Department of Transportation under its Transportation Infrastructure Finance and
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unit of Aberdeen Global Infrastructure Partners LP (DTP, 2015). 6 John Laing and
5F

Aberdeen Infrastructure Investments are the majority partners in DTP, each with a 45%
interest (John Laing, 2015). 7 Concessionaire arrangements legally bind together the Eagle
6F

P3 project into a consortium, but it is important to note that this arrangement has already
undergone some significant changes over the course of the project.
Funding source

Amount ($US millions)

Regional: RTD funds including bonds raised against
regional sales tax revenue

684

Federal: Federal Transit Administration Grant

1,030

Global: private equities and revenue bonds

486

Total investment in Eagle P3 project

2,200

Table 2: Sources of capital funding for Eagle P3 (data sources: various including RTD
FasTracks, 2015a, 2015c).

Other P3 FasTracks Projects
Besides Eagle P3, the FasTracks program is being delivered through four other
types of P3 arrangements. I describe and discuss each of these arrangements in turn
below.

Innovation Act (TIFIA) program (see http://www.laing.com/project_portfolio/109/145/i-4-ultimatehighway-project-florida-us.html).
6

Aberdeen Global Infrastructure Partners LP is a collective investment scheme registered in the island of
Guernsey, a recognized tax haven for UK-based investors. Aberdeen invests in global infrastructure projects,
which are underpinned by long term secure government contracts that generate stable cash flows (The
Hedge Fund Journal, 2014).

7

Other members of the Eagle P3 consortium are Balfour Beatty Rail Inc., ACI, Ames Construction, and
HDR.
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Figure 2: Original FasTracks program map (source RTD, 2004)
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P3 project

Aims

Partners

Denver Union Station
• Eight-track
commuter rail
station
• Relocation of light
rail station
• 22-bay underground
bus concourse
• MetroRide
downtown circulator
• Renovation of
historic Union
Station building
with hotel, retail,
and dining

Create dense,
mixed-use transitoriented
development around
the station

RTD, DRCOG,
CDOT, City
and County of
Denver, Union
Station
Neighborhood
Company,
Kiewit

U.S. 36 bus rapid transit/
HOT lanes
• Bus rapid transit
(BRT) Flatiron flyer
service
• Express HOV and
toll lanes
• U.S. 36 Bikeway
• Intelligent
transportation
system solutions
I-225 light rail
• 10.5 mile light rail
line through Aurora

North Metro commuter rail
• 18.5 mile electrified
commuter rail from
Denver Union
Station to
Northglenn

Create an
intermodal hub for
light rail, commuter
rail, Amtrak, bus,
taxi, pedestrians,
and bikes
Renovate historic
Union Station
building
To reduce
congestion on U.S.
36 corridor
Offer transportation
choices

Provide connectivity
to major activity and
employment centers
in Aurora
Provide key regional
access to East and
Southeast rail lines
Connect downtown
to Northglenn in the
first segment

Funding
sources
RRIF and TIFIA
loans,
FHWA grant,
ARRA grant,
FTA grant,
Senate Bill 1
(CO) funds
RTD property
sales and
FasTrack funds

Type of
P3
DBF

CDOT, RTD,
HPTE, Plenary
Roads, Aims
Granite Joint
Venture

RTD funds,
TIGER grant
(USDOT),
Colorado Bridge
Enterprise funds,
DRCOG,
TIFIA loans,
CDOT funds

DBFOM

RTD, Kiewit

RTD FasTrack
funds

DB

RTD, Graham
and Balfour
Beatty Rail
(Regional Rail
Partners)

RTD FasTrack
funds

DB

Table 3: Overview of P3 projects in the FasTracks program (sources: RTD 2016 a,b,c,d;
FHWA 2014, n.d.; CDOT 2012, 2014; Khorkhyrahova 2013; Lien 2014; USDOT 2016)
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Denver Union Station
Denver Union Station (DUS) is different from the other FasTrack transit P3
projects because it utilized innovative financing through real estate and development
value. The DUS public-private partnership included four public agencies, RTD,
Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT), Denver Regional Council of
Governments (DRCOG), the City and County of Denver, and one private group, Union
Station Neighborhood Company (USNC), a joint venture of Continuum and East West
Partners. The private sector was engaged in the project as a “master developer.” DUS is
the intermodal hub of the RTD transit network, where light rail, commuter rail, bus
operations, and Amtrak service all converge. In addition, the historic union station
building and great hall were refurbished, and now house a boutique hotel and very
popular retail and dining options.
The financing of DUS came from several sources including federal and state
grants, property sale proceeds, and federal TIFIA and Railroad Rehabilitation and
Improvement Financing (RRIF) loans. The money to repay these loans came from
FasTracks sales tax revenue and TIF revenue. DUS opened the light rail facilities in
2011, the bus concourse and great hall in 2014, and commuter rail service began in 2016.
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Funding source

Amount ($US
millions)

Federal: Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan

155

Federal: TIFIA loan

145

Federal: FHWA grant (CDOT)

50

Federal: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds (ARRA) (DRCOG and
RTD)

28.6

Federal: Federal Transit Administration Grant

9.6

Federal: Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) funds (DRCOG and RTD)

2.5

State: Senate Bill 1 (CO)

18.6

Regional: Property sale proceeds (RTD)

37.4

Total investment in Union Station project

446

Table 4: Sources of capital funding sources for Denver Union Station (data sources: FHWA
n.d.; Khokhryahova 2013; Lien 2014; USDOT 2016; RTD 2016a).

U.S. 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Also known as the Flatiron Flyer, the bus rapid transit service operated by RTD
runs 18 miles between Boulder and Denver Union Station. In conjunction with the BRT
expansion, CDOT entered into a PPP agreement with Plenary Roads and the HighPerformance Transportation Enterprise 8 (HPTE) within CDOT to expand highway
7F

capacity on U.S. 36 by building High-Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes. The BRT service
was included in the original FasTracks plan in conjunction with CDOT’s highway
improvements. The BRT and toll lanes began service in 2016.

8

The High-Performance Transportation Enterprise is a government-owned business within CDOT that was
formed to pursue innovative means of more efficiently financing important surface transportation
infrastructure projects.
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Funding source

Amount ($US millions)

Federal: TIGER Grant

4.8

Federal: TIFIA Loan

54

State: CDOT Bridge Enterprise

41.5

State: CDOT federal/ state grant

41.4

Regional: DRCOG federal funds

46.6

Regional: RTD funds

112.1

Local funds and other

12

Total investment in U.S. 36 improvements

312.4

Table 5: Sources of capital funding for U.S. 36 improvements (data sources: FHWA 2014,
CDOT 2012, CDOT 2014, RTD 2016d).

I-225 light rail line (R-line)
The I-225 light rail line is 10.5 miles and connects the Southeast and East (A-line)
rail lines through Aurora, Colorado. It was built as a design-build agreement with
Kiewit, who put in an unsolicited bid in 2012. Kiewit is the same contractor who
completed in 2006 the Southeast Corridor light rail line along I-25 and I-225 (up to
Parker Road) as part of the $1.7 billion TRansportation EXpansion (T-REX) design-build
project that also widened those highways. Because Kiewit had previous experience with
building light rail in the same corridor, it was able to generate a bid that was lower than
RTD cost estimates for that corridor. The I-225 line opened in 2017.
North Metro commuter rail line (N-line)
The North Metro (N Line) electric commuter rail project is a proposed 18.5 mile
line from Denver Union Station to Thornton, Colorado, with 13 miles currently under
construction and due to begin service in the early 2020s. In 2013, RTD received an
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unsolicited proposal to construct the line, then opened a competitive bidding process and
awarded a design-build contract to Regional Rail Partners (RRP) (RTD, 2016b). The
private group is a Joint Venture of Graham and Balfour Beatty Rail.
Research methods
This research utilizes multiple methods to accomplish the principal objectives of
the study. First, I conducted a desktop analysis of transportation and transit publicprivate partnerships in the U.S. Second, I conducted a survey and a sample of face-toface interviews with at least twenty strategic actors and policymakers in Denver to elicit
their views on the structure and nature of the transit PPPs in the region. I conducted the
surveys face-to-face to control its dissemination and preserve the quality of the data.
Interviewees were identified through personal knowledge and snowball sampling.
I sought to gather a variety of perspectives in the interviews, with responses from
members of the business community, local, state, and federal government, community
and advocacy groups, transit agency representatives, and private contractors.
I then input the survey responses into survey analysis software called Qualtrics. I
used this software to analyze the survey data and generate summary statistics for the
close-ended survey questions. The survey used a Likert-type scale for close-ended
questions, and the survey also included several open-ended questions. I report the
descriptive statistics, such as mean, maximum, and minimum values on a Likert scale,
and the percentage of responses for each choice. I audio recorded, transcribed, and
coded the interview responses to identify common themes. The methods and the survey
are approved by the University of Denver’s Institutional Research Board.
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Discussion of Results
Measuring the success of P3 projects in Denver
This section assessed the success of P3 projects in Denver, drawing on the results
of the survey and interviews with key stakeholders. I have included brief quotes by
interviewees in a fashion that respects the anonymity of respondents.
Effectiveness in addressing transportation needs in the Denver region.
Respondents rated Denver Union Station, US 36 BRT, and the Eagle P-3 projects
as the most effective at addressing transportation needs in the region. One interviewee
responded that there should be a category for “beyond extremely favorable” for Denver
Union Station because of the incredible transformation that has taken place in Lower
Downtown around the station. DUS is the multimodal hub of the RTD transit network,
with connections to bus, light rail, commuter rail, Amtrak, taxis, and bike and pedestrian
routes. The Eagle P-3 is also highly ranked, but with three corridors included in the
project, some are better at meeting transportation needs than others. The A-line to
Denver International Airport is seen as the most effective line in the Eagle project
because of its access to the airport and the ability to bring in economic benefits. US 36
was previously a widely used transit corridor, and the BRT and lane improvements have
already produced increases in ridership and reduced travel time along the corridor for
both drivers and transit users.
I-225 (R Line) and the North Metro Line (N Line) were also expected to meet
transportation needs effectively, but to a lesser degree. Both lines will increase
connectivity in the region, however, the I-225 line deviates from a straight alignment
with the interstate to serve areas in Aurora’s downtown and the Fitzsimmons Medical
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Center. These alignment issues will result in increased travel time on the rail, making it
tougher to compete with the automobile. The North Metro line is expected to have lower
ridership than other corridors with less frequent service, but it will fill a void in the
system because there is currently no alternative for people traveling on I-25 to the north.
The rail line is also competing with the exclusive bus and HOT lane on I-25, so it may be
less effective than that option at meeting transportation needs.
Financial benefit to involved parties
Financial benefit to RTD. The respondents were careful to point out that as a
transit agency, RTD does not financially profit from running their services. The financial
benefit of a P3 comes in the way of “bang for the buck” in spending on transit projects.
All of the P3 projects came in under the internal cost estimates for RTD to complete the
projects themselves so they are mostly viewed as financially favorable for RTD. The
projects with a full P3 financing structure are viewed as providing the most financial
benefit for RTD. The Eagle P3 project came in $300 million below internal cost
estimates, and that savings was redirected to other projects, including the I-225 and North
Metro lines. The actual debt rates for the private financing were higher than RTD could
have raised itself, but the projected savings and benefit come from financing over a
longer timeframe, which again allows RTD to fund more projects and accelerate the
delivery of the FasTracks program. In addition, the private equity that was used to
finance a quarter of the Eagle project reduced the debt burden of RTD so they can
complete the other projects. The FTA full-funding grant agreement awarded points for
cost effectiveness or "bang-for-buck" efficiency, and the P3 financing structure helped
RTD score well on that part of FTA’s assessment for federal funding.
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Denver Union Station produced the highest return on RTD’s investment
according to some experts because RTD ended up getting a half a billion-dollar project
for half the cost. RTD was able to make use of the real estate value of their property
surrounding the station to fund DUS and also make use of federal loans and private sector
investment. Therefore RTD had to invest less upfront cash to complete the project. The
revenue from DUS tax increment financing (TIF) is already ahead of performance
schedule to pay back the TIFIA loans.
A few people saw the US BRT project as financially unfavorable for RTD
because it did not add much to the service while sacrificing a lot of political goodwill.
Most people, however, recognized its benefit to RTD as favorable because they were able
to leverage about $200 million in investments to get $500 million in improvements
through the P3. Several interviewees stated that they would not have been able to do the
BRT without partnering with CDOT and the private partners. One even saw this as the
best financial deal for RTD because of the comparatively low investment in exchange for
high quality of service improvements on a much faster timetable than without the P3.
While the I-225 and North Metro lines were not viewed as favorably as the others,
they still came in below internal costs through unsolicited bids. The I-225 bid was over
$90 million below cost estimates. Any time the transit agency works with the private
sector, even on a design-build contract, they should see cost benefits because the private
sector is motivated by profits to save money.
Financial benefit to the private consortium. Overall, the financial benefit for the
private consortium involved in the P3 projects is generally favorable. Respondents were
more conservative in their assessment of the concessionaire’s finances because most
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respondents (except for representatives from the private consortium) have no real way to
know if they are making money, but the general consensus is that they are. The global
investment firms involved in the Eagle P3 have experience with these types of long-term
infrastructure projects and are looking for a “steady, long stream revenue source with
fairly predictable and manageable risk” for investors like the California school board
retirement group and the Australia Teachers Union. The consensus is that DTP got “a
good deal, but not a smoking deal,” and “nobody is walking away broke,” even with
significant unexpected expenses for the private sector, such as having to rebuild the
Jersey Cutoff bridge in the Eagle P3 project at the cost of $10 million. 9
8F

The most important factor for DTP to make money on the Eagle project was to
complete the project on time in order to begin receiving availability payments to service
their debt. Although construction was completed on time, all lines were not in service
according to the anticipated schedule. Since the interviews for this research were
conducted before all of the Eagle P3 lines entered into revenue service, the responses
were colored by the assumption that the lines would open on-time. There have since been
several battles of the contract agreement and payments because of several issues relating
to increased costs of operation and delayed opening of the G line. The A-line and B-line
opened on-time in April of 2016 and July of 2016 respectively, but the lines were
operating under a waiver from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) for safety
issues with the crossing gates. The Eagle P3 lines were the first rail transit lines to
9

This bridge goes over the BNSF railway tracks just south of I-70 along the Gold line/ Northwest line
alignment in the Eagle P3 project (Source: Eagle P3 update presented at RTD board update Sept. 2, 2014:
http://rtd.iqm2.com/Citizens/Detail_LegiFile.aspx?Frame=&MeetingID=1954&MediaPosition=&ID=2051
&CssClass=).
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implement wireless signaling to the crossing gates, and it was integrated with the
federally mandated positive train control (PTC) technology 10. As a first of its kind
9F

system, there have been glitches. According to the FRA, the crossing arms were going
down too soon and staying down too long. The waiver from the FRA requires DTP to
station human flaggers at every grade crossing, and DTP has continued to do so on and
off for over three years. While the exact cost to station flaggers at road crossings for
nearly 24 hours a day for three years is not known, it is estimated that tens of millions of
dollars have been spent by DTP to keep the A-line in operation. In addition, RTD has
withheld over six million dollars from the availability payments to DTP for failure to
meet contract terms in getting the G line open. Because of the issues at the crossing
gates, the G line opening was delayed until April of 2019, and it is also operating with
flaggers under the FRA waiver. In the fall of 2018, DTP sued RTD for $80 million
dollars for reimbursement of the costs of the flaggers and withheld payments, arguing
that federal regulations changed, and they should not be liable for the additional costs due
to FRA’s decision (Minor, 2019). RTD has threatened to end its contract with DTP and
countersued DTP for millions of dollars, claiming they have defaulted on their contract
and rushed the testing phase of operation. The net effect on the private sector partner’s
finances is not known, but it is clear that their operation costs have increased and the
delayed opening of the G-line has affected their access to the availability payments from
RTD, enough to warrant a lawsuit.

10

Positive Train Control was mandated by Congress in the 2008 Rail Safety Improvement Act. The
technology is designed to automatically stop a train to avoid accidents. For more information see:
https://www.aar.org/campaigns/ptc/
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Denver Union Station was assessed somewhat more favorably for the financial
benefit of the private sector because the property values of the real estate that was sold
around the station is publicly known and published in the newspapers. The successful
and explosive redevelopment of Lower Downtown (LoDo) is evident to everyone. A
representative of the private master developer, however, did comment that while the
private group ended up averaging out to make a profit, it was only due to market
conditions and not from any money that RTD was paying them. The real estate
developers had a difficult time early on when the real estate market was still recovering
from the 2007-8 financial crisis, and they had to wait until the end of the deal to realize
any profits. They assumed a lot of risk, but ended up making money with a combination
of historical luck and effective solutions of the transit hub problem.
The US 36 toll lane project financials remain to be seen, and it is really too early
to tell what toll revenues will be. Many respondents think this will be one of the last toll
road projects that transfers the toll revenue risk to the private sector because toll project
revenue projections can be “wildly inaccurate.” Recently, several large U.S. toll road
projects have gone bankrupt, notably the Indiana Toll Road in 2014 and the Texas Toll
Road/ SH 130 in 2016. The private sector is increasingly less likely to bear the toll
revenue risk in these arrangements. The I-225 and North Metro lines were seen as typical
design-build contracts where the contractor will likely make money as long as they work
within their budgets.
Financial and social benefits for the Denver community atlarge. The interviewees agree that PPP projects benefit the Denver community
financially and socially. Generally speaking, all of the transit projects deliver the social
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benefit of providing an alternative to the car and getting drivers off the road. This is truly
the mission of transit. The projects facilitate cost-effective mobility and livability in the
region. The P3 delivery model has enabled more transit to get built faster, without
having to go back to the taxpayers after the funding shortfall. The consensus is that
taxpayers are getting a good deal with these P3s and seeing value for their tax dollars.
Most people stated that they expect the region as a whole to benefit from future economic
development due to investment in transit infrastructure in Denver. The projects for which
respondents expected to see the most economic development and financial benefits are
the Eagle P3 and Denver Union Station.
The Eagle P3 project is economically important to the region because of the
access it provides to the airport. Interstate 70 east of downtown is the major thoroughfare
that most travelers use to access the airport, but that highway has been experiencing
crippling levels of traffic congestion and substantially increased travel times especially
during peak hours. Everyone agreed that the “train to the plane” will bring economic
development opportunities to the Denver region, and it has already brought in industry
along its corridor, including Panasonic. The A-line provides a certainty of travel time as
a social benefit to citizens. Moreover, the “aerotropolis” concept is something that
Denver and Adams County hope to further capitalize on to bring more jobs to the
region. 11 The cost of the crossing gate flaggers and the delay of the G line revenue
10F

service has been born thus far by the private contractor, DTP, but they are suing RTD for
11
Denver’s current mayor, Michael Hancock, has expressed an interest in developing the land around DIA
and along the A-line corridor into an ‘aerotropolis’ or airport city as an engine for regional economic
development. The Aerotropolis Regional Transportation Authority (ARTA) has been established to oversee
future development and infrastructure improvements on the land surrounding DIA (see
https://aerotropolisrta.org/).
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reimbursement of these costs and withheld availability payments. This could be
considered a financial benefit to the public, since a major benefit of a P3 is shifting some
of the financial risk to the private sector. However, RTD is having to expend legal fees to
fight and file the lawsuits and may end up paying for some of the expenses, so the true
cost of these issues are likely being felt by both the public and private partners.
Redevelopment of Denver Union Station is also credited with the relocation of
several national firms’ headquarters to downtown Denver. Many companies cite access
to transportation options as an amenity they hope to provide their employees. DUS has
also reinvigorated the LoDo neighborhood and facilitated higher real estate values in the
area. The tax revenues from the redevelopment around the station has been triple the
original projections. RTD and the City and County of Denver were able to refinance $300
million in loans, which will enable Denver to pay off their debt in just over eight years
while saving over $10 million, and RTD will save up to $134 million over the life of the
loan through 2040 (Murray, 2017).
The BRT and HOT lanes on US 36 provide transportation choices in an important
highway corridor. The improvements have provided more reliable and faster travel times
for the community, and the P3 delivered an “autobahn-like system” decades before it
otherwise could have.
Public accountability of P3s
Since P3s are relatively new in both the U.S. and Denver contexts, questions have
been raised about matters of public accountability and access to information. Regardless
of how much information an agency feels they provide to the public, they know that what
matters is how the public views projects like P3s. The agencies most heavily involved in
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these projects, namely RTD and CDOT, both felt that they did a good job informing
citizens of the impacts of their projects. However, the public did not always agree.
RTD’s projects in general received higher marks for public information than the CDOT
project. Transit agency respondents also gave themselves high marks for public
information, citing RTD’s philosophy of active transparency.
Every RTD project has a public information team that is responsible for engaging
with the community and local stakeholders. For the Eagle P3 project, RTD held a public
meeting in a large auditorium downtown for the public to hear presentations from the
private groups competing for the contract. People were interested in the high profile Aline to the airport, and the public could see it being built along the airport boulevard.
Moreover, quite detailed information about the project and the concessionaire
is accessible on RTD and other websites. Nevertheless, the public and even some elected
officials still do not know many details about the projects, including the procurement
model or even the differences between light rail and commuter rail.
Denver Union Station was seen as "a different animal" because the P3 was more
real estate driven. The project had more scrutiny by more people, according to
individuals involved in the station redevelopment. The project has had multiple public
and private stakeholders involved, so they felt they were always out there explaining the
project- to CDOT, RTD, Lower Downtown neighborhood groups, etc. The project also
had a citizens group, Union Station Alliance, which has had input into what type of
tenants they wanted to see in the station. Although Eagle P3 and Denver Union Station
were seen as providing more information to the public, some people were quick to point
out that these projects were not controversial. In the end, the public was mostly just glad
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the projects were being built, and there was little opposition to them. People were not as
concerned about the P3 delivery model being used in transit projects as they were with
the highways.
Toll lanes are inherently more controversial according to some interviewees.
With the US 36 project, some of the public got the wrong impression that they were
going to have to pay to drive on all the lanes on U.S. 36. People were also confusing
CDOT and RTD, thinking that RTD was building toll lanes. Some interviewees also
attributed the backlash against the US 36 toll lanes and BRT to the failure of the
Northwest rail line to get built. People felt they had voted for rail and now all they were
getting were buses, even though the BRT had always been a part of the FasTracks plan.
The project turned political, and state legislators stepped in questioning the P3 contract
with the Plenary Roads group. Some elected officials interviewed cited a “total lack of
transparency” from CDOT, stating that the “agreement was negotiated behind closed
doors, nobody including legislators, got to see the agreement until it was signed.”
An audit of the US 36 project found that CDOT failed to provide enough
information to the public, “even though all [of the RTD transit projects] provided much
less information- a lot less,” according to one interviewee. As a result, a few state
legislators sponsored a bill to restrict PPPs for CDOT in the future, but the governor
vetoed the bill. The public outreach part of the bill was kept, requiring at least two public
meetings if a project is delivered using a P3. In hindsight, a few respondents felt that the
private and public partners failed to reach out to key stakeholders, including state
legislators, to make sure they understood the procurement process and key contract
terms. Interviewees did feel that it is important for the public to understand and be
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involved in P3s, but because they are “complex and opaque transactions that are difficult
to explain and communicate,” it is hard to know how much the public really wants to
know.
Regional collaboration
Over the past few decades, the Denver metropolitan region has become known for
its strong model of regional collaboration (Jonas, Goetz, and Bhattacharjee, 2014). Most
of the interviewees credited regionalism created through the Metro Mayors Caucus, the
Metro Denver Chamber of Commerce, and other regional organizations with getting the
initial FasTracks ballot initiative passed in 2004. The Metro Mayors Caucus is an
informal collaboration between Denver metro area mayors to address issues that cross
jurisdictions such as transportation. Denver’s mayor at the time, John Hickenlooper, was
also a strong regionalist.
After the funding shortfall was discovered, it became evident that not all the rail
lines would be built, and there was potential for the strong regional collaboration to
become fragmented based on which corridors would move forward. Choices had to be
made; however, the decisions were not political, but based on the availability of federal
funding and private sector interest in the projects. The lines eligible for federal funding
in the PentaP project, the Gold Line, the B line, and the A line, were packaged together as
the Eagle P3. After the Eagle P3 project came together, there were some negative
sentiments expressed against the core city (Denver), but most people supported the
airport line getting built as a benefit to the region. The Eagle P3 also enabled part of the
Northwest rail line to get built to Westminster. Communities to the northwest, however,
were unhappy that their corridor was not being built. RTD’s ability to get the I-225 and
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North Metro lines built with savings from Eagle P3 was “brilliant” because it showed a
good faith effort to get something built for Adams County and Aurora.
Denver Union Station and the Eagle P3 rated the highest for contributing to
stronger regional collaboration. These projects met little opposition, and it was hard to
argue that the transit hub and the airport line were not good for the region. Everyone in
the region supported the projects, but DUS did not have to deal with multiple
jurisdictions- it is located only in the City and County of Denver. The US 36 BRT
project required collaboration between CDOT, RTD, and local communities, and
ironically the backlash against CDOT and the toll lanes coalesced the region.
The opinions of the P3 contribution to regional collaboration varied. Some
experts either thought that the P3 delivery model itself did not hurt regional collaboration
or it did not affect it much at all. Others, however, said that a P3 is the very definition of
collaboration. It requires government to be more proactive with regional partners and to
think about the regional benefit of the transit lines rather than what a certain jurisdiction
wants. Another pointed out that RTD is regional by definition and requires strong
collaboration between many different government entities. Another felt that the mayors
stood by one another and supported each other’s projects, not just their own. One
respondent spoke about the importance of local match grants in the Southeast corridor,
where local government and private groups collaborated to provide matching funds to get
the Southeast light rail extension back on the table.
There were a few people who felt that regional collaboration has suffered more
recently because of the ‘corridor versus corridor’ mentality, with the south metro
arguably getting everything, or so it has been claimed. The fact that the Northwest rail
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project to Boulder and Longmont was being pushed beyond 2042 contributed to this
“Mason-Dixon type line.” The FasTracks plan was supposed to be funded as a regional
system, but instead was being funded, through FTA funding and private money, corridor
by corridor.
Overall success of the projects
Denver Union Station stands out among these projects, with 100% of survey
respondents rating the success extremely favorable. DUS was assessed by some
respondents as “beyond extremely favorable” and an “unmitigated, outstanding super
success.” It is “hard to find a problem” with the project, and the region and public is
already seeing economic and social benefits from it.
Eagle P3 was also highly rated, either extremely favorable or generally favorable
by all respondents, because of the economic development and connectivity it will bring to
the region. Ridership on the A-line has exceeded expectations, and new cars are being
added to the service in 2019 to meet demand (Tinsley, 2018). The ridership has continued
to increase since 2016, from 4.1 million boardings in 2016 (from April through
December) to 6.6 million in 2017 to 7 million in 2018 (Bosselman, 2019). As of
December 2018, total ridership had reached 16 million, which RTD officials did not
expect to reach until 2020 (Tinsley, 2018). RTD has expressed their satisfaction with the
ridership numbers, as well as their on-time percentage for the A-line of 97%.
The success of the other projects was also favorable. The success of the BRT is
attributed to the high ridership and improved travel time in the corridor. In the interviews,
the North Metro (N Line) is expected to be successful because it is anticipated to be ontime, on-budget and provide high quality service to customers. The first segment of the
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Northwest rail (B line) was completed on-time in July of 2016 and on budget, and it has
achieved its expected ridership. The B line is nearing 160 boardings per hour. The R-line
along I-225 was stalled for a few months by equipment issues, but opened in February
2017, and it has thus far been the lowest performing FasTracks line. The R line had less
than 40 boarding per hour in 2017, well below the next lowest line at 140 boardings per
hour (Sachs, 2017). The R line makes significant detours from the most efficient route in
order to service the Aurora town center and is not well integrated into the large
employment center of the CU Anschutz Medical Campus. The transit oriented
development along the R line has also been slow to develop thus far. After considering all
of the measures of success, meeting transportation needs, financial success, and public
information, the P3 projects overall get high marks from interviewees.
Major Benefits of Private-Public Partnerships
Most of the benefits cited by respondents apply to a full P3, with DBFOM
aspects. The two most important and most cited benefits of these PPPs were accelerated
delivery of the projects and appropriate allocation of risk. RTD was able to deliver more
infrastructure sooner than it could have with traditional revenue streams. The private
sector has a better ability to deliver multiple projects on-time and on-budget because of
incentives such as availability payments that take effect when the project is complete.
Most of the interviewees believe that the private sector is “faster, smarter, and better”,
and through their operating efficiencies plus incentives for profit, they can complete
projects faster than the transit agency alone. Even a design-build project, without the
financing, operating, and maintenance agreements, gets built faster than a traditional
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design-bid-build because of private sector efficiencies, such as utilizing the connection
between the designer and the contractor for smoother and faster implementation.
A few people named allocation of risk as the primary reason to conduct a project
as a P3. The risks must be shifted appropriately, with the private concessionaire (and its
constituent firms) assuming those risks that they can manage better and cheaper than
RTD. For example, the private sector is much more equipped to assume construction risk
or interest rate risk, while the public sector is better equipped to handle risks such as
environmental hazards and public utilities. Shifting some of the risk to the private sector
is a significant financial advantage in a P3 contract. However, the distribution and
allocation of risk should not undermine control of public assets. Most respondents felt
that the contracts negotiated in several of the P3s had provisions that allowed the regional
public agency to retain or reassume control of strategic assets should the private sector
fail to deliver. These provisions are discussed further in section five: the role of the
regional transit agency.
A P3 can reduce some costs, as evidenced by the lower cost estimates that came
in for all of the projects discussed in this report. For the Eagle project the cost estimate
came in $300 million under initial internal projections. This freed up more money for
other transit projects, but it is not always cheaper to do a P3 in the long-term. The ability
to finance over time gets more infrastructure built faster, but it would have been cheaper
for RTD as a government agency to finance the debt than the private sector assuming that
bond ratings were strong. There is not really a cost savings through private financing, but
if the public sector needs capital from elsewhere because they have reached their debt
capacity, as was the case with RTD, then the financing element is a very important
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benefit. The financing element is also important because it gives the private sector “skin
in the game.” For the Eagle P3, the private consortia contributed $54 million to the
funding of the infrastructure. If they walk away, they lose the equity they have
contributed. One person noted that the financing element of the P3 is overrated, and “if
you (the transit agency) are doing it for money, you are doing it for the wrong reasons.”
Benefits such as allocation of risks and accelerated delivery are the primary reasons for
doing a P3 in this respondent’s opinion.
Another key to realizing all of the benefits of a P3 is to include financing,
operations, and maintenance in the partnership. The public sector benefits by being able
to pay for the full life-cycle cost of operations and maintenance. In a DB contract, some
construction savings may be reaped but possibly at the expense of operations and
maintenance. With a full DBFOM contract, the private sector is incentivized to build a
better product that will require less maintenance to increase their profit over the longterm concession lease. There is also a guaranteed condition of the asset in the Eagle P3
that requires the infrastructure to be returned to the agency in a certain condition after the
30 year O&M period. Instead of building a system to last 50 years and using it and
abusing it, this contract funds a mid-life overhaul of the system.
Another way the public sector benefits from partnering with the private sector is
the expertise that hired consultants and the private consortia bring to the table. These
specialized individuals and companies are better at executing projects at a higher level of
skill and reliability. The public sector does not have the expertise or experience to
negotiate these contracts, so they bring together a group of very sharp legal and financial
minds to represent them, resulting in a better deal for the agency. In addition, the
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knowledgeable resources that the private consortia contribute during the design,
construction, and operation phases also results in a better overall team overseeing the
project.
Bringing in the private sector results in more innovation. According to some
respondents, the public sector is used to doing things in a certain way, with a “this is the
way we have always done it” mentality. A P3 helps “get the bureaucratic bologna out of
the way.” The public sector provides robust design criteria for the transit infrastructure,
but the P3 model provides flexibility for the private sector to find efficiencies and cost
savings by building things the way they know how or by coming up with innovative
solutions to design or construction issues. In this way they are not hamstrung by the
agency’s design. One example of an innovation from the private partner in the Eagle P3
was including wireless signaling technology with positive train control. However, in this
instance, the innovation has resulted in additional regulatory problems and costs since the
technology was relatively untested prior to the opening of the Eagle P3 lines. Neither the
public nor private partner has been able to adequately address the technical issues with
the crossing gate software.
Major Shortcomings of Public-Private Partnerships
The nature of P3s, at least in the U.S., is that they are “complex and opaque,” and
difficult to explain to the public because PPPs are misunderstood, unfamiliar, and still
novel. From the public perspective, and as evidenced here by reactions to the U.S. 36
project, there is a lack of transparency in P3 agreements and negotiations. The public and
private entities must spend a lot of time on public information, in order to ease the
increased public suspicion of corruption and uneasiness of the private sector taking over
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public assets. Keeping the public informed is even harder with a P3 than with traditional
projects because everything moves so much faster.
Changes can also be difficult in a P3. The public agency loses some flexibility
and ability to request changes from their original design. For example, the City of
Denver and RTD wanted to add another station at 61st and Pena on the A-line to the
airport very late in the construction phase. While some change orders can be done, it is
not usually in the best interest of the private sector. In this instance, the private side was
able to add the station, but everything comes at a cost. Some people view some loss of
control by the agency as a shortcoming. The public entity has less control of the design
and building specifications compared to a design-bid-build contract, but one response
from RTD was “we have plenty of control over what we should worry about.” RTD does
not need to be concerned about the specific way the contractor builds a bridge or station
platform, as long as it is safe, reliable, and produces quality transit service.
The expense to hire private expertise in the negotiation phase can cost millions in
upfront soft costs. The public sector does not have the skills to negotiate these complex
deals themselves. The risk of ending up with a bad contract is more expensive than the
cost of hiring the experts, but there is also a risk that the project will never get to the bid
phase and the agency will have spent millions of dollars on lawyers, designers, bankers,
consultants, and other experts. There is no standardization of contracts for full DBFOM
agreements, so for the Eagle P3, financial and legal experts from Goldman Sachs, JP
Morgan, and Freshfields were required to ensure that the public entity was adequately
prepared to enter into the P3 arena.
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There is also the issue of cost. It is complicated to precisely identify whether P3s
provide a cost savings or not. As discussed in the benefit section, P3s can result in a cost
savings in the short term and allow projects to get completed that may have had funding
issues. However, over the longer term, the agency will end up paying more for a P3
project because they are paying a higher debt rate through the private sector financing.
As one expert put it, rarely will the agency’s “green-visored accountant” in the back
room look at the spreadsheets and say that a P3 makes financial sense, because the
agency will pay more over time. But the agency should take into account all of the other
benefits of a P3, especially the transfer of risk, which also adds to the increased cost.
Experts agreed, financing is not funding, and P3s are not a magic bullet to address the
lack of transportation funding in U.S. states and cities.
Using Denver P3s as a Model
Many people stated that the Eagle and Denver Union Station P3s could serve as
models for other cities and regions looking to expand their transit infrastructure,
especially for transit agencies with constrained revenue streams. In fact, these projects
already are serving as models for projects such as the Maryland Purple Line, outside of
Washington D.C. RTD has hosted numerous cities that have visited Denver to see how
they were able to get these projects done. RTD also produced a “Lessons Learned”
document after the procurement phase of Eagle P3 and hope to produce another one after
the transition to O&M 12. They have shared their experiences with others at conferences
11 F

and shared transit exchanges as well.

12

See http://www.rtdfastracks.com/media/uploads/main/Eagle_P3_Procurement_Lessons_Learned_final_with_cover_letter.pdf
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The Eagle P3 is considered a good model contractually and financially. The
contract was based on toll road and international deals, and the “risk transfer was nearly
perfect,” according to one expert. The way these projects were financed is also
considered a model for future transit PPPs. Denver and RTD were able to maximize all
sources of funding including federal funding and grants as well as private equity. Cities
looking to replicate Denver Union Station’s success are especially interested in how to
use TIFIA loans and Certificates of Participation (COPs) to leverage economic
development dollars. The Eagle P3 and DUS project are also models of
intergovernmental cooperation and regional collaboration. Part of the model of Denver’s
success is the strong regionalism that has characterized regional governance and
economic development for several decades. For instance, the Denver model was cited in
an important national study of metro regionalism published by the Brookings Institution
(Katz and Bradley, 2013) 13
1 2F

The most repeated answer to whether Denver can serve as a model was “yes,
but…” Respondents cautioned that Denver and RTD had a special set of circumstances
with the Eagle P3 and DUS that might not be replicable in other situations. They stressed
that every P3 deal is different, and as former general manager Phil Washington was prone
to say, “If you have done one P3, you have done one P3.” Perhaps it would be better to
call Denver an example, as suggested by some interviewees. As the first full-scale transit
PPP (DBFOM) in the United States, the Eagle P3 can serve as a useful example of how a
transit PPP can be done. The federal PentaP program was one of a kind, and while other

13

The Brookings study did discuss the FasTracks vote, but it did not assess the role of P3s in regional
collaboration.
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agencies can learn from RTD by leveraging as much federal funding as possible, they
may not be able to replicate the exact circumstances and funding sources. RTD has
produced a checklist of things to address in P3 contracts, but not every agency will have
to address the issues in the same way as RTD. No one can pick up RTD’s contract and
say, in effect, “now we do not have to draft our own”. Transit agencies interested in P3s
can also learn from Denver how transit can court private investment. Prior to entering
into the Eagle P3 agreement, the private sector already viewed RTD as a good business
partner based on their experience with DB contracts and contracting out
some paratransit and bus operations.
Other regions should consider whether a P3 is even the right delivery model for
them. Not every transit agency needs to do their project as a P3. Because of the
Colorado Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) law that requires all new tax requests to go
to the voters for approval and revenue shortfalls, RTD had to be innovative with their
financing structure. Cities looking to Denver as a P3 model must understand that
financing is not funding, and it is not a magic bullet.
The Role of the Regional Transit Agency
The transit agency interviewees were asked additional questions regarding their
preference for P3s, the protection of public interests and potential for default from the
private sector. These questions address concerns from some legislators and the public
about private operators defaulting on public assets.
Should projects be conducted as a P3 or by transit agency alone.
Transit agency representatives were asked if they could choose whether these
projects would be conducted as PPPs or conducted by the transit agency alone, which
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they would choose. There were two schools of thought. Some people would prefer the
transit agency to conduct the projects as design-bid-build because the agency would have
more control and involvement over the project, and the agency’s ability to control costs is
better. Most people, however, said it depends on the project and the circumstances
surrounding it. For example, for the Eagle P3, it made sense to do a DBFOM P3 because
the agency was short on funding, and electrified commuter rail was a new technology that
required coordination with the FRA, which RTD did not have experience operating.
Despite the benefit of the private sector’s experience with electrified commuter rail, the
commuter lines have not been immune to technical issues with the crossing gates and
other unlucky events including lightning strikes and power outages. Furthermore, RTD
has stated its intention to operate and maintain the yet to be opened North Metro line (N
line) itself, rather than use DTP which operates the other commuter lines (Minor, 2019).
The I-225 line (R line), however, would not have made sense to do with an operate and
maintain component because it is light rail technology, which RTD already runs in
several corridors. The takeaway was that each project should be analyzed, and using a P3
as the delivery model should be considered as a part of the cost/ benefit analysis, and if it
makes sense, then do it. Construction on toll lanes in the C-470 highway corridor is
another example where CDOT decided after analyzing the options, that it would make
more sense for the agency to build and operate the lanes rather than a private entity. A
full DBFOM agreement does not make sense in every case, but DB agreements also
allow the agency to benefit from bringing in the private sector through risk transference,
efficiencies, lower cost, and the ability to complete multiple projects at the same time.
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Assurances that the public interests are being protected.
I also asked the agency respondents what elements of the PPP contracts provide
assurances that the greater public interest is being protected. It all comes down to the
contract, according to RTD representatives. The Eagle P3 contract has robust
requirements with default provisions and tender provisions should something happen
with the private sector’s ability to pay for or run the service. The quality of service is
also specified in the contract, with penalties that apply if the service is not performing up
to required levels. The contract was negotiated by leading financial and legal experts that
RTD hired, so the transit agency felt that the contract fully protected the public interests.
On the Eagle project, RTD also had an oversight team of more than 60 people overseeing
DTP and conducting QA/ QC, as well as four inspectors in the field.
The potential for the PPP being deliberately bankrupted
The transit agency was not concerned about the concessionaire defaulting because
of the numerous levels of protection in the contract. First, it would be incredibly unlikely
that the private consortium would intentionally bankrupt the project because of the
repercussions to the private firm and its parent company, Fluor. If Fluor (or the other
partners) were to walk away from the debt of over $400 million in private activity bonds,
they would never be allowed to work on a federal contract for the next ten years or
borrow money from anyone. In addition, they would lose the equity they previously
invested in the project. Secondly, the contract and financing agreement do not allow the
private group to foist its project debt on the transit agency. The bonds specifically state
that RTD is not responsible for repayment on the offering statement; all of the debt is
with the private sector. Thirdly, even in the worst-case scenario, if the private
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concessionaire did default or they do not perform up to contract requirements, RTD
retains ownership of the infrastructure asset. If they fire the private concessionaire or the
private group defaults, RTD has the right to re-tender and sell the lease to someone else
or operate the service itself. This is the scenario that would develop if RTD follows
through with their threat to terminate its contract with DTP, albeit not without extensive
legal wrangling in the courts. The most damaging consequence of such default to the
public would be that the trains would not run until RTD or another operator could take
over the service. There is really no additional risk to the public compared to the case if
RTD owned the bonds.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Public-private partnerships have been utilized for public infrastructure projects
throughout the world, but they are relatively underutilized in the United States. Interest in
P3s is increasing in the U.S., especially in the transportation sector due to lack of federal,
state, and local funding. Denver’s RTD agency used P3s to deliver several of their
FasTracks projects. FasTracks was a 2004 voter approved ballot measure to increase the
regional sales tax by 0.4% to fund a regional light rail and commuter rail system
alongside a bus rapid transit system and the redevelopment of Union Station as a transit
hub connecting the transit network. FasTracks has thus far cost over $5 billion dollars,
and the system has not yet been fully built-out. After a funding shortfall following the
wake of the global financial crisis and increasing construction costs, partnering with the
private sector to use innovative procurement methods allowed the agency to deliver
several of the rail lines that were in jeopardy of not getting built. The Eagle P3 project
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included the region’s first commuter rail service and was the nation’s first full DBFOM
transit P3.
This research sought to outline the different transit P3 that were a part of
FasTracks and analyze their successes. The research also aimed to answer whether or not
the Denver region’s approach to P3s and regional collaboration could be seen as a model
for other public agencies seeking to use P3s to build transportation infrastructure. The
research utilized semi-structured interviews with public and private stakeholders and
media and document analysis to answer these questions. This research contributes to the
literature by filling in the research gap of transit P3s in the U.S. and provide public
agencies interested in implementing P3s with information from a case study about
benefits and drawbacks of the P3 approach.
Denver’s five PPP projects were rated favorably by nearly all the respondents.
Denver Union Station in particular has exceeded expectations in several areas, notably
economic development for the city and financial benefit to the private and public
partners. Respondents identified the most important benefits of utilizing a P3 delivery
model as accelerated delivery of a project and appropriate allocation of risk. In addition,
the projects were also able to be delivered at a lower cost than if the transit agency alone
had completed them. The incentives for on-time project delivery facilitated faster
completion by the private sector. The allocation of risk for maintenance and operations
through the use of availability payments incentivized the private partner to build a better,
longer-lasting product. The main shortcoming is that P3s can be complex and opaque,
especially to the general public. Public accountability and transparency were found to be
lacking in the U.S. 36 toll lane and BRT project. Overall, the Denver P3s, especially the
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Eagle P-3, can serve as a useful model for other transit agencies seeking to expand their
transit infrastructure.
The interests in P3s for transit agencies is growing because of the continuing
funding and financing problems that face transit agencies and state DOTs. For public
agencies interested in following Denver’s P3 example, the Denver P3s can serve as a
useful model. Recommendations for future P3s in transit include investing in specialized
legal and financial expertise to ensure the inclusion of appropriate safeguards for project
quality and to protect the public interest. Agencies should do so in a way that fully
integrates P3s within existing structures of regional collaboration.
This research focused on the development of public-private partnerships and their
success thus far. This research was limited in scope by the level of completion for each of
the P3 projects at the time of the data collection in 2016. In some cases, interviews and
surveys were conducted before some of the lines went into service, so the long-term
benefits and success cannot be pinpointed from this study. The success of the FasTrack
lines were determined in the context of the design-build-finance phases of the
partnerships, but the success of the operate-maintain phases is yet to be seen. Recent
issues surrounding the contractual agreement and obligations of the public agency and
private partner in the Eagle P3 suggest that these partnerships need to continue to be
studied over the long-term. Future studies should explore the long-term effects of the
Eagle P3 and U.S. 36 toll road project since they are long-term concession agreements
that stretch over several decades, and the financial benefit of the partnerships may not be
realized at the start of the service phase.
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Chapter Three: Passenger Rail and Freight Rail Partnerships: A Case Study in
Denver, CO
Introduction
In the U.S., the demand for increased commuter and intercity passenger rail
service is increasing due to population growth and traffic congestion. Amtrak service is
growing and high-speed rail service is planned in a few major corridors. Locally, transit
agencies are looking to expand their light rail and heavy rail service to meet the
transportation needs of their region. Because the railroad networks are already built out
through densely populated cities, most experts agree that sharing freight rail corridors is
one of the least environmentally and socially impactful ways to expand passenger rail
services across the country. As plans for shared-use railroad corridors increase, more
research is needed to improve, encourage, and sustain the cooperation between freight
and passenger rail.
This research examines the use of public-private rail partnerships across the
country by identifying and describing existing relationships between freight and
passenger rail, analyzing elements of good agreements and bad agreements, and
developing best practices in corridor sharing. Commuter rail and Amtrak operations in
Colorado and the Denver metropolitan region are also examined in detail. Amtrak,
regional and state transit and transportation authorities, and local governments in Denver

61

have had experience in conducting negotiations with freight railroads concerning the
acquisition or use of rail corridors, rights-of-way, or tracks. It is important for public
transportation agencies and authorities at all levels—federal, regional, state, and local—
as well as the private railroads to learn from these cases and to develop more effective
partnerships. In-depth interviews with key participants and stakeholders from the freight
and passenger rail industry at the national and local levels yield useful examples of both
positive and negative experiences, and best practices in freight and passenger rail
partnerships.
Research questions
This research intends to identify, describe, and analyze existing relationships
between freight railroads and passenger rail operators in Denver, CO for the purpose of
facilitating future public-private partnerships in rail corridor capacity expansion and
gaining a better understanding of this major intermodal transportation issue. Building
upon the research conducted by Bing et al (2010) in a National Cooperative Highway
Research Program (NCHRP) report, this research will use a case study approach to
answer the following questions:
•

What is the current status of rail corridors in Denver and how have public
agencies acquired and/ or shared use of rail corridors with freight railroads?

•

How do shared-use rail corridors in Denver impact economic competitiveness for
both freight and passenger rail service?

•

What are best practices for future shared-use rail agreements?
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Background in shared use rail corridors
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) provides definitions of different
categories of shared-use partnerships between freight railroads and passenger rail
agencies (Resor 2003). A shared track is rail line track on which both commuter rail or
light rail vehicles and freight railcars operate. A shared right of way (ROW) utilizes
different tracks for transit and freight rail, but they both operate within the same 25 foot
right of way. In other words, the centerline of the freight and passenger rail tracks is less
than 25 feet apart. In a shared corridor, transit and freight rail operate on their own tracks
separated by a distance of greater than 25 feet but less than 200 feet. As a federally
operated and subsidized service, Amtrak is the only operator that has a statutory right to
operate on private railroad property. Amtrak does have to compensate freight railroads
for incremental costs associated with operating on freight tracks.
Several key academic papers and industry reports have been published discussing
the technical and policy-related issues of shared-use rail corridors. Bing et al. (2010) is
the most recent, most comprehensive guidebook for implementing public-private
partnerships between freight companies and passenger rail agencies. It describes the
present situation of rail corridor sharing in the U.S., the process of negotiations with
private freight rail companies, analysis and modeling of cost sharing, and content of
operations and maintenance agreements. The guidebook also includes several case
studies of implemented shared-use corridor agreements and best practices in negotiations
and approaches to fees and incentives. This research will follow-up and update the
findings in the guidebook.
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From a review of numerous relevant papers and reports, several issue areas
emerge as concerns for future shared-use rail agreements: capacity, liability, cost-sharing,
and capital constraints. (Bing et al., 2010; FRA 2005; Resor 2003; Prozzi 2006; Dolata et
al. 2005; GAO 2004). Preserving capacity for freight rail is a primary concern of private
railroads and can be a source of contention in shared-use negotiations. Passenger rail
service will not be run at the risk of harming current or future private freight business
(Mitchell, 2006). Liability continues to be a concern for freight railroads when entering
into shared-use agreements. The $200 million cap on liability for passenger rail operators
may not be extended to host freight railroads, so often the host railroads ask passenger
agencies to procure at least $500 million in liability insurance. This can greatly raise the
cost of transit operation in a corridor.
Cost-sharing is another issue that must be addressed in negotiations. How much
the passenger agency is required to pay for the right to run on the private railroad tracks,
ROW, or corridor can be especially contentious. Capital constraints are also a concern.
Passenger agencies should come to the table with money, since as a private company
usually beholden to stockholders, freight railroads are not apt to subsidize public or
private passenger rail (Mitchell, 2006). General best practices for agencies entering into
shared-use corridor agreements or negotiations are to recognize that each situation is
different, the importance of trust and bargaining, and coming to the table with
experienced negotiators with a background in passenger and freight rail issues.
A case study approach to studying shared-use rail agreements is found to be
effective, since several reports have found that there is no silver bullet or one-size fits all
approach to shared-use agreements (Wilcock & Stoetzel 2009; GAO 2004; Prozzi 2006).
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Recent economic environments have changed since the reviewed literature was written,
such as an increase in freight rail traffic, growth in demand for passenger rail service, and
growing interest in expanding mobility options. Adding a Denver case study, which is
one of the most recent shared-use agreements between public transit and freight rail, will
contribute to the literature informing future shared-use agreements.
Study Area and background
Colorado has a rich history of freight and passenger rail operations. At its peak in
the 1930s and 1940s, Denver’s Union Station served up to 80 trains a day. The private
railroad industry began to drop its less lucrative passenger rail service after competition
from air and car travel increased. With the formation of Amtrak in 1971, passenger rail
service decreased significantly in the state. Colorado currently has two long distance,
intercity passenger rail services operated by Amtrak: the California Zephyr and the
Southwest Chief routes. The services operate on shared track with both Burlington
Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and Union Pacific (UP) railroads. This research will focus on
the recent negotiations between BNSF and Amtrak to continue the Southwest Chief
service in Colorado.
After private railroad companies stopped operating passenger rail services in
Denver, only Amtrak utilized shared use rail corridors, and regional commuter rail
service did not exist until a recent rail proposal from Denver’s transit agency. The
Regional Transportation District (RTD) is the transit agency for the Denver metropolitan
area, and in 2004, passed a new regional rail transit system plan called FasTracks. Voters
approved the FasTracks plan which proposed six new rail lines in the Denver area, five of
which were proposed to be built at least partly within freight rail corridors, with funding
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from an increase in sales tax. Most of the FasTracks rail lines have already been built or
will open by the early 2020s except the full Northwest rail line 14. This research will
13 F

analyze the nature of the FasTracks sharing agreements and acquisitions as well as the
major impediments to reaching a public-private rail partnership agreement on the
Northwest line.
Research methods
The research utilizes multiple methods to answer the research questions of the
study. First, literature on public-private partnerships between freight rail and passenger
rail operators across the US was collected and analyzed. The literature review includes
public and private reports as well as scholarly articles. The 2010 TRB Guidebook for
Implementing Passenger Rail Service on Shared Passenger and Freight Corridors (Bing
et al 2010) provided an excellent background into the many issues related to publicprivate rail partnerships. It has appendices on applicable acts of congress and federal
government regulations, capacity and cost analyses, legal and institutional arrangements,
safety regulations, and an appendix with several limited case study descriptions of
passenger rail development on freight lines.
Secondly, an in-depth case study of public-private rail partnerships in the Denver
metropolitan area was developed. Key decision-makers and policy officials for both the
freight railroads and the public agencies that operate rail transportation services in
Denver were identified through personal knowledge and snowball sampling. Face-toface, in-depth interviews were conducted with these key participants and stakeholders in
order to elicit their perspectives and viewpoints concerning the nature of these public14

Find more information at www.rtd-fastracks.com.
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private rail partnerships. Interviewees include representatives from transit agencies, state
DOTs, passenger rail advocates, freight rail representatives, consultants, and local
officials who have experience concerning the acquisition or use of rail corridors, rightsof-way, or tracks. The case study interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded
to reveal common themes from the interview questions.
The Denver metropolitan region was chosen as a case study due to its long and
significant history of railroads, and its current effort to build a regional rail transit system
through its 2004 FasTracks transit and land use plan. Of the six new rail lines proposed
in the FasTracks plan, five were scheduled to be built at least partly within freight rail
corridors. While access to the rail corridors has been acquired on four of these lines,
negotiations over the proposed Northwest Corridor line have stalled, thus placing that
line’s completion in serious jeopardy. It is especially important to analyze the major
impediments to a public-private rail partnership in this case.
Denver Case Study
Amtrak
Amtrak operates along two routes in Colorado: The California Zephyr, connecting
Chicago and San Francisco, and the Southwest Chief, connecting Chicago and Los
Angeles. The California Zephyr operates along shared tracks with BNSF and UP from
the northeast into Denver, and along the Union Pacific tracks west of Denver to Salt Lake
City. The Southwest Chief operates primarily over BNSF track in the southeast corner of
Colorado. Although Amtrak has legal right to operate over any freight or passenger rail
track and priority is given to Amtrak trains by law, as one interviewee put it, “whoever
controls the switches, controls the railroad; the reality is [Amtrak] can’t move until
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whoever owns the switches gives them permission.” This reality can lead to contentious
agreement negotiations and ongoing operations if there is not a partnership mindset
between the parties.

Figure 3: Amtrak routes and stations (Amtrak 2015)

In 2010, the future of the Southwest Chief in Colorado seemed to be in jeopardy.
According to the Colorado State Freight and Passenger Rail plan (CDOT 2012), BNSF
announced to Amtrak that it would no longer maintain the tracks between Hutchison, KS
and La Junta, CO to speeds of 79 mph, and if Amtrak wanted to run its trains at speeds
higher than 60 mph, Amtrak would have to pay for the increased maintenance cost.
BNSF also stated that Amtrak would be responsible for all maintenance costs for the
track between La Junta, CO and Lamy, NM. Amtrak continued to run the service and
bear the additional maintenance costs for several years. Later, BNSF further reduced the
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speed to 30 mph for safety on some segments of track because of the track’s poor
condition, and their argument was since their freight does not need to run at higher than
30 mph, Amtrak should pay to run at a higher speed. Amtrak and BNSF had discussions
about rerouting the Southwest Chief out of Colorado altogether through Kansas,
Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico, but several communities in Southeast Colorado that
would lose Amtrak service banded together to “Save the Chief.”
The response to the efforts to continue the Southwest Chief service in Colorado is
a good example of cooperation and partnerships. The process of renegotiating Amtrak’s
contract with BNSF started off as contentious, with BNSF levying demands. Amtrak
alone did not have the funds to continue to pay additional maintenance costs or to
improve the track. Through a partnership of federal Transportation Investment
Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants and matching funds from state and local
governments, BNSF, and Amtrak, an agreement was reached that benefited all the
stakeholders. In total, TIGER grants of over 48 million dollars were awarded to allow
Amtrak to maintain the line as well as replace decaying tracks. BNSF has pledged to
pick up the cost to maintain any portions of the track that are improved for the next 20
years. The value of BNSF’s contribution is over 111 million dollars over the 20 years,
saving Amtrak and the states future maintenance costs. The funding package reflects
cooperation amongst the BNSF, Amtrak, local communities, and state governments.
Since improving the line, Amtrak has improved their on-time performance and improved
the run time by over 90 minutes along this segment. BNSF has also experienced
improved quality of service.
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Regional Transportation District (RTD)
The first RTD rail line to use a shared freight corridor was the Southwest light
rail. This line was built in 2000 and shares 11.8 miles of right of way (ROW) with both
BNSF and the UP railroads in their consolidated main line corridor. This is a true shared
corridor where BNSF, UP, and RTD own different portions of the corridor, and everyone
has tracks on each other’s property. RTD bought fee interest from Denver Rio Grande,
which after multiple mergers in the 1990s, became Union Pacific by the time of closing.
On BNSF property, RTD purchased a passenger easement.
The West rail line was the first FasTracks line to be opened in 2013 and operates
light rail within an abandoned consolidated freight rail corridor that RTD acquired
through an outright purchase in the 1980s from the Colorado and Southern, a predecessor
to Burlington Northern. Freight no longer operates in this corridor.
The Gold line (G line) corridor is an electrified commuter rail line that opened in
2019 and includes two sections of shared corridor. From Pecos Street to Sheridan
Boulevard, RTD bought two miles of forty foot wide right of way from Union Pacific,
and from Sheridan Blvd to Golden and the Coors property, RTD owns the entire corridor
and grants an operating easement to BNSF. The current Gold line does not run all the
way to Golden, but there is potential for future expansion because of the purchase of the
additional property.
In the summer of 2016, the B line opened as an electrified commuter rail line and
is the first six miles of the Northwest Rail line. It currently runs on portions of right of
way purchased from BNSF from Pecos Junction to Westminster Station.
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The North Metro line is an electrified commuter rail along the Boulder Industrial
Lead (BIL), which is former UP right of way. RTD purchased the entire corridor right of
way, which extends 33 miles north to Erie, although only the first 13 mile segment of the
proposed 18.5 mile line identified in FasTracks is currently under construction. The
Union Pacific no longer operates in this corridor. The 13-mile North Metro line is
scheduled to be opened in the early 2020s.
The A-line along the east corridor to Denver International Airport is one of the
more complicated shared corridors. From Denver Union Station to York St., RTD bought
all required right of way adjacent to either the BNSF or UP. From York to Airport Blvd,
RTD bought a forty-foot wide right of way from UP. In practice, the UP and RTD
operations exist as independent corridors because the UP operates on their own property
while RTD operates on their own property, but in reality, they are only separated by a
fence so it is a shared corridor in practice.
Northwest rail line is the only one of the FasTracks lines where the freight
railroad and transit agency could not reach an agreement for shared use, although that is
not the only reason the line is stalled. Lack of funding for RTD was a major issue that
required the agency to prioritize the FasTracks build out based on availability of federal
funds, cost, and ridership benefits. The proposed commuter rail line would go over BNSF
right of way, and it is the only RTD rail line that would involve shared track for portions
of the corridor. Further discussion of the Northwest Rail line issues follows in the next
sections.
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Figure 4: FasTracks corridors (CDOT 2012)
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Agreements and corridor sharing development process
Recent FasTracks corridor sharing deals involved three basic parts: (1) purchase
of the real estate interest, (2) relocation of freight rail and construction of passenger line,
and (3) ongoing operation and maintenance and shared corridor use agreements.
Real estate interests
The process of developing a corridor sharing agreement begins by approaching
the freight railroad with a general plan for rail development to see if the railroad would be
willing to sell or share part of their right of way, corridor, or track. These “feasibility
discussions” for the FasTracks plan with BNSF and UP took place prior to the 2004 vote
on the sales tax increase. These discussions are very general and meant to determine
whether or not the freight railroads would be willing to participate in further negotiations,
and if there is even a right of way or corridor that could be shared. The freight railroads
will not engage in detailed engineering until there is a sure source of funding and detailed
plans from the transit agency emerge. When RTD approached the railroads about options
for corridor sharing, it became clear early on that shared track would not work in most
cases because of the time sensitive nature of the passenger rail service that RTD and the
community desired.
In addition, for the transit agency to receive federal funding for a project, the
agency is not allowed to enter into a legal contract to purchase or share the rail corridor
until the federal environmental impact assessment (EIA) is completed. The
environmental process for some of the corridors began prior to the 2004 vote and others
after, and the process is meant to rule out other alternatives to the planned construction in
the rail corridors. Before and during the environmental process, the transit agency is not
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able to engage with interested third parties or private property owners such as the
railroads, other than basic feasibility discussions. After the EIA, plans for construction
and realignment may change based on community input and environmental factors, and
the best situation/ alternative is chosen. The environmental impact statement (EIS) is
then publicly available for everyone, including the freight railroads, to view, and only
then can the right of way be purchased with funds designated under the plan. A transit
agency could, however, use other funds proactively to secure access to freight rail
corridors for proposed passenger operations as part of a "landbanking" strategy.
The limitations on private railroad involvement prior to environmental
assessment have a significant impact on the ability of the freight railroads and the transit
agency to reach an agreement. It makes it very hard to negotiate with the railroads when
there is a document stating what type of service the transit agency has decided to
provide. One respondent said that RTD would have been able to negotiate better
agreements if they had not had a document that already identified their intended plans to
the railroads. The railroads knew that RTD had committed the rail lines to the voters, and
that they intended to build in the freight right of way, thus providing the railroads with
the upper hand in negotiations. An alternative approach would be to amend the
environmental process to allow the freight railroad to be a participant from the
beginning, to allow negotiations and establish realistic cost estimates for access to the
right of way first, and then continue with the environmental assessment process.
In recognition of the unfortunate paradox that often exists in the timing of
cooperation, some flexibility in implementing regulations for NEPA has been introduced.
Implementing regulations allow for ‘categorical exclusions,' i.e. actions that have been
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presumed, based on history and frequency of occurrence, to have no significant impact on
the environment. Furthermore, in 2012 the FTA introduced a change in their
implementing legislation that provides for corridor preservation before completion of
NEPA. Specifically, 49 USC 5323 states:
(q) Corridor preservation.-(1) In general.--The Secretary may assist a recipient in acquiring right-ofway before the completion of the environmental reviews for any project
that may use the right-of-way if the acquisition is otherwise permitted
under Federal law.
(2) Environmental reviews.--Right-of-way acquired under this subsection
may not be developed in anticipation of the project until all required
environmental reviews for the project have been completed.
Passenger agencies should always seek the advice of their regional FTA, FRA,
and/or other relevant federal offices before pursuing this course of action. There
can be no development of the corridor property, only the acquisition. Compliance
with NEPA is paramount and non-compliance could kill a project, so passenger
agencies must be careful in how they proceed with corridor preservation.
Nevertheless, these approaches can be useful in addressing corridor access issues.
There are a few corridors where RTD was able to buy the right of way or corridor
prior to construction and the environmental process. The West line was purchased during
the 1980s as corridor preservation, but it was bought from base RTD funds. The Gold
line runs from Denver Union Station to Wheat Ridge at Ward Road. RTD was able to
purchase an additional six-mile long property along the BNSF corridor beyond Ward
Road all the way to Golden at the Coors Brewery. In addition, RTD is only building the
first 13 miles along the UP corridor of the North Metro line, but purchased 33 miles of
the corridor up to Erie. These landbanking acquisitions will enable RTD to expand the
lines in the future if population growth demands it. In the future, corridor preservation
purchases would make sense and prevent negotiations with railroads from stalling rail
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lines, but the funding issues are the problem. Future sales tax revenue from the
FasTracks funds cannot be used to purchase property not included in the FasTracks plan,
and federal funds cannot be used to purchase corridor property unless the federal
environmental review process is followed.
Relocation and construction.
The freight railroad and the transit agency must also reach agreement on where
and how some of the freight facilities will be relocated. The original plan for the A-line
to the airport was to relocate UP totally out of the corridor that RTD purchased, but after
the EIS, it became cost-prohibitive to rebuild facilities up to new code and technologies.
RTD and the Union Pacific reexamined the design and ended up with a different
alignment that still worked. The needs of both the freight and passenger agencies must
be taken into consideration for relocation and during construction, and everything comes
at a price.
Operation and maintenance agreements
The BNSF calls these agreements “joint corridor agreements” and the Union
Pacific calls them “O & M agreements,” and both provide for ongoing operations and
maintenance issues that arise such as insurance, drainage, indemnity, emergency
coordinations, and the construction of future additional facilities in the right of way.
Previous agreements or acquisitions made in the 1990s did not involve all of these
elements. Operations and maintenance were not discussed with Union Pacific in the
Southwest light rail corridor deal. It was a “we take care of ours, you take care of yours”
situation that was not formally agreed to in a contract. At the time, there were not as
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many freight and passenger rail shared use agreements, but today, the freight railroads
have seen the value of including operations and maintenance terms in their agreements.
The Contentious Process of Developing a Shared-Use Agreement
When asked whether the development of corridor sharing agreements were
contentious, the general consensus was yes, all agreements were contentious but most
were ultimately successful. None of the corridors were described as easy negotiations
where everything fell into place, but agreements were reached in all corridors except the
Northwest, which had a variety of issues that prevented the passenger rail from being
implemented. In order to be successful in negotiating an agreement, the transit agency
needs staff members who understand the operations and infrastructure requirements of
freight rail. The passenger agency lays out the plan for what they want to do in the
freight corridor, shows how it will not affect the freight and if it does, how to mitigate the
impact on them. Having someone at the table that speaks the railroad’s language, knows
the business, and realizes that the freight railroad is there to make money will create a
more cooperative relationship. Dealing with freight in an honest, one-on-one basis with
good interpersonal skills makes a big difference in reaching an agreement.
Cost is generally the main sticking point in negotiations. Everyone comes to the
table needing things, RTD has a limited amount of funds, and the goal is to reach a deal.
Prior to the 2004 FasTracks vote, RTD generated a cost estimate for all the corridors
based on preliminary design plans and a rough 10-20% estimate, usually a gross cost per
mile. Prior to meeting with freight railroads to negotiate a price for property acquisitions,
the agency only knows the cost of their own facilities, but not of relocating freight
facilities, upgrading technology or track that must be moved. The price of the real estate
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can be determined, but other factors can affect the cost that RTD originally estimates for
a corridor or for an acquisition. Another contentious issue in agreement negotiations is
how to preserve service to local freight rail customers. This is sometimes done by
relocating the customer, building a flyover to retain freight access, or other creative
solutions, but it must be addressed and paid for in the negotiations.
Northwest rail line
The public saw the Northwest rail line negotiations as especially contentious
because of rising cost estimates for sharing the corridor, but RTD points out that cost
changes came about on their side of the negotiations as well. The Northwest rail line is
proposed to run from Denver Union Station to Boulder and Longmont northwest of
Denver along a BNSF freight corridor. The line was included in the FasTracks plan,
some argue, to get the votes needed in the jurisdictions to the north to pass FasTracks.
Even before the recession of 2008, several factors affected the cost estimates and funding
sources for the Northwest rail. A combination of a shortfall in sales tax revenue and
increased costs for construction commodities jeopardized all of the proposed FasTracks
lines, but innovative financing structures through public-private partnerships and federal
funding enabled the other lines to move forward. The ridership in the Northwest corridor
was always projected to be low, and because of the low ridership, low population density,
and competition from RTD’s bus rapid transit (BRT) service to Boulder, the line was not
eligible for federal funding. This left some people in the northern communities to feel
that they were paying for FasTracks, but getting no rail in return.
RTD approached BNSF to design a system that could handle projected RTD
operations in the BNSF corridor. Unlike other corridors in the FasTracks plan, RTD
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could not acquire the entire right of way or corridor because there is barely room for two
tracks, and BNSF still needed to move freight in the corridor. RTD was negotiating for
time slots on the freight tracks where the railroad would retain the infrastructure and
guarantee RTD could move their trains. RTD says that BNSF came back with a fair
number, but that the number kept changing over time. Some of the cost increases came
from changes requested by RTD in the original design after the 2004 vote and after the
EIS. Communities wanted more stations, quiet zones, grade separations, and bigger Park
and Rides, and the level of service was changed to 55 trains a day. The equipment was
changed from diesel locomotive-hauled coaches to electrified commuter rail, which also
required a different type of maintenance facility.
In addition, the freight traffic on the line had nearly doubled since 2004, so
additional capacity improvements that the freight railroad needed would cost much more
than RTD had anticipated. Additional right of way would be needed for more sidings and
more overpasses to maintain capacity for freight trains that were as long as two miles.
Positive train control (PTC) was a new safety technology that needed to be implemented
but was not previously figured into the cost estimates. When original estimates were
derived more than five years before, there were different economic conditions, different
capacity needs for the freight, technology changes, and operational changes. All of this
contributed to rising costs in the corridor.
RTD says the biggest challenge with this corridor is its length. The Northwest
corridor is over 40 miles long, much longer than most of the other corridors, and an
increase in the cost per mile is compounded over 40 miles of track. In 2004 RTD initially
budgeted $66 million for access to the corridor, but by 2012 BNSF announced that it
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would cost $535 million. With other operational and technology changes, the total cost
for the Northwest rail line jumped from $461 million in 2004 to $1.7 billion by 2012
(Migoya 2012). A railroad representative stated that their cost estimates for sharing
corridors are generally good for only one year, and after that, new costs need to be
determined in order to reflect changes in capacity, freight flows, and other economic
determinants. In order to reach a successful agreement, the railroads need to know that
the transit agency has a committed, reliable source of funding. When the sales tax
revenue fell short of projection, RTD was uncertain of the time frame in which the
Northwest line would be built. RTD says it needed to know the costs from the railroads
before it could determine when the line can be built and if it had funding. BNSF said that
they could not produce detailed engineering plans and negotiate an agreement until RTD
had certainty in funding and a short to medium time frame to ensure that the railroad
protected its interests for future capacity needs. RTD blamed BNSF and BNSF blamed
RTD, and they went in circles. This then spilled over into the newspapers, where the
“dirty laundry” from the discussions was aired out in public. When parties do not protect
each other’s reputations in the media, it hurts future negotiations and ends the partnership
mentality of agreement discussions.
To add to the situation, the communities along the corridor could not agree on
what made sense in the corridor. Some of the mayors and elected officials were
committed to BRT rather than rail, while other communities dug in their heels for a rail
line. One elected official in the corridor stated that he felt BNSF could see the
disagreement among local governments, and that Boulder, the largest city in the corridor,
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was not really interested in completing the Northwest line, so they determined there was
not really a serious effort to complete the rail line.
Economic competitiveness
Nearly everyone agreed that bringing passenger rail to the Denver metropolitan
region keeps Denver economically competitive with other cities. They believe that it
brings development and employers to the region, citing the relocation of several national
headquarters of companies to downtown Denver near the Denver Union Station transit
hub and DIA. The value of fewer people on the highways and less congestion also
increases economic productivity and competitiveness for the region. One passenger rail
advocate even stated that freight rail does not drive economic development, it is
passengers that do, and the service must be at least every fifteen minutes for economic
development to occur.
The interviewees did not think that sharing rail corridors has a negative effect on
freight railroads. By law, Amtrak is not allowed to impede freight traffic, and if it does,
railroads can petition the Surface Transportation Board. The consensus is that when
negotiating agreements with passenger rail agencies, the freight railroads look out for
their core business, moving freight, and they will not do anything that will detrimentally
affect their ability to serve their customers. While some relocation or buy out of
customers is necessary during relocation or construction, it is up to the railroads to ensure
that their ability to run their service is not reduced. For example, in the east corridor of
FasTracks, when RTD tracks went in on the south side of the corridor, it blocked access
to a few direct freight shippers who had to make alternative transportation arrangements
or use relocation money to relocate elsewhere along the railroad. However, it was
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stressed that the railroads would not have agreed to these terms if they thought it would
make them suffer. RTD has tried to negotiate fairly with both railroads, the BNSF and
UP, to keep the railroads whole, and not give either railroad any advantage over the other.
These deals are voluntary for the railroads and they enter into the deals only if they can
maintain their capacity. In the past, they have entered into agreements where they have
curtailed their service, such as in Chicago when they allowed absolute curfews whereby
the freight railroads could not run their trains during certain peak commuter hours. The
railroads have learned from these past agreements that this does not work for future
capacity concerns. There are also some positive impacts to economic competitiveness to
the railroads sharing their corridors because such agreements can include eliminating or
improving at-grade crossings. These types of operational advantages are good for
everyone, as they help car traffic flow easier and the freight traffic move smoother
through town without as much stopping and downtime.
Best Practices
The experts agree that it is important for the passenger agency to have the most
accurate cost estimate possible, and to try to keep the costs from escalating too much. If
costs change substantially, people get angry, and it causes concern for the passenger
agency, the freight railroad, and the public.
One way to keep cost estimates more accurate is for the transit agency (RTD) to
have an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) with every community along a corridor
before entering into negotiations with the freight railroad. This helps to define what RTD
is doing on the project, and what the community is doing on the project. For example, if
a community wants sidewalk near the track and station, RTD may think it is the
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community’s responsibility, the community thinks it is RTD’s responsibility. Additional
ROW may need to be purchased, and then costs go up. RTD learned from previous
experiences, and they were able to negotiate IGAs for the North Metro line before issuing
a RFP for that line. This helps keep cost estimates more accurate.
Think ahead about everything the agency might need from the railroad, and tie it
all into one package. For example, the freight railroad may not be willing to negotiate
small issues like grade separations and crossings or to sell smaller corridor segments
unless it is tied to a larger deal. It is not worth the price to the railroads to process such
small deals (the cost of paperwork, lawyers, etc.). RTD was able to get things packaged
together that they otherwise would not have been able to get, while they had them at the
table for larger acquisition deals.
The passenger agency needs to show how the railroad will come out ahead even
before beginning discussions. They also need to show that they know what they are
doing and what they are talking about in negotiations. The transit agency needs to employ
staff members who understand the operations and infrastructure requirements of the
freight railroad, either as consultants or in-house employees. Passenger rail agencies must
be able to see things from the freight perspective as a business with stakeholders who
need to make money. Approaching the railroad with honesty and good faith is the way to
achieve good agreements.
Both the freight and passenger rail sides must have people who know the local rail
issues, and not just send people from the headquarters, Fort Worth (BNSF) or Omaha
(UP), to negotiate. The freight railroads benefit the most when the transit agency can
help address local rail issues that the higher ups may not be aware of.
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It is incredibly important for the passenger agency to be able to show that they
have a secure source of funding and feasible time frame for project completion. The
freight operations need to see that passenger rail is committed to completing the project
in a short to medium timeframe to ensure that the costs are accurate.
One best practice for both the freight and passenger agencies is to not air out
"dirty laundry" from negotiations. The two sides should be partners and strive to protect
the reputations of both entities in the public eye. Pointing fingers or assigning blame for
failures in negotiation talks can quickly sour any working or future relationship.
One expert suggested that all successful agreements are where the agency buys
the ROW, as RTD did for all of its corridors except the Northwest line. He stated, “It is
not a good agreement if you don’t control the switches.”
Several people suggested that incrementally adding capacity is the way to get
good commuter service. Examples they pointed to were the Minneapolis North Star and
Seattle Sounder services. Starting a high level of service, such as 55 trains a day, can
disrupt the freight operations significantly and require much higher capital contributions
for improvements.
The planning process should not take place in isolation, and the process needs to
address passenger rail needs, highway needs, and freight flow needs. Collaborative
planning can accomplish a win-win-win scenario, for example improved grade crossings.
Freight rail and passenger rail need combined solutions, not one at the expense of
another.
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Future shared use corridors and future of agreements
Most people agreed that the most feasible and probable location for future shared
corridors is along the Front Range running north and south of Denver. The interviewees
had varying opinions of the breadth of a potential Front Range rail system, but it could
generally span from as far south as Albuquerque, NM to as far north as Cheyenne, WY,
closely paralleling Interstate 25. The more likely scenario is within 20-25 years, building
Front Range Rail north from Pueblo to Colorado Springs to Denver and on to Fort
Collins, mostly along BNSF track with some UP trackage rights. This corridor would be
suitable for passenger rail because population is expected to grow along the Front Range
by over two million people in the next 25 years, from four million to six million. There is
little room to expand the highway in key highway corridors in the region. Several
Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) studies supported the feasibility of
either commuter rail or high-speed rail along the Front Range corridor. The CDOT North
I-25 Environmental Impact Statement (2011) recommended commuter rail as the
Preferred Alternative along the northern section of I-25 from Denver to Fort Collins. An
update to the I-25 commuter rail study was published in 2015 to update the right-of-way
needs of such a project and provide better cost estimates due to relationships with the
freight and passenger rail service and changes in the economy (CDOT 2015b). The
Rocky Mountain Rail Authority (RMRA) completed a High-speed Intercity Passenger
Rail (HSIPR) Feasibility Study in 2010, which analyzed a high-speed rail corridor from
Cheyenne, WY to Trinidad, CO as well as along the I-70 corridor from Denver to Grand
Junction, CO. It concluded that HSIPR is feasible along shorter sections of these
corridors, from Fort Collins to Pueblo and from DIA to Eagle County Regional Airport
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near Vail, Colorado (CDOT 2015a). The RMRA recommended a follow-up study called
the Interregional Connectivity Study (ICS), which was completed in 2014. The ICS found
HSIPR to be most feasible along the I-25 corridor because it would connect the most
dense areas of population. Another study, Advance Guideway Feasibility Study (AGS)
looked at HSIPR along the I-70 corridor from Golden, CO to Eagle County Regional
Airport. The AGS and ICS recommended two levels of phasing to implement the HSIPR
vision and did not identify specific sources of funding (CDOT, 2015a).
According to RTD, Northwest commuter rail is still going to be built as part of
FasTracks, when RTD has the money. Current estimates peg completion of the
Northwest rail line sometime in the early 2040s. Additional corridor sharing projects
beyond FasTracks are not on the horizon for RTD. Amtrak is considering expanding
service from La Junta to Pueblo as part of a reconfigured Southwest Chief route, with
current plans to begin thru car service to Pueblo in anticipation of this expansion. While
some rail options exist to share track along Interstate 70 with UP running west from
Denver, few people mentioned this as a likely option in the near future.
One recommendation from RTD staff was to preserve as much corridor as
possible to avoid having to deal with negotiating these types of deals in the future, even
though expanded rail service will likely not be needed for the next 20-25 years. The
Northwest rail corridor was offered to RTD in the 1990s for “peanuts” when freight
traffic was waning, but RTD did not have cash to buy it then. If they had, they would
have been able to avoid the contentious negotiations for later acquisition of access to the
corridor. The transit agency has tried to learn from this, and would hope to buy
additional ROW along the corridors for future expansion.
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Discussion of an eastern freight bypass to move freight rail activity out of
downtown Denver waxes and wanes with the volume of freight flows. It could free up
more capacity for passenger rail and more land downtown for redevelopment. The North
I-25 EIS decision was based on the assumption that as eastern bypass would be built, but
the 2015 I-25 commuter rail update study was needed since it does not look like the
bypass is a feasible alternative. Is there a cooperative solution for moving freight that can
benefit both parties? The local experts see more cooperation in the future for freight and
passenger rail because of pressure on both sides.
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Figure 5: Proposed I-25 commuter rail, Northwest Area Mobility Study (CDOT 2012)

Government policy for Shared-Use Corridors
Most passenger representatives view more government intervention as positive,
but they do not necessarily think the federal government should mandate policy for
shared-use corridors. Shared-use corridors should be looked at on a case-by-case basis
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because shared-use does not make sense in all situations- it is only one tool in the toolbox
for expanding passenger rail.
One way the government can support shared-use is through the continuation of
federal grant and loan programs such as TIFIA, RRIF, and TIGER programs. The feds
can also help by integrating services and facilitating cooperation and collaboration among
agencies like the EPA, HUD, and USDOT to improve innovation. The federal
government should not intervene and dictate, but instead should facilitate cooperation
amongst passenger and rail operations.
A few people had specific suggestions for how the government could get more
involved in shared-use agreements. Passenger rail is not currently subject to the STB’s
jurisdiction (except for Amtrak interactions with railroads), but the STB or another
national body could act as an oversight body to allow disputes or stalled negotiations
between passenger and freight operations to come before them. Currently, if an
agreement cannot be reached, then the passenger agency is the one that has to walk away.
On the other hand, the general feeling is that the freight rail operators are smart people
who will figure out a way to work with passengers to prevent the feds from getting
involved. Another suggestion is for the federal government to amend the environmental
process to allow railroads to be at the table during the EIA, so the passenger agency could
have the ability to acquire ROW before the environmental process is completed.
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Figure 6: Light rail and CML Lower Downtown, Denver. Photo Credit: Julie Cidell

Conclusion and recommendations
Demand for passenger rail service within and between cities in the U.S. will
increase the need to develop shared use rail corridors. As local transit and state agencies
seek to expand their commuter rail service, freight rail corridors are often the most
feasible locations for expansion or development within an already built-up city. Shareduse corridors include shared track, shared right-of-way, or shared corridors. Amtrak is the
only entity that has the legal right to operate on private freight railroads. All other entities
must negotiate an agreement with a host railroad to operate on their tracks or within the
railroad right of way.
This study sought to examine the public-private partnership aspect of passenger
rail agencies sharing rail corridors with private freight rail companies. The case study
approach was applied to the Denver metropolitan area and the state of Colorado. After
the 2004 FasTracks ballot measure was passed to expand RTD’s rail network, the transit
agency looked to freight corridors to build out the rail lines. This study described and
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analyzed shared corridors in the FasTracks system. In addition, this study describes how
the threat of moving the Amtrak’s Southwest Chief out of Colorado prompted a
collaborative effort between public and private agencies to raise capital to invest in
upgrading tracks and technology to keep the line moving through southeast Colorado.
The study used in-depth interviews with railroad personnel, transit agency
representatives, and rail advocates to answer the following research questions: What is
the current status of rail corridors in Denver and how have public agencies acquired and/
or shared use of rail corridors with freight railroads? How do shared-use rail corridors in
Denver impact economic competitiveness for both freight and passenger rail service?
What are best practices for future shared-use rail agreements? This study is significant
since Denver and Colorado provide a recent case study on shared-use agreements that
have been both collaborative and contentious, resulting in examples of both successful
and unsuccessful shared use agreements.
The response to the threat of discontinuing Amtrak’s Southwest Chief service
through Colorado is seen as a successful example of cooperation between public-private
partners. The renegotiation of Amtrak’s contract with BNSF resulted in benefits for all
stakeholders through contributions from federal, state, and private funding to improve
track and contribute to additional maintenance costs. RTD currently operates light rail
and commuter rail service and entered into several shared-use agreements with both
Union Pacific and Burlington Northern Santa Fe. Most of the agreements were negotiated
as outright purchases of right of way. The Northwest Rail is not built yet, partly because
of escalating costs to share the corridor and tracks from the host railroad, BNSF, because
of increased freight traffic along the corridor. The shared-use of a rail corridor involves
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agreements being reached in three areas: the purchase of the real estate, relocation of
freight rail and construction of passenger rail, and ongoing operation and maintenance
agreements or shared-use agreements.
Private freight railroads are not obligated to share their corridors with public
agencies other than Amtrak. Negotiations can be contentious, as was the general
consensus of interviewees involved in RTD negotiations. Cost is often a major obstacle in
negotiations, and inaccurate cost estimates or out of date estimates can result in major
sticker shock when it comes time to approach the host railroad. The Northwest rail line is
an example of a corridor where costs increased over time since the passage of the
FasTracks ballot measure. Negotiations involving shared track are often more difficult
than acquiring right of way within a corridor. Economic competitiveness for the freight
rail industry is not affected by entering into shared-use agreements, otherwise, the private
companies would not do it. That is part of the negotiation process, making the railroads
whole.
The research on Denver’s shared-use corridors revealed several lessons learned
and best practices for future shared-use agreements. Passenger agencies should attempt to
establish the most accurate and timely cost estimate as possible. Creating
intergovernmental agreements (IGA) is one strategy to lessen the escalation of costs
during the planning process. Another way to ensure accurate estimates from the freight
side is to be sure the passenger agency has a secure source of funding and that the project
can be completed in the short to medium timeframe. Packaging smaller acquisitions into
a larger corridor negotiation is a good practice to limit the costs to the railroad company
of negotiations. It is imperative that the passenger agency knows the railroad business
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and employs people who know the infrastructure and operation needs of the freight
business. Beginning early in the planning process for potential rail service is key, and
collaborative planning can result in benefits to the public and private partners. Corridor
banking is another successful strategy for passenger agencies to reduce the contentious
negotiations with freight rail when the money is available. RTD has moved forward with
this strategy to purchase additional ROW on the G-line and North Metro Line, even
though there is not an immediate plan to build in those corridors. Finally, keep
negotiations and “dirty laundry” out of the media because this can adversely affect the
relationship between host railroad and passenger agency.
Future growth in shared-use corridors is likely to increase. Several CDOT studies
point to the Front Range corridor as the next feasible expansion of rail in Colorado,
followed by the I-70 corridor west of Denver. These corridors will require close
collaboration and planning with the host railroads in each case. Most interviewees did not
see the need for federally mandated shared-use policies, but the role of the federal
government is important for grant and loan programs to support shared-use cooperation.
Amending the federal environmental process to allow host railroads to be involved during
the assessment could help smooth the process of acquiring ROW.
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Chapter Four: Public-private partnerships with public transit, local government
agencies, and ridesourcing in Denver, CO
Introduction
In recent years, there has been an explosion in the shared economy that has
brought innovation and efficiency to many sectors, from buying and selling goods, to
renting new forms of lodging accommodations, to transportation provision. Shared
mobility in particular has boomed since the introduction of bikesharing, carsharing, and
ridesourcing and their interaction with the on-demand economy that utilizes smart-phone
application technologies to provide mobility options on demand. The use of shared
mobility has the potential to reduce car ownership, expand mobility options, and generate
higher utilization of public transit services. Ridesourcing, the use of private vehicles and
drivers summoned by smartphone apps such as Lyft and Uber, along with the entrance of
autonomous vehicles (AVs), is seen as potentially contributing to the end of private
vehicle ownership. The co-owner of Lyft, John Zimmer, has proclaimed that “by 2025,
private car ownerships will all but end in major U.S. cities” (Zimmer, 2016). However,
legal issues surrounding employment designations, privacy issues, and regulation by
public agencies have tempered innovation in the ridesourcing arena. In addition, some are
concerned about the impact of ridesourcing on the public transit network. Still others see
ridesourcing as an answer to the first/ last mile conundrum of transit and the easy and
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cheap way to expand mobility options for many. Public-private partnerships between
ridesourcing companies and public agencies are just getting off the ground around the
U.S., with pilot programs between local governments and transit agencies and several of
the largest ridesourcing companies, Uber and Lyft. With proper integration of
ridesourcing with public transit and local municipalities, these new P3s could greatly
affect the cost and efficiency of transportation provision across the U.S. The full benefits
and shortcomings of utilizing ridesourcing as a partner to provide services or integrate
with public transit have not yet been fully researched.
Using interviews with public and private agencies involved in ridesourcing P3s
and desktop analysis, this research seeks to address the gap in the literature of P3s and
ridesourcing by documenting the characteristics of pilot programs across the U.S, and
addressing two specific partnerships in the Denver metropolitan region. This research
identifies how transit agencies and local governments are partnering with ridesourcing
companies to enhance their mobility offerings through improved first-last mile
connections and on-demand services, document the pilot programs produced thus far, and
measure their success in achieving the goals of both the private and public sector
partners. Finally, the research addresses the benefits and drawbacks of contracting out
services to ridesourcing companies and suggests recommendations for agencies seeking
to enter into public-private partnerships.
Research questions
•

How are transit agencies and local governments partnering with ride-sourcing
companies, both locally and nationally, to address mobility goals? (first-last mile
connections, use during off-peak transit hours, paratransit substitute)
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•

How successful have Denver area pilot partnership programs been in addressing
their mobility goals?

•

What are the benefits and drawbacks of public private partnerships between
public agencies and ridesourcing companies?

Background
Facilitated by recent advances in technology, the sharing economy/ collaborative
consumption has exploded in recent years. The on-demand environment enabled by
smartphone technology as well as an increased focus on sustainability has fueled the
explosion in many sectors (Nadler 2014). Rachel Botsman, the author of What’s Mine is
Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption (2011), recently clarified some of the key
definitions in the collaborative consumption movement. The sharing economy is used to
describe “an economic system based on sharing underused assets or services, for free or
for a fee, from individuals” (Botsman, 2015). Collaborative consumption is “the
reinvention of traditional market behaviors- renting, sharing, bartering, gifting- through
technology and on a scale not possible before the internet” (Botsman, 2015). The
ridesourcing services described in this research are facilitated by the expansion of ondemand services- “platforms that directly match customer needs with providers to
immediately deliver goods and services” (Botsman, 2015).
On-demand technology has facilitated the development of shared mobility
services as people search for alternatives to the single-occupancy vehicle (SOV). Shared
mobility encompasses several different mobility services including car sharing, bike
sharing, ridesharing, and ridesourcing. (Kodransky and Lewenstein, 2014). Bike sharing
allows individuals to rent a bike for a fee or membership cost for short point to point trips
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usually less than five miles. Many cities in the U.S. now operate or contract with private
companies to run bike sharing systems. Examples of bike sharing systems include Denver
Bcycle, Chicago Citibikes, and New York City bikes. Car sharing refers to a system
where users can rent a car for short to medium distances for occasional trips. Car sharing
may utilize several forms, for example round-trip service that requires the user to return
the car to the same location, one-way service that enables users to return the car to a
different destination than origin, and peer-to-peer car sharing where individual car
owners rent their cars to fellow drivers when not in use (Kodransky and Lewenstein, p. 7,
2014). Companies that operate car shares include Zipcar and Car2Go.
Ridesharing is differentiated from car sharing in that multiple people share the
ride to a common origin or destination. Ridesharing includes vanpool, carpool, microbus,
and demand-responsive transit or paratransit. Paratransit is most often used by older
adults or people with disabilities who cannot use the fixed-route public transit. These
systems are usually very expensive per rider, rising from $14 per ride to $33 on average
from 1999 to 2012, a 138% increase, and are generally operated by public transit
agencies (FTA report 0081 cited in Feigon and Murphy, 2016).
Transportation network companies (TNCs) are “app-enabled chauffer services
that match drivers to passengers (Kodransky and Lewenstein, p. 11, 2014).” Uber and
Lyft are the two largest TNCs in the U.S. The term ridesharing is commonly used to
describe the services offered by TNCs, but ridesourcing and ridehailing are more
appropriate terms to differentiate between carpool or vanpool and Uber and Lyft. The
main difference is that ridesourcing does not use the rider(s) own vehicles. TNCs now
offer a form of ridesharing through services such as UberPool and Lyft Line that match
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passengers with other riders and drivers going in the same direction. This research
discusses the impact of ridesourcing on urban areas and focuses on partnerships between
TNCs and public agencies.
Literature Review
The research on ridesourcing is limited because of its relatively recent and quick
adoption. Privacy and data sharing issues for users of the app-based technology have also
held back extensive research into the efficiencies and bottom lines of private TNCs.
Unlike public transit agency data, which is more widely shared, private, for-profit
companies with competitors keep their data close to the vest. A few prominent data
sharing agreements have been reached, such as a partnership between Uber and the city
of Boston, which has been more hospitable to TNCs than other cities (Dungca, 2015).
The limited previous research conducted on ridesourcing spans a breadth of issues, from
legal issues to quantitative methods of ridematching, to comparisons of taxis and
ridesourcing efficiency. Many questions remain unanswered, and this area is ripe for
research as TNCs are quickly expanding their modal share in urban centers throughout
the world.
Oversight of ridesourcing TNCs also generates issues around collaborating with
public agencies. Taxi cab companies have long been regulated and subject to oversight by
government, while TNCs’ recent arrival on the transport scene has managed to skirt many
of those regulations and employment practices. Cab companies have filed lawsuits
against Uber, upset over the taxi companies’ loss of revenue, higher operating costs due
to compliance with regulations, and more extensive and expensive background checks.
Lyft and Uber have also been involved in litigation about whether their employees are
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independent contractors or employees, which greatly affects the tax burden and costs of
TNCs based on the designation (Lichten & Liss-Riordan, 2017). Each state, region, and
city has treated the TNCs differently, some fostering a friendlier atmosphere of
cooperation, while others push an atmosphere of regulation.
Cramer and Krueger (2016) found that TNCs are more efficient than taxis in
terms of the amount of time the driver spends with a passenger in the car, known as the
capacity utilization rate. They found that it was 50% for Uber and between 30-50% for
taxis depending on the city. The authors point out the inefficient taxi licensing
regulations and Uber’s flexible labor supply model which can better match supply of and
demand for drivers as reasons for the differences. Utilization of technology is also seen as
an important factor in higher capacity utilization rates. Rayle et al. (2016) found that
ridesourcing trips had a higher vehicle occupancy rate than taxis, and this may be due to
the social nature of most ridesourcing trips. Ridesourcing trips had an average of 2.1
passengers compared to an average of 1.1 for taxi trips.
Both Lyft and Uber tout their abilities to keep drunk drivers off the road.
Greenwood and Wattal (2015) found that the presence of ridesharing in a city decreased
rates of alcohol related car fatalities, but that this effect is diminished with “surge
pricing 15” in effect. Dills and Mulholland (2016) found a reduction in fatal crashes and
1 4F

DUIs in over 150 cities with ridesharing. Through an analysis of transportation survey
data, Young and Farber (2019) found that in Toronto, 20-29 year olds use ride-hailing
services at the highest rates and between the hours of 11pm and 5 am for “other purpose

15

“Surge pricing” is a term used by Uber to describe an increase in the price of a ride based on highdemand. Lyft uses the same strategy and calls it “prime-time” pricing.
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trips” (not commuting, household trips, etc.), therefore suggesting, but not proving, that
these ride-hailing trips are likely helping users to avoid drunk-driving. Brazil and Kirk
(2016), however, found no association with the availability of Uber and drunk-driving
related fatalities in 100 of the largest U.S. metro areas.
Some studies have focused on the effects of ridesourcing on traffic volume and
congestion. There are mixed results on whether they increase or decrease traffic. Li et al.
(2016) found that after Uber enters a market, traffic congestion goes down, and
Alexander and Gonzalez (2015) found similar results with high to moderate adoption of
ridesourcing in an area. A traffic study by Fischerbaum and Bialik (2015) of the site
FiveThirtyEight based only on number of pickups stated that Uber vehicles were merely
replacing taxis, as the number of Ubers in the street increased by 3.82 million and taxis
decreased by 3.83 million. Others question the assertion that ridesourcing does not impact
congestion levels, pointing out that it is based on assumptions that ridesourcing is
replacing drive-alone personal car trips and not transit or active transport trips. Most Uber
and Lyft trips still only carry one passenger. Henao (2017) found that ridesourcing
increases VMT by 185%, which can clearly impact congestion levels. More research is
needed on the question of how ridesourcing affects traffic or if it can lead to fewer people
owning cars in the future.
Many have wondered if the increase in ridesourcing means the end of public
transit. Kuhr et al. (2017) does note the potential for widespread ridesourcing to eliminate
transit, especially if integrated with autonomous vehicles, but only if the price of the
service drops very low. Many studies looking at the effects of ridesourcing on public
transit have found that the services complement public transit rather than threaten it.
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TNCs could complement and enhance public transit by addressing problems that have
long plagued transit, including the first and last mile connection, expensive paratransit
and call-n-ride services, and filling in geographic and time gaps in the network. A 2016
survey by APTA reported that users of shared mobility services are more likely to use
transit and own fewer cars than the general population (Feigon and Murphy, 2016; Rayle
et.al., 2016). Several studies have found that people most frequently use ridesourcing for
social and recreation purposes (Feigon and Murphy, 2016; Young and Farber, 2019;
Rayle et al., 2016). These social/ leisure trips are usually during late night hours when
public transit operates at lower frequencies, and the ridesourcing trips more likely
substitute for car trips rather than public transit trips (Feigon and Murphy, 2016; Young
and Farber, 2019). Hall et al. (2018) found that Uber was more likely to complement
transit in cities with low transit ridership and substitute for transit trips in cities that had
already high public transit ridership. A 2015 study by fivethirtyeight.com (Silver &
Fischer-Baum, 2015) notes that in New York City, Uber combined with public transit
trips becomes cost-competitive to car-ownership much more quickly than ridesourcing
alone. People who combine Uber trips and public transportation can go carless and
achieve higher mobility than with either mode alone. Young and Farber (2019)
concluded, however, that the mode share of ride-hailing trips is too inconsequential to
influence the mode share or ridership of either public transit or cars, but as the share of
ridehailing trips grows, it will become an issue especially for the younger generation
(below 40), which had the highest rates of ridehailing use.
Zimmer’s proclamation of the end of the private vehicle raises some concerns for
lower-income populations and suburban areas if private vehicles are replaced solely by
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ridesourcing and AVs rather than enhancing public transit. One obstacle to public transit
collaboration with the private sector is the differing goals of the two sectors. In a recent
paper for the Transportation Research Board, Kuhr et al. (2017) point out the potential
challenges of relying too heavily on private ridesourcing companies. There is the
potential for service disruption, monopolistic practices, and revenue changes to the public
sector from falling parking and traffic violations. They also note the social inequity of
such services because of price and the private companies’ ability to refuse service. TNCs
are for-profit companies that have no obligation to serve certain geographic areas or
socio-economic levels or even less-abled passengers. There have been instances where
Lyft or Uber drivers have refused to pick up blind passengers with service dogs or
disabled people who require additional time for the service.
Public agencies have the opportunity to engage with shared-modes, including
TNCs, to ensure that the benefits of ridesourcing are shared widely and equitably with all
potential users (Feigon and Murphy, 2016). Collaboration through public-private
partnerships can steer for-profit companies to connect with lower-income users and in
less-dense areas that they might not otherwise choose to service. Government officials in
some cities have experience collaborating with bikesharing and carsharing companies and
can build off these partnerships to enhance shared-use mobility. Feigon and Murphy
(2016) suggest transforming public transit agencies into mobility agencies that oversee
multiple modes with the goal to maintain accessibility, equity, and expand mobility
options. If public agencies engage with ridesourcing through P3s, they can supplement or
encourage transit rather than threaten it and address the challenges of increased
transportation via TNCs if the collaboration is negotiated properly (Kuhr, 2017).
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There is promising potential for collaborative P3s in multiple areas, including in
the integration of ridesourcing technologies with already established public transit
services. For example, the app-based technology could improve paratransit and demand
responsive services that can cost public agencies up to $33 per ride. By either contracting
with TNCs to directly provide transportation or using their customer technology
interfacing and ridematching, these services could be provided more inexpensively and
with improved quality (Feigon and Murphy, 2016). Kuhr et al. (2017) presents a
framework for P3s in ridesourcing, based on contracts with other transit projects,
including Denver’s Eagle P3 project to expand commuter rail infrastructure. They remark
on both public and private sector benefits to ridesourcing P3 and offer P3s as a potential
solution to the some of the pitfalls of private transportation provision through TNCs.
Ridesourcing P3 pilot programs in the Denver Metro Area
In 2014, the state of Colorado was the first to pass statewide legislation to
regulate TNCs. In some ways, this legislation has made it harder for TNCs to operate in
the state, especially in rural areas of the state, because of the strict regulations for drivers
regarding background checks, vehicle inspections, and prohibiting felony convictions.
Despite this early regulation, the Denver metropolitan region of Colorado is a good study
area because of the atmosphere of partnership thus far by the state and region. TNCs have
used Denver as a testing ground for several programs, including being one of the first
cities where TNCs introduced their ridesharing programs including UberPool and
LyftLine. UberPool and LyftLine allow users to choose an option to share their ride with
another passenger for a reduced fare. The city of Centennial, a suburb of Denver,
recently operated a P3 pilot program with Lyft and other private and public partners to
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provide transportation between the Dry Creek Regional Transportation District (RTD)
light rail station and its nearby service area. This pilot program used the TNC model in
place of paratransit and call and ride services to facilitate the first-last mile connection to
transit. The University of Denver entered into a pilot program with Lyft as well, utilizing
Lyft as a test for a campus shuttle, safe ride home for students, and a first-last mile
connection to the University of Denver light rail station. The results of these innovative
pilot programs will serve to inform future ridesourcing collaborations and how to best
integrate public transit and TNCs in the future.
Research methods
In this research, I use multiple methods to address the research questions in the
study. First, I conducted an analysis of newspaper articles, academic literature, and
interviews with experts in public transit, ride-sharing, and local government to develop an
overview of public-private partnerships with TNCs that have developed in various cities.
Then I focused on the pilot programs in the Denver metro area. I used semi-structured
interviews and analysis of data and reports to investigate the success of the partnerships
of public agencies with ridesourcing companies in the Denver metropolitan area, how
these partnerships have addressed the mobility needs in the region, and the costs and
benefits of contracting with ride-hailing companies.
I audio recorded most interviews, transcribed the recordings and notes, and then
coded the interviews to identify common themes. I use semi-structured interviews in this
research, which allowed me to develop open-ended, content-focused questions while still
allowing for flexibility and change during the interview (Dunn, 2010). The interviews
provide a variety of perspectives from both private and public sector actors, including
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representatives from Lyft and Uber, the City of Centennial, the City and County of
Denver, the University of Denver, and the Regional Transportation District (RTD).
The next section provides a discussion of the results of the research, beginning
with how different actors in the public and private sector define a partnership. Then I
provide an overview of P3 pilot programs from the Denver metropolitan region,
including their goals and purposes. The themes that emerged from the interviews and
document analysis are discussed next, including the benefits and difficulties of P3s with
TNCs, the changing role of the transit agency, recommendations for agencies seeking out
P3s, and the future of such partnerships.
Discussion of results
Defining a partnership
The term public-private partnership is sometimes used to describe the contractual
relationship between a transportation network company and a public agency. One
definition of a P3 centers on the transfer of risk, from public to private, private to public,
where the best entity to take on risk will do so. For example, a public agency may take on
the risk of public utilities location and relocation in an infrastructure project, while the
private agency would take on the risk of construction or design malfunction. RTD was
the first transit agency in the United States to enter into a full Design-Build-FinanceOperate-Maintain (DBFOM) P3 agreement to build the Eagle P3 rail line in Denver. In
addition, the City and County of Denver recently opened the Performance-Based
Infrastructure Office to “improve the lives of Denver residents by leveraging privatesector financing and expertise to build, operate, and maintain City-owned projects when
that approach would deliver the best value” (Performance-Based Infrastructure, 2019).
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But there is a substantial difference between partnering to building something like a rail
line and partnering to provide a service. In a public-private partnership with a TNC, the
main objective or definition of a partnership may not be the transference of risk.
Centennial, CO, the public partner in the Go Centennial case study discussed below, has
a history of contracting with the private sector to provide many of their municipal
services, including public works. Because of their history contracting out to both public
and private partners for municipal services, it was not a major leap for them to pilot a P3
to address first and last mile issues.
P3s are perceived to be an innovative solution for transit agency service
provision. According to a transit agency representative, however, contracting is nothing
new. RTD currently contracts out nearly 50% of its fixed route bus services and 100% of
their commuter rail operations to private operators. Additionally, they contract out 100%
of their on-demand service, which includes Call-n-Ride and Access-a-Ride. These
contractors include taxi cab companies, which RTD has used for decades. According to
the RTD representatives, partnerships involve more than just payment for services. What
makes a true partnership with a TNC is, in the transit agency’s view, the TNC bringing
something new to the agency, such as being able to utilize the on-demand, ride-matching
smartphone technology of an Uber or Lyft to better address on-demand transit needs. Or
to enable the transit agency to have a more flexible non-dedicated vehicle fleet to address
peak commuter needs and demand. This could be a more cost-effective way of providing
potentially better quality service. So the reasons to enter into a relationship with a TNC
are different than just risk transference as in a typical infrastructure P3. And they are
different than just contracting with, say a cab or bus company. With increased private
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sector participation at all levels of the public realm, the concept of what a P3 is has
changed.
According to a representative of a TNC, the definition of a “partnership” is it
must be a special contractual agreement or arrangement. If a public agency uses “off-theshelf products,” such as special coupon codes or subsidies, the public agency is merely
paying for something that does not require a contractual relationship. Competing for and
being awarded a contract to provide service through an RFP process is considered a
partnership. As an example, Lyft has a program called Lyft for Business, which enables
any company to utilize the TNC to provide transportation or subsidies for people, but this
is not considered a “P3”.
So why would a transit agency want to contract with a TNC or any other service
provider? Cities, states, and other public agencies are increasingly looking to the private
sector to save money in cash-strapped times with reductions in public funding and
expenditures. The benefits of a typical contract with a private service provider might be
lower costs and/ or better service. There are additional benefits for both the public and
private partners in a P3, as discussed below. Essentially, a partnership with a TNC and
public agency is defined by both parties as one that goes through an RFP process and is a
contractual agreement resulting in the contract going to the lowest cost, highest qualified
bidder. In addition, a true partnership, according to the transit agency, would utilize the
new technology of the TNC to provide better use of current vehicle fleets and address
peak demand.
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Examples of recent P3s with TNCs in the U.S.

Public Agency

Location

Dates

Cost/ Subsidy

TNC
partner

City of Centennial
(Go Centennial)

Centennial, CO

Free rides to rail
station

Lyft

GoMonrovia

Monrovia, CA

August
2016-Feb
2017
March 2018

$.50 rides

Lyft

Pinellas Suncoast
Transit
Authority (PSTA)
City of Altamonte
Springs, Lake
Mary, Longwood,
Maitland, Sandford

Pinellas Park,
FL

2016

Up to $3 subsidy

Uber

Altamonte
Springs, FL

2016-2018

20% subsidy
25% subsidy for
trips
beginning/ending at
Sunrail station

Uber

City of San
Clemente

San Clemente,
CA

2016

$2 ride + $9
subsidy on rides on
former OCTA
corridor

Lyft

City of Summit

Summit, NJ

2016

Free (with prepaid
parking permit) or
$2 to and from
station

Uber then
Lyft

Table 6: Selected national partnerships with TNCs

Case studies and partnership examples
The metropolitan region of Denver, Colorado has been the site of several
innovative partnerships between the public and private sector in transportation. In
particular, in the area of transit provision and service expansion, the Go Centennial pilot
project stands out as an example of a partnership between the private TNC, Lyft, and the
City of Centennial. In addition, the University of Denver piloted a project with Lyft. This
section provides details of these pilot partnership projects, the results of the pilots, and
the role of each in serving as a model for future partnerships.
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Go Centennial Pilot project
The City of Centennial, a suburban area in the Denver metro region, is a young
city. It was formed in 2001 from unincorporated areas of Arapahoe County, Colorado.
Centennial has a history of working with the private sector and contracting out many of
its city services, for example public works, to private companies, including CH2M. After
winning a grant from Bloomberg Philanthropies’ Innovation Team program, the
Centennial Innovation Team (I-team) set out to improve mobility within the city 16. The
15 F

city is included in the RTD service area, but as is typical of suburban areas, it suffers
from infrequent bus service and poor connections to the light rail station within its
boundaries. The eligible service area was approximately four square miles. The I-team
packaged a P3 pilot program to offer free shared Lyft Line rides to and from the Dry
Creek light rail station (see map below).

16

In 2014, Centennial was one of 12 U.S. cities to be selected for The Bloomberg Philanthrophies’
Innovation Team program. It received $1.5 milllion over 3 years to develop an in-house group of
innovation consultants. The goal of the I-team program is to improve the capacity of cities to effectively
design and implement new approaches that improve citizen’s lives. Centennial’s focus was improving
mobility across all modes within the city. The I-team program focuses on using data and innovation to
solve urban challenges. For more information see https://www.bloomberg.org/program/governmentinnovation/innovation-teams/
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Figure 7: Map of Go Centennial coverage area and Dry Creek light rail station (Go
Centennial report, 2017)

The primary goals of the Go Centennial pilot were to increase ridership to the
station by maximizing the first and last mile services and increasing ridership at the light
rail station. In order to provide a direct comparison to the RTD service, Go Centennial
operated in the same boundaries as the RTD Call-n-Ride service, an existing “ondemand” service that picks up and drops off people to the light rail station, for a fare of
$2.60 in 2017 (now $3 in 2019). The service offered a free transfer to other RTD
services, so in essence, the cost to the rider was free if going to the light rail station. The
cost to operate the Call-n-Ride service is heavily subsidized, with an average cost of
$18.50 per one way trip (Go Centennial Report, 2017). Some of the problems with the
Call-n-Ride service at the time were the need to sign up for a reservation in advance,
limited capacity during peak commute times, and less flexibility to meet real-time
demand for the service (Go Centennial report, 2017). The team thought that by providing
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a free Lyft ride to the station, they could increase the ridership on the light rail and
increase the quality of service provided.
The Go Centennial program provided free Lyft rides to and from the Dry Creek
light rail station. The fully-subsidized service could be used between 5:30 am and 7:00
pm. Users had to go through the GoDenver app, a multi-modal trip planning app that was
itself a P3 between the City of Denver and Xerox, later known as Conduent. Through the
GoDenver app, a rider would be required to select a LyftLine option, which had the
potential to match riders to share a Lyft vehicle. In addition, the pilot included the ability
for anyone to request an accessible vehicle (WAV- wheelchair accessible vehicle)
provided through VIA that would take people anywhere within the service area. The Go
Centennial report outlines several types of partners involved in the pilot program: funding
partners, service provision partners, operational partners, and integration partners. The
program was publicly funded with $200,000 each from the City of Centennial and
Southeast Public Improvement Metropolitan District (SPIMD) for the service provision.
Costs for the I-team personnel and the marketing, evaluation and app development costs
came from the Bloomberg grant.
Results of Go Centennial
The partners in the Go Centennial pilot program assessed the results of the pilot
through a quantitative assessment of trip data and a qualitative assessment, using surveys
of users and partners involved. The pilot resulted in 1,302 rides from 127 unique users
between August 2016 and February 2017. Many of the users used the program multiple
times. The final report assessed the success of the pilot at meeting the various goals of the

111

program. They found that the Go Centennial trips taken via Lyft were not likely replacing
walking trips, since only 2 percent of trips were less than half a mile or less (p.24).
One of the best results was in the area of improving services levels for first and
last mile riders. The average time between booking a ride and the arrival of the vehicles
decreased from a minimum of two hours on RTD’s Call-n-Ride to an average of five
minutes for the Go Centennial program, which was a 95% reduction in booking time
from Call-n-Ride (p. 27). The cost effectiveness of both the first/ last mile services and
the paratransit service was also greatly improved. The user fee plus subsidy for the RTD
Call-n-Ride was $21.14 compared to the Go Centennial service which was an average of
$4.70, a decrease of 78%. The user fee plus subsidy for the RTD Access-a-Ride
(paratransit) was $47.82 compared to the Go Centennial Access average cost of $20.07
per ride, a decrease of 42%. However, this is calculated based on whether the accessible
vehicle has been used continuously during the program. Over $45,000 was spent to have
the accessible vehicle in service, but it only made around twenty trips, which is
unsustainable. Increased ridership in a larger service area would better distribute the high
operating costs of the accessible vehicle.

Figure 8: Cost effectiveness and service improvement outcomes for Go Centennial (Go
Centennial Final Report, 2017)
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Some of the goals saw improvements in their metrics, but did not meet the stated
goal. For example, over 60% of users thought that booking a first/ last mile trip was easy,
but it did not reach the goal of 90%. They increased the number of first and last mile trips
to the light rail station by only 4.6%, which was much lower than the target increase of
50% (See Figure 9: Change in first last mile trips).

Figure 9: Go Centennial influence on first and last mile trips to the light rail station (Go
Centennial Report 2017)

The success of the pilot was mixed depending on how success is measured, but an
RTD representative stated, “I consider the Centennial/ Lyft project the premier pilot in
the U.S., not because of something cool, but because they actually did the research.”
Because the Go Centennial project was able to compare the side-by-side services of Calln-Ride to the Lyft pilot, they could compare ridership and users of each service. A Lyft
representative evaluated the partnership as
All in all, the program was a huge success, and a great alpha test that we are
trying to build on in subsequent rounds. The big successes were, we took a lot of
people to the station, more than would have gone [without the pilot]. We didn’t
hit the numbers that Centennial hoped for, but those numbers were very ambitious
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[improving trips to light rail by 50%]. We were very pleased with the number of
people who utilized the program. Cost was extremely low...Key takeaway was we
need to find a better way to do the wheelchair vehicle. (Interview, 2018)
Both the City of Centennial and Lyft stressed the importance of finding the right scale
and geography to operate in an economic and scalable fashion. The accessible vehicle
saw only 19 rides over 6 months, but used about 75% of the project’s service funding.
The partners knew going into the pilot that this was not a sustainable economic model,
but they wanted to provide the accessible service for the community.
RTD’s role in the PPP was as a stakeholder, rather than a partner. This meant that
Go Centennial services were operating in parallel with the RTD services. If the first/ last
mile services were consolidated, then ridership would increase, costs would decrease, and
environmental benefits could increase. Other lessons learned as stated in the Go
Centennial final report were the importance of formalizing pick-up and drop-off
locations, improving the back-end integration, expanding the pilot duration, hours, and
service area, and increasing marketing. They concluded that a larger service area would
likely foster higher ridership and better utilization of the accessible vehicle, thereby this
type of program has the potential to cut the cost of on-demand service provision in half
while also improving the service quality through lower wait times (p.4). The City of
Centennial has not decided to continue the program at this time, but views the pilot as a
program that “provided a successful foundation for the planning and launching of a future
first and last mile program in the region (p. 54).”
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DU Moves
The DU Moves pilot project was a program at the University of Denver that was
designed to test the concept of a campus shuttle, better connect the campus to the light
rail station and bus stops by providing first and last mile connections, provide more
mobility options to reduce the need for a car on campus with Lyft rides around campus,
and provide a safe ride home option for students (See map in Figure 10). Several campus
studies and master plans called for a shuttle around the campus to provide better access to
the light rail station on the north end and dorms and academic buildings on the south end
of campus.
The University is private, so it was not technically a public-private partnership.
The partnership involved the University of Denver, Lyft, and Xfinity by Comcast. DU
acted as the "public" partner, Lyft provided the service and operational support, and
Xfinity by Comcast and DU provided funding for the subsidized rides. These services are
defined as “off-the-shelf” coupon subsidies and did not require a contractual agreement
or data-sharing agreement to be signed. The DU Moves program ran in the summer and
fall of 2017. The subsidy was $2.25 off any Lyft Line ride in the DUMoves coverage
area. There were no time parameters or constraints, but each Lyft user could only use the
coupon ten times. The goal was to get the user cost of a Lyft Line ride to about $2 within
the coverage area.
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Figure 10: Map of coupon code coverage area for DU Moves (Source: S. Brady and Lyft)

Results of the DU Moves pilot
The total number of rides using the coupon was 131. The rides were split into
those beginning or ending at the light rail station and any other ride. The majority of the
rides, 75 of 131, were either to or from the DU light rail station. The peak day for the
DUMoves rides was Wednesdays. This mirrors results from the public transit literature
that shows the peak ridership day is Wednesdays. The time periods of the rides were
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divided into AM-peak, midday, PM-Peak, and late-night. The most rides were taken
during the PM-peak. This option was not heavily utilized as a late-night/ safe trip home
option for students.

Time of day of Lyft Line rides
46
40
30
15

AM-Peak

Midday

Pm-Peak

Late-night

Day of the week of Lyft Line rides
28
24

24

24

15
11
5
Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

Friday

Saturday

Sunday

Figure 11: DU Moves data analysis rides by time of day and day of week

The location data Lyft provided was at the zip code level. This was a problem in
fulfilling the goal to use it as a preliminary data source for where people want and need a
shuttle stop. Although a workaround using two coupon codes enabled Lyft to determine
which rides started or ended at the rail station, the zip code level data were not fine
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grained enough to provide the type of data needed on a small urban campus. The time of
day data was such a large span of time (6 hour increments) that it also did not provide the
type of data needed to inform the hours of a future shuttle. The pilot did show that there
is a need for transportation connections to and from the light rail station.
Purpose of partnerships/ goals
Partnerships with TNCs are usually meant to address several goals or purposes:
improve first and last mile connections, decrease single-occupancy vehicles, encourage
economic development, and improve customer service. Usually, public agencies are also
seeking to maximize the amount and quality of service for minimum cost. Although some
transit agencies have successfully utilized TNCs to take out bus service along a lightly
used route and replace it with available TNC service (see San Clemente), most agencies
seek out TNCs for small-scale service provision. The cars that the independent
contractors use to drive for Lyft and Uber are small vehicles that usually hold between 26 passengers, sometimes more. Their use is limited by their capacity. The TNCs share the
goal to reduce SOVs and car ownership because this will likely lead to an increase in
their market for TNC rides.
First-last mile connections
One main goal of the Go Centennial pilot was to improve first/ last mile
connections, which are a challenge in the area. Getting to the Dry Creek light rail station
via transit is difficult because of infrequent service, and once people were in the car to
drive, they were likely to continue driving to their final destination. In addition, because
the area is a mix of about 50% housing and 50% residential, the last mile to employment
centers was also a challenge for people getting off the rail to their jobs. This challenge
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affects all transit agencies because of the inflexibility of fixed-route buses and rail. RTD
recently completed a first-last mile strategic plan and put out an RFI for mobility on
demand services. RTD’s major ridership on the Call-n-Ride service is first and last mile
connections to transit.
Lyft and Uber both see their role as valuable to address the first/ last mile
conundrum. Lyft notes that first/ last mile connections using Lyft may be the “most
valuable in areas with a robust backbone of transit, but maybe less dense population,” for
example in suburban areas with access to rail. Uber also sees its role as complementary to
transit rather than siphoning rides from public transit. Based on their own observations
of how Uber users apply the TNC service to transit trips, they saw the potential of
partnering with transit agencies to provide complementary services as part of an area’s
mobility network.
Reduce Single-Occupancy Vehicle Trips through shared mobility
One goal of the major TNCs, Uber and Lyft, is to reduce SOV trips and car
ownership overall. They benefit in the long run if fewer people own cars because their
customers would likely use a TNC more often. Some recent research (Clewlow and
Mishra, 2017; Schaller Consulting, 2017; Henao, 2017) has stated that increased mode
share of Uber and Lyft increase congestion, and therefore increase carbon emissions as
well. This has caused backlash from many sides, from the environmentalists to the cardriving citizens increasingly stuck in traffic. Partly because of this backlash, and partly
because their bottom line improves with more paying customers in each car, Uber and
Lyft have increasingly focused on improving their shared services and increasing the
rates of shared rides. Lyft has announced a goal of 50% shared rides by 2020, while they
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are currently at about 1/3 of all rides being shared. Uber also acknowledges that most of
its trips are still SOV trips, but they are continually making steps toward eliminating cars
from the road by improving and encouraging Uberpool and Uber Expresspool. Public
agencies that desire to lower SOV rates can put stipulations in partnerships that riders
must select a shared ride in order to decrease SOV TNC trips that could contribute to
congestion, as was the case in the Go Centennial and DUMoves programs.
Both companies have explored options to complement and encourage the use of
public transit and have stated that they are not trying to replace or compete with public
transit. If fewer people own cars, they are more likely to use all of the other mobility
options, such as bikes, scooters (both TNCs recently bought scooter companies), transit,
and TNCs. Uber and Lyft recently announced partnerships with RTD to display public
transit information in their app. Lyft merely shows “Nearby Transit” options including
scooters and bikes. Uber states it will eventually allow a customer to purchase a RTD
mobile ticket through their platform and currently allows the user to compare travel
modes, including transit, Uber, and Uberpool rides. Lyft also sees an additional role for
them in partnering with transit agencies:
Where we are taking empty buses off the road because I say the only thing worse
than a SOV is a SOB-(bus). [For example in San Clemente], programs where we
can allow transit agencies to remove failing routes and double-down on trunk
lines, and then let us handle the lower density routes, in my mind, that is the best
way for us to work together. At the end of the day what we [all] want is full
vehicles, full buses, and full Lyft vehicles, and that’s how we solve congestion,
pollution, and cost issues. (Interview, 2018)
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Most transportation management agencies, city planners, and transportation officials are
also trying to decrease the rate of drive-alone trips in their city in order to decrease
pollution and traffic congestion. As previously stated, RTD is also concerned with
getting people to use more shared modes.
Economic development/ Parking needs
Economic development also played into the goals of the Go Centennial
partnership. Southeast Public Improvement Metropolitan District (SPIMD) was one of
the public funding partners working with City of Centennial and Lyft. SPIMD found that
employers were having trouble attracting new and talented workers that were most likely
to want to live downtown. The long commute times to Centennial, which by transit would
include a long rail trip and an additional walk on the end, made traveling by car shorter
and easier. SPIMD saw the partnership as an opportunity to expand the economic
development of the city by attracting new talent to the area.
The need to reduce the demand for parking has also been the reason for using
TNCs to provide transit service. The city of Summit, New Jersey provides subsidized
TNCs to meet parking demand at their rail station rather than building a new and
expensive parking structure. The city began a partnership with Uber but recently
switched to Lyft because of its ability to schedule rides in advance. The rides are free for
people who have already purchased a parking pass, and $2 per ride for people who have
not. This equates to the same cost as the daily parking fee. The number of residents
eligible for the program started small, at 100 people, but it has since expanded to 150 and
was approved by Summit voters (Tarrazi, 2017). The Go Centennial P3 also mentioned
parking at the light rail as a concern, although not immediate. The average weekday
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parking utilization rate is near 75%, so parking space is at a premium for light rail users.
If more people take a ridehailing service to the rail, it could free up parking spots and
reduce the need for cruising for parking and increase the reliability of finding parking for
transit users (Co Centennial I-Team, 2017, p. 41)
Improving quality of service
Improving the customer experience and level of service for transit users and the
community in general is another goal of partnerships with TNCs. A major goal of the Go
Centennial pilot was not only to try to increase ridership at the station, but also to
“enhance service and allow people to get service [to and from the station] much faster: in
5 minutes instead of 2 hours [using the Call-n-Ride or access a ride].” The results showed
success in the service quality, through a 95% reduction in wait time for a vehicle. TNCs
are also interested in improving their customers’ experiences, and by partnering with a
city or transit agency, they can offer better experiences such as designated pick up or
drop off zones in front of a transit station or stop, and utilize the curb for waiting and
picking up as well. These goals of partnerships can be mutually beneficial and also
improve service for customers of both the TNC and transit.
Benefits of P3s for TNCs and public agencies
Benefits to TNCs
As stated above, public agencies, whether cities or transit agencies, seek
partnerships with TNCs to meet a variety of mobility goals. In order for these
partnerships to work, there should be mutual benefits to both partners. Both the TNC and
the public agency must get something from the partnership beyond just the money they
would earn or save engaging in a contractual relationship. The representatives of the
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TNCs identified their biggest benefits of partnering with public agencies as increasing
their rides, raising awareness of their product and gaining new users, creating good
relationships with cities and citizens, and especially testing out innovative solutions to
mobility problems and developing new knowledge of how to solve mobility problems in
the current climate.
Both Uber and Lyft representatives acknowledge the short-term benefit of
increasing the number of rides that their companies generated through partnerships with
public agencies. Business development and brand awareness is certainly a driver of P3s
for TNCs. The Go Centennial pilot showed that about 30% of the riders that utilized the
free Lyft rides to and from the light rail station had never used Lyft or another rideshare
before taking part in the pilot. However, each TNC noted that their end goal is not this
short-term access to riders. An Uber rep stressed the organization’s need to be good
corporate citizens to help solve mobility problems that communities might have, and
Lyft’s rep noted that having a good relationship with cities and being a good community
member is an important component of engaging in these partnerships. Lyft has a specific
transit team, which sits on their commercial enterprise team, to develop these
partnerships. In the end the team is judged on the number of rides that they generate, but
the public good component is also a large part of its mission.
This public good aspect of partnering and an increase in customer rides does not
outshine the long-term goals of both companies: to position themselves as the go-to
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company for mobility as a service (MaaS) 17. The more people they get to try their
16F

product, alone or in conjunction with a transit agency, the more likely a person may be to
“get used to the idea that car ownership isn’t an outright necessity like it used to be (Uber
representative),” and the more people that give up their car, the larger the market for
MaaS and for a TNC.
In addition, the idea that these partnerships can provide a testing ground for
innovative mobility solutions and an opportunity to generate new knowledge is key to
TNC willingness to participate in future partnerships. According to Lyft, “we are happy
to work with transit. Even it if doesn’t go exactly right, we learn from it.” Uber is most
interested in the “opportunity to advance a collective knowledge base of how transit and
TNCs…can work together” and “big, bold ideas” to show there are still important step
function changes to be made. In addition, they want to partner on more than just
subsidized rides. While there is a value to passengers and citizens if there is a subsidy,
there are many other places to work together for better passenger experiences. For
instance, changing the traffic flow at transit locations to make it easier for picking up or
dropping off, as well as improve the flow of traffic for other modes as well. Uber is
especially excited about partnerships that are multi-faceted, such as their partnership with
the City of Cincinnati, Ohio that connects mobility to economic development and career
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Mobility as a Service (Maas) describes a movement towards transportation being consumed as a service
rather than a personal product, such as owning a car, bike, or scooter. A key component of MaaS is a onestop travel planner, usually a smartphone app, that integrates multiple mobility services and fare payments.
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development 18. Using pilot partnerships as a testing ground for innovation, mobility
17 F

improvements, and knowledge building is an important benefit to the TNCs.
Benefits to the public agency
The benefits to the public agency are inherently different than those for the TNC.
In the end, the partnership is developed in order to address specific transit goals of an
agency in a cost-effective manner. An RTD representative acknowledged one benefit of
engaging in a partnership with a TNC is the potential to “carry more people more cost
effectively or save money if we are able to coordinate our trips with another service
provider,” especially in terms of on-demand transit provision, such as Call-n-Ride
services. Service expansion by an agency or company is a true benefit, especially for
cities that do not currently have the infrastructure to provide transit service themselves.
One benefit of utilizing a P3 as stated by a Centennial city employee is that it expands
what the city staff can do, while also providing an avenue for more oversight than an
internal employee might be given. The contractual relationship provides for specific
oversight measures by the public agency.
Difficulties/ barriers with P3 partnerships
Despite these benefits, there are difficulties that come with developing a
partnership between public and private agencies. No one in the interviews identified these
difficulties as having the potential to derail the partnership, but being aware of these
issues ensure that all parties can make a more calculated analysis of the costs and benefits
of a partnership. These difficulties may include operational costs, legal agreements, and
institutional barriers.
18

For more information on this partnership, visit https://www.uber.com/newsroom/cities-as-partners/.
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There is an operational cost to participation in a partnership for the TNC. While it
is assumed that the transportation company would benefit through an increase in their
number of rides, the cost in terms of assigned time for staff is worth noting. When a TNC
enters into a partnership, it will often assign a person to work with the city or transit
agency to make sure everything works and that the customer experience is good.
Sometime Uber and Lyft might subsidize portions of a discounted ride as well when
promoting certain partnerships.
For TNCs, the cost of doing business with the public can be paid in time. Speed is
not a quality that the public sector is often known for. According to a representative from
a TNC,
We try to move at the speed of a nimble tech company, and transit agencies are
beholden to so many bureaucratic rules that often things go very slowly. We
understand the reasons, but it would be great if we get to the point where these
types of partnerships are streamlined, and there aren’t so many hoops to jump
through and so much bureaucratic tape. (Interview, 2018)
This “bureaucratic tape” can include legal agreements and the institutional requirements
and barriers to entry for the private sector in transportation.
Legal agreements have both a monetary and time cost. The potential legal back
and forth between parties can extend the time needed to implement a P3. For example, in
the DU/ Lyft pilot project, there were some sticking points in the process of approval by
the university legal team that slowed down the initial launch of the pilot. As shown in
chapter 2 (p. 47), legal agreements require legal expertise which can be costly, especially
for agencies that do not have the expertise in house. TNC P3 legal agreements, however,
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are not usually as complex as an infrastructure DBFOM P3 that might require hiring an
outside legal firm. In fact, a partner in the Go Centennial pilot P3 stated that legal
contracts were not a major hurdle to institute the partnership, since, “our legal agreement
went back and forth twice and was signed really quickly, but I know that’s been a
challenge in some other cities.”
Institutional barriers have the most potential to derail a P3. Institutional barriers
are often put into place by a local, state or federal government in order to receive funding
from different sources. Examples of institutional barriers or requirements include
requiring public participation in a decision-making process, ensuring equity of access, for
example in terms of cash payments and access to smartphone technology, ADA
accessibility, and requiring more stringent background checks and drug testing for
employees. These institutional requirements are a way to ensure the public is being
served by various infrastructure and planning projects, but they may be seen as barriers
by both private companies and public agencies seeking to work together.
Equity is a major concern of transit agencies and rightly so, because the federal
government requires that a transit agency like RTD abide by Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin
if an agency is to receive federal funding. In addition, they must meet all requirements of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. However, TNCs have argued in court that
because they are “technology companies” and not taxi companies that own or lease the
vehicles used to pick up passengers, they do not have to adhere to the ADA guidelines 19
1 8F
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See an example of an ADA case against Uber here: https://www.courthousenews.com/judge-advancesmens-ada-complaint-against-uber
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However, both Lyft and Uber have a mechanism to request an accessible vehicle in some
larger cities, but the ratio of wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAV) to regular vehicles is
very low. It has been found that the number of WAVs in NYC are only 554 of the
118,000 active TNC vehicles (Taft, 2018). While several ADA lawsuits work their way
through different courts, both Lyft and Uber have made efforts to increase their
accessibility standards. This is a major concern for public transit agencies interested in
partnerships with TNCs, since many are specifically interested in using the TNC app
technology to better process on-demand vehicle requests for services such as Access-aRide or Call-n-Ride in the Denver metro area.
As stated in the FTA guidance document for the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),
When a public entity enters into a contractual or other arrangement...with a
private entity to operate fixed route or demand responsive service, the public
entity shall ensure that the private entity meets the requirements of [Part 37] that
would apply to the public entity if the public entity itself provided the service.
(FTA, 2015, p. 1-5)
As further discussed in the guidance for ADA document, “private entities (e.g.
contractors) ‘stand in the shoes’ of public entities with whom they contract to provide
transportation services....while a public entity may contract out its services, it may not
contract away its ADA responsibilities” (FTA, 2015, p.1-5).
Representatives from RTD still see these institutional requirements that the transit
agency must meet to receive federal funding as a major barrier to implementing a
partnership with a private TNC.
Those institutional barriers are significant...it’s pretty darn cool that you can hail a
car by pressing a button on your phone, it’s hard to argue about that, but in those
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confines that we operate in, it makes a partnership prove somewhat difficult.” In
the transit agency’s mind, “for the most part, TNCs tend not to be able to meet
those requirements. So it’s problematic, is it not? (RTD interviewee, 2018)
Some of these regulatory issues are the reason why RTD was initially hesitant, back in
2016, to jump in “feet first” with the Go Centennial pilot. They wanted to make sure that
some of these institutional barriers were worked out during this pilot project. If RTD was
involved as an official partner and used the Go Centennial pilot to replace their Call-nRide service rather than use it in tandem, then they would have had to delay the launch
date to ensure proper adherence to all requirements. In Lyft’s partnership with San
Clemente, however, they
Have figured out ways to comply with FTA requirements so transit agencies can
integrate our services into their program. We’ve heard, ‘you can’t do this,’ but we
can and we are. That’s the message we send to transit agencies. This is something
that is viable, and we can make it work. (Lyft representative, Interview 2018).
Despite their initial hesitance, RTD is interested in working on how to best meet
the requirements for a future partnership with a TNC. One way to try to meet these
requirements is to figure out the best way to offer trips through the TNC, in order to give
certain trips, perhaps for persons with different abilities, to the transit agency, and send
other trips to the TNC vehicles. Transit agencies, including RTD, have experience
contracting out with taxi companies, which usually have the option of dispatching
accessible vehicles as a part of their fleet. In the transit agency’s mind, the contractual
agreement must first meet the institutional requirements, including state, federal, RTD,
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and customer requirements, then they can work on the technology part of trip
coordination.
Withholding federal funding from a transit agency is a way to ensure compliance
with ADA guidelines and Title VI. In terms of equity, there are no regulations requiring
the TNCs to provide unbanked people, those who do not use banks or do not have their
own bank accounts, with access to their services. A recent FDIC survey found that 6.5%
of U.S. households were unbanked in 2017 (FDIC, 2017). There are also no
requirements for TNCs to serve lower socio-economic areas. In the Go Centennial pilot,
the City of Centennial was
Very cognizant of that equity piece and making sure everybody would be serviced
so we paid a lot to have that accessible vehicle in the service area. Without doing
that, I think we could have run into some issues. We also were cognizant about
finding a way for people without smartphones to use it, and because it was free,
we were able to allow people without credit cards through that call in center.
(Interview, City of Centennial representative, 2018)
As a stipulation to entering into a P3 with a TNC, public agencies could require the TNC
to provide certain things that they otherwise would have no leverage to require.
Role of the transit agency
The role of the transit agency came up in the interviews regarding the agency’s
mission and role in providing transit versus mobility. How a transit agency defines itself
and its mission determines whether transit agencies see shared mobility and TNCs as
complementary or competition.
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RTD’s current mission statement is to “meet our constituents’ present and future
public transit needs by offering safe, clean, reliable, courteous, accessible, and costeffective service throughout the district (RTD: Facts and Figures, 2019).” According to
one interviewee, there are two ways of looking at the transit agency’s role in a region.
One is that their purpose is to “run buses and trains;” another is that they should provide
mobility options to the region. LA Metro was offered up as one example of an agency
that embodies the “mobility integrator” definition of a transit agency (Kuhr, 2017). LA
County recently passed two tax resolutions to provide for multimodal transportation
options, including mobility hubs and bike lanes, not just bus and rail transit. Their
mission is to “provide a world-class transportation system that enhances the quality of
life for all who live, work, and play in LA County (LA Metro, 2019).” The three elements
of their vision specifically address providing mobility options. Transit agencies must
innovate or they will be left behind as the private sector quickly enters the transportation
arena. Choosing to partner with TNCs is one way that agencies signal they are willing to
look beyond trains and buses to provide more service options to citizens. An RTD
representative stated:
The role of the transit agency is not to provide bus service. The transit agency’s
role (maybe just my opinion) is to improve mobility through the region. Whether
it’s on a bus, Uber, bike share, or people walking, I don’t think it really matters.
Whether or not our ridership is decreasing as a result of some other innovation
that is happening, I don’t think is a metric we should necessarily be paying
attention to. We should be paying attention to, are more people getting out of
single occupancy vehicles and shared modes, like a lot of the innovative services
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are offering now, more. Because that’s really the primary objective, in my
opinion, of the transit agency: To improve mobility and reduce congestion, by
making any type of shared mobility more attractive to the general public including
people who are driving now. So anytime those services can operate better
together, the consumer understands how they can use a bike share with transit,
with a TNC for example, that’s a good thing. It operates more as a whole system,
rather than in competition. (Interview, 2018).
So transit agencies have the choice to be an agency that provides and integrates
multi-modal mobility options or one that sees other mobility options as a threat to their
services. TNCs are providing new services that are increasingly using characteristics of
transit, such as the LyftLine Saver and Uberpool Express, where passengers share a ride,
but have to walk to a designated pickup spot and end at a drop-off spot and then walk to
their final destination. Do transit agencies compete, complement, or coordinate with these
services? In the Go Centennial pilot, RTD was a stakeholder, but not an official partner.
The Centennial staff were aware that their pilot could be seen as competition, so they did
not want to market it directly to RTD Call-n-Ride passengers. By having both services
compete side by side, RTD saw it as an opportunity to test their Call-n-Ride service
against the TNC model.
RTD also recognizes that it does not make sense to have competing services if
they are serving the same market, so RTD’s position is that they are increasingly
interested in coordinating their services to avoid duplication and direct competition.
If anything is to come of substance from this regional discussion of mobility, it’s
how do we coordinate those [locally free or subsidized] services such that we are
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able to leverage each other’s strengths rather than compete against each other.
That’s part of the discussion with TNCs as well. When Uber launched Uber
Express Pool, there was quite a bit of discussion about how that really looked a lot
like public transit. (Interview, RTD representative, 2018)
And with the price differential of Uber Express Pool approaching the cost of a regional
RTD fare for a shorter ride time, this leads to a discussion of the most effective way to
expend both public and private funds. “It’s like Lyft and Uber are huge transit agencies!”
just technologically enabled.
Another RTD representative, however, asked the questions: “Do you coordinate
or do you just compete? What’s the matter with competition? What’s wrong with that,
just let Uberpool compete. People are getting more options for only a small premium,
able to make a faster, more convenient trip” (Interview, 2018). Because in the end, even
if RTD does take on the role of mobility integrator, they acknowledge that they are not a
taxi service. Complementing and coordinating services could potentially allow TNCs to
offer a transit combo trip, paired with transit. RTD’s transit service can currently be
viewed in both Lyft and Uber’s apps, but one-step payment through their apps is not yet
available.
Recommendations for creating a P3 with a TNC
The public stakeholders interviewed in this study provided some
recommendations for agencies looking to partner with TNCs. Representatives from the
TNCs also offered some advice for agencies in the hopes that future partnerships could
become more streamlined. The recommendations center around the importance of data

133

sharing in a partnership agreement, the importance of marketing for a successful pilot,
and knowing what the market for services is before developing a new service.
Data sharing
Many public agencies are enticed by the potential to mine large amounts of data
from their tech savvy partners at the TNC, hoping to use the mobility data to solve
problems of congestion, transit, parking, and mobility. The amount of spatial data of
citizens’ movements is increasing and has the potential to provide solutions to city woes.
However, TNCs are becoming increasingly concerned with protecting users’ privacy and
data, especially after there were reports that Uber’s app continued to monitor and record
the location of app users up to five minutes after their official Uber trip ended 20. Data
19F

sharing is a key piece of partnership agreements, but agencies should not be given a
dump of private citizens’ data. In some cases, data sharing is not automatic, unless a
specific data sharing agreement is signed. Both public agencies and TNCs expressed the
importance of data-sharing, and each had suggestions about how to satisfy the need for
data on the public side and to protect the customer on the private side.
Privacy issues are very important for TNCs, especially when working with public
agencies that must adhere to laws such as the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) that
require governmental agencies make available most public records to the public.
Agencies should refrain from asking for data just for the sake of it. Agencies can instead
identify what data are truly necessary and be willing to discuss the data-sharing
component of a partnership upfront.
20

Uber was found to be tracking user’s locations on their phones, after they were dropped off. Uber has
since ended this practice. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/29/547113818/uber-ends-itscontroversial-post-ride-tracking-of-users-location.
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It is really important to explain why you want the data, tell [the TNC] the policy
question that you need to answer. Because if you just say, ‘give me what you got,’
that’s not going to work. But if you clearly say, I need this piece of information to
prove to my council member that X, that’s a much more compelling argument.
(Interview, 2017)
Expect to have more access to aggregated data and discuss what level of
geography is needed to answer the policy questions. According to Uber, “Our stance
continues to evolve on what we are comfortable sharing and not, the privacy issue is a
huge one.” In 2016, the city of Boulder partnered with Uber and Lyft to provide rides to
downtown Boulder over the winter holidays. This program was called “Door to
Downtown” and provided a $5 credit for up to five downtown trips, funded by the City of
Boulder and the Downtown Boulder Partnership. According to an Uber representative,
the city began by asking for large amounts of location data and personal information,
such as starting and ending addresses and names, but the availability of the data evolved
to Uber suggesting using zip codes and anonymous, aggregated data on a larger spatial
scale. The DU Lyft pilot did not include a signed data agreement either, which would be
key to getting the kind of data that an agency needs. Zip code level data in a small area
such as the DU campus were not very helpful to fulfill the mission of using the pilot as a
simulation for future shuttle use and stop location.
In the DU Moves pilot with Lyft, DU did not enter into a contractual agreement
and used “off-the shelf” products to subsidize rides. There was no signed data agreement
about what Lyft would provide to the University, which affected the type of data that Lyft
ultimately did provide. Over the course of a year of talks to begin utilizing the subsidized
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coupon codes, it went from being able to get spatial coordinates for each starting and
ending destinations along with start and end times for each trip, to later getting zip code
level data for six-hour increments of time, such as the “late night” or “peak evening
commute” period. This illustrates the changing degree of comfort with TNCs providing
customer and trip data, as well as the realization that data are valuable and should be
provided through a signed contractual agreement.
Uber has attempted to quell the resounding desire for its data by implementing a
data platform called Uber Movement, designed for city planners to use regardless of any
existing partnership with Uber. Data are not available in all markets, but only from select
cities globally, including Boston, Seattle, Washington D.C., Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, San
Francisco, and Los Angeles in the U.S. The data are anonymized and aggregated and can
be used to study travel times, travel speeds, and even new micromobility modes such as
electric bikes and scooters. The data-sharing piece of a partnership is incredibly
important to discuss at the beginning of a partnership, but signing a data-sharing
agreement and negotiating the terms of data-sharing should be based on specific policy
questions that an agency wants to answer.
Marketing and the market
Marketing a new service or product can be challenging, but it is key to the success
of pilot programs. In their follow-up surveys, the Go Centennial partners found that lack
of awareness of the pilot program was the main reason people did not use the service.
On projects like this, the marketing is more than just, hey this exists. People need
to understand exactly how this impacts them, where to pick up, step-by-step of
how they are going to do it, before they are comfortable enough to actually take
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the step and do it. The marketing was a little more challenging and more nuanced
than I had anticipated (Go Centennial interviewee, 2017).
In the Go Centennial Final Report (2017), the team recommends starting comprehensive
marketing early to allow people to plan commutes and understand the new service.
Outreach to the community should be a natural strength and benefit of conducting a P3,
since each sector has its own area of expertise and sphere of influence. For the pilot, the
Go Centennial team decided not to directly market to the Call-n-Ride customers because
they were cognizant that the program could be seen as a competing service. However,
even though RTD was not an official partner and running a competing service, the transit
agency handed out flyers to their Call-n-Ride passengers. They saw the Go Centennial
pilot as a good way to test the market for a new service while still operating their service
side by side. If a future partnership of this kind included RTD, then the target market
would be customers who already use the Call-n-Ride or the Park-n-Ride, as well as car
drivers. They further suggest marketing heavily to employers to reach employees who do
not yet use public transit service.
For future partnerships that seek to develop a new transit service or pilot project,
the Go Centennial team recommended to keep the restrictions and program requirements
as simple as possible, in order to help with the marketing.
To the extent that you can get rid of restrictions in your program, if you can, it’s
24 hours, 7 days a week, just make it as simple as possible. We were telling
people Monday through Friday, 5:30 am – 7 pm. Here is our weird service area.
Are you in the boundary? Here is the coupon code. You gotta go to Lyft, give
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them the phone number, give them all this stuff. I think that initial step was really
hard. (Go Centennial interviewee, 2017)
In addition to developing a detailed and nuanced marketing plan for a new TNC
partnership, it is important for agencies to know the market for the service. Transit
agencies have usually developed a strong understanding of their ridership trends and
users, but other public entities, such as cities, universities, or other agencies that do not
have as much experience with transportation provision may not. RTD representatives
focused on the importance of knowing the market when thinking of how a TNC or other
innovative solution could be incorporated into their service. RTD, which operates the
largest on-demand service in the country, hosts many transit agencies who are interested
in how they provide their on-demand service Call-n-Ride. It is important for agencies to
understand that
Tech isn’t the first or second thing. First, what is the market? What is the travel
pattern? Who is our customer? And then what service meets your needs. Then
maybe tech can help you. It’s the hype. Someone higher up said just get it, not
knowing anything about transportation, much less on-demand transportation,
which is an order of magnitude more complex. (RTD interviewee, 2018)
Knowing why people choose to take transit is key. For example, to downtown
Denver, people largely choose transit to save on parking cost and avoid congestion: “That
is the market for transit” (RTD interviewee, 2017). Do the research about who may be
willing to use the service. For example, in the Go Centennial pilot, the goal of the
program was to increase first and last mile trips to the rail station by 50%, but they
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achieved only a 4.6% increase even though it was a free service. A market for a new
service will not magically appear.
RTD acknowledges the difficulty in promoting transit services, and transit across
the nation only has about 4-5% of the market with ridership currently on the decline. It is
not realistic to think that a new service, no matter who operates it, will magically draw a
new market of customers. Customers have options. For example, the Go Centennial pilot
operated in a suburban location, where transit ridership is closer to .5%. This is arguably
the metric that the I-team should have been evaluating, rather than thinking they could
increase ridership to the average metropolitan area numbers. Today, new options in the
market are the Uber Expresspool and Lyft Shared Saver, which allow for a lower cost,
shared TNC ride that may require the passenger to walk a short distance to their pickup
location. These low cost fares that take a person directly to their destination, are the new
competition for bus and rail service. The price point is closer to the transit fare (which
recently rose for the average RTD user) and are usually quicker without any transfers.
The market is expanding with choice, so knowing the market is extremely important
before establishing a partnership.
Future partnerships
Future innovative partnerships between public and private agencies are likely
throughout the country and in the metropolitan region of Denver. In 2017, the Regional
Transportation District in Denver released a RFI for “Mobility as a Service, Mobility on
Demand and Technology” and received 24 responses under the following categories:
Service delivery (dedicated and non-dedicated vehicles), fixed route shuttles, trip
planning, integrated payment, mobility on demand trip exchange, and branding. RTD
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plans to follow up this RFI to explore adding non-dedicated vehicles, including taxis and
TNCs, to the Call-n-Ride service, which has already been rebranded as FlexRide 21. RTD
20F

sees their role in the future as a “mobility integrator.” The new vision of RTD is that
“RTD’s transit network serves as the backbone for regional shared mobility in metro
Denver. We are uniquely positioned to maximize this investment and be the regional
integrator for metro Denver.” In their “Transportation Transformation” summit and
rebranding effort, RTD specifically highlights the need for pilot projects with private
sector partners and to identify potential for efficient technology-leveraged investment as
key goals of the regional approach to mobility.
RTD is especially interested in how TNCs and RTD can work together to come
up with a better on-demand service by adding the on-demand technology of a TNC to
their current Call-n-Ride services. Assigning different fares to different people could be a
breakthrough use of P3s as well. For example, using a tech on-demand app for the transit
company, an employer could cover the cost of a Lyft Line ride or the city might subsidize
part of the fare and that would provide a lot of flexibility for a rider and the service
provider. Additionally, the ability of a TNC to offer trips paired with public transit
through their app has incredible potential to change the way people access the transit
network.
Conclusion
As more public agencies look for efficient ways to expand mobility options in
their regions, they are looking to the private sector as a source of new technology and to
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For more information about the FlexRide brand, see http://www.rtd-denver.com/FlexRide.shtml
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expand their transit service provision. The pilot programs discussed here provide
examples of innovative uses of P3s in transit.
Public agencies increasingly seek out collaboration with the private sector to
provide more mobility options to citizens. This study sought to identify examples of
innovative public-private partnerships between Transportation Network Companies
(TNCs) and public agencies and describe their successes, benefits, and drawbacks. I
answered the research questions by collecting and analyzing data from semi-structured
interviews, document analysis, and desktop research. Two P3 pilot projects in the Denver
metro area, Go Centennial and DU Moves, were used to examine the research questions
within a case study framework.
As more agencies look to the private sector to decrease costs and improve quality
of service, P3s in transit provision should be studied to provide informed
recommendations to stakeholders and evaluate and document the results of these
partnerships. The full impacts of using TNCs to enhance transit service provision are not
fully understood. This study fills a gap in the transport literature on ridesourcing and
more specifically on P3s with TNCs.
The Go Centennial partnership between the City of Centennial, Colorado and Lyft
tested the use of free Lyft Line rides to improve first/ last mile connections to the light
rail station. While the pilot program did not significantly increase ridership or first/ last
mile connections at the rail station, it was found to improve the quality of service to
passengers. The DU Moves pilot project used Lyft to test the concept of a campus shuttle
and improve first-last mile connections to the light rail station. The predominant use of
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the subsidized Lyft Line rides were to connect to the light rail station, and the time the
rides were used was highest during the peak pm commute hours.
P3s between TNCs and public agencies address the following goals: improve
first-last mile connections, reduce single-occupancy vehicle trips, encourage economic
development, improve customer service, and reduce the demand for parking. For a P3 to
work, there should be mutual benefit to both parties. The benefits to the TNC include
increasing the number of rides they offer, raising awareness of their product to gain new
users, creating positive relationships with cities and their citizens, and testing out
innovative solutions to mobility issues. The benefits for a public agency include meeting
their mobility goals in a more cost effective way and improving quality of service.
Difficulties in establishing a P3 with a TNC, while not insurmountable, include
overcoming institutional barriers and slower implementation times. Data sharing is an
important aspect of P3s and should be clarified upfront in a partnership.
The role of the transit agency is changing, and agencies must choose whether they
will work with or against TNCs. If they embrace the role of “mobility integrator,” more
P3s are likely to take place for transit service provision. The transit agency may
transform into a regulator, nudging TNCs to provide more accessible and equitable
service through their partnerships.
There is much room for future research in the area of P3s in ridesourcing. With
the recent public offerings of both Lyft and Uber, profitability of the companies will
become more important to stockholders. In addition, the uncertain effect of autonomous
vehicles on the transit industry and TNCs is yet to be seen. Future research on the
viability and long-term results and effects of ridesourcing P3s is needed. A review of
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these partnerships at the national level is needed to compare successes and failures after a
pilot period. The financial and social costs of these P3s need to be analyzed to account
for all costs and benefits (including environmental, social, and economic) to the
passenger, agency, TNC, and the community at-large.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
Public-private partnerships are expected to increase in the U.S. transportation
sector, as public funding for transportation becomes scarcer and the importance of
maintaining and expanding mobility increases. Transportation provision is increasingly
being pushed towards neoliberal policies of competition and efficiency. This research
described and analyzed the use of public-private partnerships in the public transit sector.
The studies provided literature reviews, desktop analyses, and in-depth interviews with
public and private experts and stakeholders. The research investigated innovative
infrastructure delivery of transportation P3s, shared-use rail corridor negotiations and
agreements, and emerging ridesourcing partnerships with transit agencies, using Denver,
Colorado as a case study. The studies together provide examples of opportunities for
engagement of the private sector in the provision of public transportation infrastructure
and service, as well as discusses recommendations for agencies interested in pursuing
such partnerships.
Chapter two discussed several transportation P3s that were a part of RTD’s
FasTracks program to expand the regional rail and bus transit network. The innovative
delivery model of the Eagle P3 was of particular note because it was the first full designbuild-finance-operate-maintain P3 in transit infrastructure in the U.S. The FasTracks P3s
were found to be a model for future transit agencies interested in pursuing private sector
involvement in building out new transit rail lines. Chapter three discussed the shared-use
144

rail corridor agreements and negotiations that developed between private freight rail
companies and public passenger rail agencies, focusing again on the buildout of
FasTracks in freight rail corridors. Chapter four identified examples of pilot partnerships
between transportation network companies, including Uber and Lyft, and public agencies
and discussed the results of Denver area pilot programs. This chapter highlighted the
changing role of the transit agency and the potential benefits and drawbacks of
ridesourcing partnerships.
The research does have some limitations. The case study approach limits the
generalizability and applicability of the results to all situations. However, the case study
approach for this type of research was validated by previous research, especially since the
number of transit P3s in the U.S. is still quite low. This research is most applicable to
cities in North America where the public agencies are in the early stages of P3 adoption
in transportation. It is important to be aware that the private sector actors that were
interviewed tended to stick to the “company line,” and private companies are constantly
marketing themselves and thinking of the public relations angle that will be reflected
through their interviews. The data collection and analysis for the FasTracks P3s took
place prior to all the lines being in revenue service. Although the study was updated with
ridership numbers since the lines opened, the interviews should be taken as a snapshot in
time and may not represent current sentiment of all interviewees.
Defining a public-private partnership
The individual research projects provided analyses of P3s in specific and diverse
contexts including the role of the private sector in transit infrastructure provision and
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financing, private land acquisition for transit infrastructure, and transit service provision.
When taken together, the research did reveal several overarching themes. The definition
of a public-private partnership and the benefits of a P3 are context specific and evolving.
P3s in transit that include private financing mechanisms are fairly new in the U.S. (see
chapter two). The Eagle P3 rail line in Denver was the first full transit DBFOM in the
states. This research showed that increasingly for infrastructure P3s, the private sector is
expected to bring equity to the partnership and financing of the P3 is what is considered
innovative. But there is a substantial difference between partnering to building
something, such as the Eagle P3 rail line, and partnering to provide a service. The
concept of what a P3 is has changed, since it was once innovative to “partner” with a
private company to design and build transportation infrastructure through the design-bidbuild (DBB) process, and now this process is considered the status quo. “A simplified
definition [of a P3] is transfer of risk, from public to private, private to public (interview,
2018)” where the best entity to take on risk will do so (see Chapter 2). For example, a
public agency may take on the risk of public utilities location and relocation in an
infrastructure project, while the private agency would take on the risk of construction or
design malfunction.
P3s with a TNC, however, are still in the stages of pilot programs, and the
benefits of these partnerships to the public sector are yet to be fully explored. But risk
transference is rarely the reason to engage in transit service P3s. Transit agencies often
seek out these innovative partnerships with TNCs in order to expand service in less dense
areas or improve the quality of transit service they can provide.
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The differences between contracting and partnering with the private sector is an
important distinction since the P3 label signifies a certain level of innovation and
efficiency that contracting does not. The fundamental question is: Is there really a
difference between contracting and a public private partnership? For example in the
shared-use rail corridor partnerships between private freight rail companies and public
transit agencies, the transit agency pays the freight rail company to utilize their ROW,
share tracks, or purchase land to operate their trains. This could be called merely a
contract, payment for services or land. But the private freight rail company does not have
to enter into an agreement. They are not bidding on a contract. They tend to view it as a
partnership, meaning it is mutually beneficial and for the public interest. Similar
distinctions can be made in contracting with a TNC versus creating a partnership. It is
difficult to develop a side-by-side comparison of such different partnership contexts.
Changing role of the transit agency
This research is significant because it addresses the question asked by Bruun and
Givoni (2015): what kinds of governance work for transport systems? Bruun and Givoni
(2015) state that with new innovations, like carsharing and ridehailing, there are great
opportunities, but also risk. Chapter 4 addressed the innovative partnerships between
transit agencies and ridesourcing companies and finds that the role of the transit agency
could serve to help mitigate some of the risk of such partnerships with the private sector.
The changing role of the transit agency became a focus of many of the interviews
because it is the likely public partner in most of these transportation P3s. The transit
agency’s identity is changing to become more of a mobility integrator rather than just a
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bus and rail operator. With more mobility options, the transit agency has a choice to
maintain the status quo or evolve to keep up with competition and customer preferences.
RTD’s partnerships with the private sector in the TREX light rail project and the Eagle
P3 project changed the way the agency approached building capital infrastructure
projects. It had to relinquish some control over the design and building of these projects
in order to achieve the cost and time saving benefits of the private sector. RTD is
beginning to embrace its role as supervisor and integrator rather than builder and operator
of transportation options in the region.
The transit agency’s role may evolve to being a “watchdog” for private mobility
operators to ensure that environmental and social justice is being maintained through the
private transit provision. If the transit agency ends up contracting out more of its service
operations or using TNCs or other private operators to enhance their mobility offerings,
the agency will need to serve as the regulator to ensure proper adherence to industry
guidelines and institutional requirements. The agency’s influence over the private sector
will increase, and it can use its power as a liaison with the federal government (which
provides funding opportunities) to steer private companies into compliance with federal
mandates and focus more on the social service aspect of transportation. In addition, the
transit agency may have the opportunity to address local social needs such as requiring a
TNC to operate in an underserved geographic area or subsidizing rides for lower-income
people just as they currently subsidize rides on their buses and trains. Some issues of
concern with partnering with TNCs such as driver wages and the availability of
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accessible vehicles can be overcome if the agency takes on the role of industry watchdog
and technology and mobility integrator.
Transport geography and future research
Transportation geographers today conduct a good deal of research on how to
solve the problems created by automobility: congestion, fatalities, pollution, social
exclusion, etc. We have reached a pivotal time in history where technology advancement
and the pace of mobility growth are converging to create a sweeping change in the
transportation landscape. One of the biggest potential advances in technology is
automated and connected vehicles (AVs). Ridesourcing companies are betting on the
technology to lower their labor costs and finally produce a profit for shareholders.
Transport geographers have experience studying the spatial interactions of multiple
modes and their interaction with human behavior as well as forecasting the changes in the
transportation network that technology can bring. Connected and autonomous vehicles
are likely to usher society into the next transportation epoch, but the full impacts and
consequences have yet to be determined. Geographers must stay at the front lines of this
burgeoning technology, influencing policy and practice, and studying the impacts of AVs
on public transit.
Increasingly, transport geographers, planners, and policymakers are looking for
solutions to congestion, population growth, access, and pollutions through a modal shift
to more active modes as well as transit. Sustainable transport theory argues that
environmental costs should be included in cost-benefit analyses and investment in
sustainable transportation should be encouraged for longer-term economic development
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(Black, 2010). Transport researchers must keep sustainability at the forefront of
transportation discussions. Geographers look at the spatial aspects of transport, and this
should include the spatial aspects of mobility equity and carbon emissions produced from
the transport sector.
Neoliberalism in transportation has grown, and public transit has not been
immune to the call to turn to the private sector for more efficiency and cost savings.
Public transit was once seen as a public service for the common good, and agencies need
to maintain their authority in providing mobility to all citizens. A recent opinion piece in
the New York Times that discussed P3s with ridesourcing companies stated that “risks of
privatization are grave,” and these companies could draw people away from public
transport all together, especially more elite and well-off people, which in turn would
undermine financial support for public transit (Kim, 2019). In addition, the negative
impacts of heavy reliance on ridesourcing such as congestion and pollution are significant
externalities that should be at the forefront of partnership discussions. Public transit
agencies strive to be transparent and are held accountable by their public constituents.
Partnerships with TNCs could improve mobility and lower costs for one segment of the
population, but at what other environmental and equity costs? This question is
fundamental to measuring and assessing the impacts of ridesourcing in a city, and must
be taken into account by public agencies seeking such partnerships. In any P3 that the
transit agency enters into, it is paramount that it uses its position to ensure that public
interests are being protected through the partnership.
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As shown in the case studies in Chapter 4, TNCs could help solve the first and
last mile problem, eliminate expensive paratransit and call-n-ride services, and fill in
spatial and time gaps in the transit network, but they also introduce other negative
externalities. One solution to leveraging ridesourcing benefits and reducing the negative
externalities of deadhead, overhead, and chauffeured single-occupancy vehicles is the
mobility hub. Mobility hubs typically include access to bike and car sharing near a high
frequency bus or rail stop, harnessing the value of the growing shared economy. Placing
multiple users in one place increases the opportunities for shared TNC rides, such as
UberPool and LyftLine. The mobility hub allows TNCs to better complement and
enhance public transit. Bringing in the private sector through public-private partnerships
(P3s) with TNCs could help achieve innovation and efficiency in the mobility hub. Public
agencies have the opportunity to engage with TNCs to ensure that the benefits of
ridesourcing are shared widely and equitably with all potential users and help to
encourage transit rather than threaten it (Feigon and Murphy, 2016; Kuhr, 2017).
Partnerships with TNCs would need to result in lowering the cost of ridesourcing to make
them a viable option for first and last mile connections, which could be done by the
transit agency subsidizing fares or creating an incentive or preferred partner status for a
specific TNC company. Partnership in the mobility hubs also generates large pools of
customers, thereby maximizing ridematching rates and resulting in lower fares.
Transport geographers are grappling with how to sift through the ever increasing
“big data” and best use it for policy and decision-making. Mobile phones and ubiquitous
GPS technology provide 24-hour access to people’s movements and travel, resulting in
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huge spatial data sets for geographers to wade through. The full potential of this data
have not yet been realized, but the availability of new data is likely to spur new
applications and methods to answer transportation research questions. Much of this data
collection relies on data sharing between public agencies, the private sector, and
community or institutional stakeholders. An integrated smart card that can be used for all
modes is the best way to gather data about individual users and their trips. Using one card
for all modes allows you to track multimodal trips and trip chaining and spatially analyze
the movement of users within the hub and the city. Data sharing agreements with TNCs
can be included as a part of a preferred partnership with transit or in exchange for
providing pick up and drop off zones at the hub. As more data becomes available from
ridesourcing companies, statistical and spatial analysis can be used to more quantitatively
measure the impact of partnerships on people’s mobility and accessibility in order to
more fully assess costs and benefits of service provision partnerships. This research
shows that although P3s have been used to a lesser extent in the U.S., they are practical
and possible in the context of growing private sector participation in transportation. The
research presented in chapter 2 on transit infrastructure P3s in Denver showed that like
other international P3 studies, the benefits P3s in the Denver case studies were lower
costs, on-time completion, and transference of appropriate risks.
Additional future research in transportation infrastructure P3s should include a
national comparative study across several cities to analyze P3 applications, agreements,
and results in various contexts. Analysis of the full life cycle of an infrastructure P3 such
as the Eagle P3 is required to determine whether such long-term concession agreements
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end up being a good deal for the public agency and taxpayers. An analysis of the risk
transfer in agreements like the Eagle P3 and U.S. 36 toll road is also necessary. A followup study is warranted to determine, in light of recent court filings and operations issues, if
the Denver model of P3s in transport infrastructure can still be seen as a model for other
agencies and cities interested in pursuing private sector involvement in infrastructure
provision.
Future growth in shared-use rail corridors is likely to increase. Future research on
the operations and maintenance agreements of both shared-use rail corridors and rail
transit service provision should be undertaken to see how effective negotiated agreements
were in anticipating future costs and needs of each party. Several past CDOT studies
pointed to the Front Range corridor as the next feasible expansion of rail in Colorado, and
the state legislature has now funded a Front Range Rail Passenger Commission to study
the possibility of building different levels of service in this corridor. The Front Range
corridor will require close collaboration and planning with the host railroads, and future
research could help determine the best way to begin service and property acquisition.
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Appendix A
Survey instrument Paper 1
Interview Questions
1.
Which of the following categories best describes your current affiliation:
Transit agency
_____
Private contractor
_____
Local Government
_____
State Government
_____
Federal Government
_____
Business community
_____
Non-profit advocacy organization _____
General public
_____
Other (please specify)
_____________________________________________
2.

Please rate your level of familiarity with each of the following public-private
partnership (PPP) projects in the Denver area:
Eagle P-3
Extremely
Familiar

____

Generally
Familiar ____

Somewhat
Familiar ____

Not
Familiar ____

Generally
Familiar ____

Somewhat
Familiar ____

Not
Familiar ____

Denver Union Station
Extremely
Familiar

____

US 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Extremely
Familiar

____

Generally
Familiar ____

Somewhat
Familiar ____

Not
Familiar ____

____

Generally
Familiar ____

Somewhat
Familiar ____

Not
Familiar ____

Generally
Familiar ____

Somewhat
Familiar ____

Not
Familiar ____

I-225 Line
Extremely
Familiar

North Metro Line
Extremely
Familiar

____

Additional comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
3.
How would you rate each of these projects based on how effectively they address
transportation needs in the Denver region:
Eagle P-3
Extremely
Generally
Effective ____ Effective ____

Fairly
Effective ____

Fairly
Ineffective ____
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Generally
Ineffective ____

Extremely
Ineffective _

Denver Union Station
Extremely
Generally
Effective ____ Effective ____

Fairly
Effective ____

Fairly
Ineffective ____

Generally
Ineffective ____

Extremely
Ineffective _

Fairly
Effective ____

Fairly
Ineffective ____

Generally
Ineffective ____

Extremely
Ineffective _

Fairly
Effective ____

Fairly
Ineffective ____

Generally
Ineffective ____

Extremely
Ineffective _

Fairly
Effective ____

Fairly
Ineffective ____

Generally
Ineffective ____

Extremely
Ineffective _

US 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Extremely
Generally
Effective ____ Effective ____

I-225 Line
Extremely
Generally
Effective ____ Effective ____

North Metro Line
Extremely
Generally
Effective ____ Effective ____

_

Additional comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
4.
How would you rate each of these projects based on their financial benefit for the
Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD):
Eagle P-3
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Denver Union Station
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

US 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

I-225 Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

North Metro Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Additional comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
5.
How would you rate each of these projects based on their financial benefit for the
private consortium involved in each project:
Eagle P-3
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Denver Union Station
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

US 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

I-225 Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

North Metro Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____
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Additional comments:
________________________________________________________________________
6.
How would you rate each of these projects based on their financial and social
benefits for the Denver community at-large:
Eagle P-3
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Denver Union Station
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

US 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

I-225 Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

North Metro Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Additional comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
7.
How would you rate each of these projects based on the level of information
provided to the general public about these projects:
Eagle P-3
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Denver Union Station
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

US 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

I-225 Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

North Metro Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Additional comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
8.

How would you rate each of these projects based on its contribution to stronger
regional collaboration:

Eagle P-3
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Denver Union Station
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____
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US 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

I-225 Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

North Metro Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Additional comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
9.
Overall, how would you rate the success of each of these projects thus far:
Eagle P-3
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Fairly
Favorable ____

Fairly
Generally
Extremely
Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable ____ Unfavorable

Denver Union Station
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

US 36 Bus Rapid Transit
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

I-225 Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

North Metro Line
Extremely
Generally
Favorable ____ Favorable ____

Additional comments:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
10.
How far do you agree or disagree with the following statements about transit
public-private partnerships (circle your response as follows: 1=Strongly Agree /
2=Agree / 3=Neutral / 4=Disagree / 5=Strongly Disagree).
Such partnerships ….
(1) Reduce the financial burden on local taxpayers:

1/2/3/4/5

(2) Reduce public risk for major infrastructure projects:

1/2/3/4/5

(3) Transfer most of the burden to the private sector:

1/2/3/4/5

(4) Transfer most of the risk to the private sector:

1/2/3/4/5

(5) Spread the financial burden equitably between the
public and private sectors:

1/2/3/4/5

(6) Spread the risk equitably between the public and private sectors: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5
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(7) Make the local economy too dependent on federal funding:

1/2/3/4/5

(8) Make the local economy too dependent upon global investors:

1/2/3/4/5

(9) Enhance the delivery of major infrastructure projects:

1/2/3/4/5

(10) Reduce local public accountability for key infrastructure:

1/2/3/4/5

(11) Foster regional collaboration:

1/2/3/4/5

Additional comments on any or all of the above:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
11.

Overall, what in your view are the major benefits of these public-private
partnerships?
(1) ________________________________________________________________
(2) ________________________________________________________________
(3) __________________________________________________________________

12.

Likewise, what are their major shortcomings?

(1) ________________________________________________________________
(2) __________________________________________________________________
(3) __________________________________________________________________
13.
To what extent do you feel that these transit public-private partnerships in Denver
could serve as a model for other regions seeking to expand their transit
infrastructure? Please be specific in explaining why or why not these PPPs could
serve as a model.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________
(For transit agency and other respondents)
1. If you could choose whether these projects would be conducted as PPPs or
conducted by the transit agency alone, which would you prefer and why?
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
2. What elements, if any, in these PPP contracts provide assurances that the greater
public interest is being protected?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________
3. Do you know what the debt burden will be? Is there a danger that PPP
instruments will deliberately be bankrupted and stick the public with a huge tab?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________
14.

Please provide any additional comments about the public-private partnerships
mentioned in this survey.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________

Thank you for your time and input!
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